Education and Military Rivalry
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
2 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
3 Collège de France - Chaire Economie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance
4 LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science
5 Stockholm University
6 CIFAR
7 OCDE - Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
2 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
3 Collège de France - Chaire Economie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance
4 LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science
5 Stockholm University
6 CIFAR
7 OCDE - Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Résumé
What makes countries engage in reforms of mass education? Motivated by historical evidence on the relation between military threats and expansions of primary education, we assemble a panel dataset from the last 150 years in European countries and from the postwar period in a large set of countries. We uncover three stylized facts: (i) investments in education are associated with military threats, (ii) democratic institutions are negatively correlated with education investments, and (iii) education investments respond more strongly to military threats in democracies. These patterns continue to hold when we exploit rivalries in a country’s neighborhood as an alternative source of variation. We develop a theoretical model that rationalizes the three empirical findings. The model has an additional prediction about investments in physical infrastructures, which finds support in the data.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
What makes countries engage in reforms of mass education? Motivated by historical evidence on the relation between military threats and expansions of primary education, we assemble a panel dataset from the last 150 years in European countries and from the postwar period in a large set of countries. We uncover three stylized facts: (i) investments in education are associated with military threats, (ii) democratic institutions are negatively correlated with education investments, and (iii) education investments respond more strongly to military threats in democracies. These patterns continue to hold when we exploit rivalries in a country’s neighborhood as an alternative source of variation. We develop a theoretical model that rationalizes the three empirical findings. The model has an additional prediction about investments in physical infrastructures, which finds support in the data.
|
Titre |
en
Education and Military Rivalry
|
Auteur(s) |
Philippe Aghion
1, 2, 3
, Xavier Jaravel
4
, Torsten Persson
5, 6
, Dorothée Rouzet
7
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1171428 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
Collège de France - Chaire Economie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance
( 1043633 )
- 11 place Marcelin Berthelot F-75231 Paris Cedex 05
- France
4
LSE -
London School of Economics and Political Science
( 328453 )
- Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
- Royaume-Uni
5
Stockholm University
( 300563 )
- SE-106 91 Stockholm
- Suède
6
CIFAR
( 543771 )
- MaRS Centre, West Tower
661 University Ave.,
Suite 505 , Toronto, ON
M5G 1M1
- Canada
7
OCDE -
Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
( 310903 )
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
2, rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2019-04
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.1093/jeea/jvy022 |
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