Referenda Under Oath
Nicolas Jacquemet
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 12676
- IdHAL : nicolas-jacquemet
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5056-9225
- IdRef : 103289860
Stéphane Luchini
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 742445
- IdHAL : stephane-luchini
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2721-0529
- IdRef : 059505621
Jason Shogren
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 848865
Résumé
Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Referenda Under Oath
|
Résumé |
en
Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.
|
Auteur(s) |
Nicolas Jacquemet
1, 2
, Alexander James
3
, Stéphane Luchini
4
, Jason Shogren
5
1
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
University of Oxford
( 302612 )
- Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD
- Royaume-Uni
4
GREQAM -
Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
( 199934 )
- Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, 13236 Marseille cedex 02
- France
5
Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming
( 152417 )
- États-Unis
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date de production/écriture |
2016-04
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2017-07
|
Date de publication électronique |
2016-04-08
|
Volume |
67
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
479-504
|
URL éditeur |
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10640-016-0023-5
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Dichotomous Choice Mechanism, Preference revelation, Oath, Hypothetical bias
|
DOI | 10.1007/s10640-016-0023-5 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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