Forced saving, redistribution and non linear social security scheme
Helmuth Cremer
(1, 2, 3, 4)
,
Philippe de Donder
(1, 2, 3)
,
Dario Maldonado
(5)
,
Pierre Pestieau
(6, 7, 8, 9, 10)
1
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
2 IDEI - Institut d'Economie Industrielle
3 GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative
4 IUF - Institut universitaire de France
5 Universidad del Rosario
6 PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
7 PSE - Paris School of Economics
8 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
9 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
10 CREPP - Center of Research in Public Economics and Population Economics
2 IDEI - Institut d'Economie Industrielle
3 GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative
4 IUF - Institut universitaire de France
5 Universidad del Rosario
6 PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
7 PSE - Paris School of Economics
8 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
9 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
10 CREPP - Center of Research in Public Economics and Population Economics
Résumé
This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save "enough" for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types. We show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics: Paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects. Numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving, and the desirability of social security increases.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Forced saving, redistribution and non linear social security scheme
|
Résumé |
en
This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save "enough" for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types. We show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics: Paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects. Numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving, and the desirability of social security increases.
|
Auteur(s) |
Helmuth Cremer
1, 2, 3, 4
, Philippe de Donder
1, 2, 3
, Dario Maldonado
5
, Pierre Pestieau
6, 7, 8, 9, 10
1
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
( 93477 )
- Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
- France
2
IDEI -
Institut d'Economie Industrielle
( 199449 )
- Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 allée de Brienne 31015 Toulouse Cedex 6
- France
3
GREMAQ -
Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative
( 744 )
- manufacture des tabacs - bat. F 21 Allée de Brienne 31000 TOULOUSE
- France
4
IUF -
Institut universitaire de France
( 56663 )
- Maison des Universités 103 Boulevard Saint-Michel 75005 Paris
- France
5
Universidad del Rosario
( 217040 )
- Colombie
6
PJSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1312 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
7
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
8
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
9
CORE -
Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
( 48233 )
- 34, Voie du Roman Pays B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
- Belgique
10
CREPP -
Center of Research in Public Economics and Population Economics
( 143557 )
- Belgique
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2009-07
|
Volume |
76
|
Numéro |
1
|
Page/Identifiant |
86-98
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
|
Version du document |
version éditeur
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Voir aussi |
|
Indexation contrôlée |
|
DOI | 10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.86 |
ProdINRA | 316722 |
UT key WOS | 000268370300006 |
Origine :
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