Terror networks and trade: Does the neighbor hurt?
1
Université Paris-Saclay
2 RITM - Réseaux Innovation Territoires et Mondialisation
3 CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
4 LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [UMR7322]
5 CEPII - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales
6 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
7 PSE - Paris School of Economics
8 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
9 PUC RIO - PUC RIO
2 RITM - Réseaux Innovation Territoires et Mondialisation
3 CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
4 LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [UMR7322]
5 CEPII - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales
6 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
7 PSE - Paris School of Economics
8 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
9 PUC RIO - PUC RIO
José de Sousa
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1296009
- IdHAL : jdesousa
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8130-2331
Daniel Mirza
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 938164
Thierry Verdier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 737748
- IdHAL : thierry-verdier
- IdRef : 035502037
Résumé
This paper studies how network-related terrorism redistributes trade flows across countries, including those countries that are not a direct source of terror. We first develop a game theoretical framework with imperfect information on the spatial location of transnational terrorism to show how the resulting security measures produce a non-monotonic effect on the distribution of trade across countries. Neighbors adjacent to terror, even when they do not source it, have trade reduced through enhanced security measures, while countries farther away benefit from those security measures. Second, to empirically assess the distortional effects of terrorism on trade, we first estimate the structural gravity equation derived from our theory. Then, armed with the estimates of the partial effect of neighbor terror on bilateral trade, we perform a counterfactual experiment and confirm the non-monotonic general equilibrium effect of neighbor terror on trade.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Terror networks and trade: Does the neighbor hurt?
|
Résumé |
en
This paper studies how network-related terrorism redistributes trade flows across countries, including those countries that are not a direct source of terror. We first develop a game theoretical framework with imperfect information on the spatial location of transnational terrorism to show how the resulting security measures produce a non-monotonic effect on the distribution of trade across countries. Neighbors adjacent to terror, even when they do not source it, have trade reduced through enhanced security measures, while countries farther away benefit from those security measures. Second, to empirically assess the distortional effects of terrorism on trade, we first estimate the structural gravity equation derived from our theory. Then, armed with the estimates of the partial effect of neighbor terror on bilateral trade, we perform a counterfactual experiment and confirm the non-monotonic general equilibrium effect of neighbor terror on trade.
|
Auteur(s) |
José de Sousa
1, 2, 3
, Daniel Mirza
4, 5
, Thierry Verdier
6, 7, 8, 9
1
Université Paris-Saclay
( 419361 )
- Bâtiment Bréguet, 3 Rue Joliot Curie 2e ét, 91190 Gif-sur-Yvette
- France
2
RITM -
Réseaux Innovation Territoires et Mondialisation
( 243551 )
- Université Paris-Sud, Faculté Droit Economie Gestion Jean Monnet 54 boulevard Desgranges 92331 SCEAUX Cedex
- France
3
CREST -
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
( 2579 )
- 5, Avenue Henry Le Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau
- France
4
LEO -
Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [UMR7322]
( 199945 )
- Université d'Orléans - UFR Droit Economie Gestion - Rue de Blois - BP 26739 - 45067 ORLÉANS Cedex 2
- France
5
CEPII -
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales
( 39083 )
- 9 rue Georges Pitard - 75740 Paris Cedex 15
- France
6
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
7
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
8
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1171428 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
9
PUC RIO -
PUC RIO
( 507112 )
- Brésil
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2018-08
|
Volume |
107
|
Page/Identifiant |
27 - 56
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Terrorism, Trade, Security
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.05.001 |
UT key WOS | 000441492500002 |
Loading...