Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Résumé
We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
|
Résumé |
en
We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
|
Auteur(s) |
Navin Kartik
1
, Olivier Tercieux
2, 3
, Richard Holden
4
1
Columbia University [New York]
( 75524 )
- Columbia University in the City of New York, 2960 Broadway, New York, NY 10027-6902
- États-Unis
2
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
UNSW -
University of New South Wales [Sydney]
( 74661 )
- High St
Kensington, Sydney, NSW 2052
- Australie
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2014-01
|
Volume |
83
|
Page/Identifiant |
284-290
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Behavioral mechanism design, Implementation, Lying costs, Separable domain
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011 |
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