Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective - HAL Access content directly
Journal articles Economics and Philosophy Year : 2016

Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective

Abstract

Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in 'revealed preference' theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states.
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halshs-01249632, version 1 (21-04-2016)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01249632 , version 1

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Franz Dietrich, Christian List. Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective. Economics and Philosophy, 2016, 32 (2), pp.249-281. ⟨halshs-01249632⟩
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