Sincere voting, strategic voting : A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems
Antoinette Baujard
(1)
,
Herrade Igersheim
(2)
,
Frédéric Gavrel
(3)
,
Jean-François Laslier
(4)
,
Isabelle Lebon
(3)
Antoinette Baujard
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1200569
- IdHAL : antoinette-baujard
- ORCID : 0000-0002-4156-7527
Herrade Igersheim
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 750688
- IdHAL : herrade-igersheim
Jean-François Laslier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 10499
- IdHAL : jean-francois-laslier
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8334-1350
- IdRef : 069975124
Isabelle Lebon
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 173322
- IdHAL : isabelle-lebon
- ORCID : 0000-0003-4516-6736
- IdRef : 07907071X
Résumé
Strategic voting is classically defined as voting for one’s second preferred option to prevent one’s least preferred option from winning when one’s first preference has no chance. Voters want their votes to be effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election is undesirable. Thus, some voters cast strategic ballots when they decide that doing so is useful.This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom, providing a conceptual framework for understanding strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with at least three candidates and a single winner. This situation is more common in electoral systems that have single-member districts that employ plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered elections in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by taking into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two-round elections, and mixed electoral systems.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Chapitre d'ouvrage |
Titre |
en
Sincere voting, strategic voting : A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems
|
Résumé |
en
Strategic voting is classically defined as voting for one’s second preferred option to prevent one’s least preferred option from winning when one’s first preference has no chance. Voters want their votes to be effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election is undesirable. Thus, some voters cast strategic ballots when they decide that doing so is useful.This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom, providing a conceptual framework for understanding strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with at least three candidates and a single winner. This situation is more common in electoral systems that have single-member districts that employ plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered elections in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by taking into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two-round elections, and mixed electoral systems.
|
Auteur(s) |
Antoinette Baujard
1
, Herrade Igersheim
2
, Frédéric Gavrel
3
, Jean-François Laslier
4
, Isabelle Lebon
3
1
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
2
BETA -
Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 93745 )
- Université de Lorraine, UFR Droit Sciences Economiques et Gestion, 13 place Carnot CO 70026, 54035 Nancy Cedex
Université de Strasbourg, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 67085 Strasbourg Cedex
- France
3
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
4
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
ISBN |
978-0-472-13102-0
|
Date de publication |
2018
|
Titre de l'ouvrage |
The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Numéro |
Chapitre 10
|
Lieu de publication |
Michigan
|
Page/Identifiant |
203-231
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Éditeur commercial |
|
Éditeur scientifique |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Elections, Strategic, Laboratory experiment, Proportional system
|
DOI | 10.3998/mpub.9946117 |
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