Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Pré-publication, Document de travail |
Résumé |
en
This paper demonstrates, through a controlled experiment, that the “Laffer curve” phenomenon does not always reflect a conventional income - leisure trade-off. Whether out of reason or out of emotion, taxpayers may also be willing to punish intentionally unfair tax setters by working less than they would under the same exogenous circumstances. We conduct a real effort experiment in which a player A (the "tax receiver") is matched with a player B (the "worker") to elicit the conditions under which tax revenues will increase under a certain threshold and decrease thereafter. We ran four different treatments by manipulating work opportunities and the power to tax. Consistent with the history of tax revolts, the working partner overreacts to the perceived unfairness of taxation when the tax rate exceeds 50%, most strongly so in the high effort treatment. With two types of players, selfish and empathic, our model predicts the emergence of a social norm of fairness under asymmetric information, and elicits the optimal and emotional patterns of punishments and rewards consistent with the norm's enforcement. The social norm allows players to coordinate tacitly on a “focal equilibrium”, which offers a solution to the indeterminacy raised by the Folk theorem for infinitely-repeated games and a behavioral justification for the tit-for-tat strategy. The social norm of fairness enhances productive efficiency in the long run.
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Titre |
en
A Behavioral Laffer Curve: Emergence of a Social Norm of Fairness in a Real Effort Experiment
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Auteur(s)
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Louis Lévy-Garboua
1, 2, 3, 4
, David Masclet
3, 4, 5
, Claude Montmarquette
3, 4, 6
1
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne UMR8174 ( 7550 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR8174 ( 441569 )
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement ( 577435 )
3
CIRANO
( 25390 )
- 2020, rue University, Montréal, Québec, H3A 2A5
- Canada
-
Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en ANalyse des Organisations ( 308206 )
4
CIRANO -
Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations
( 37218 )
- 2020, rue University, 25e étage Montréal, Québec, H3A 2A5
- Canada
-
Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal ( 360045 )
5
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
-
Université de Caen Normandie ( 7127 )
;
-
Normandie Université ( 455934 )
;
-
Université de Rennes ( 105160 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR6211 ( 441569 )
6
Université de Montréal - Département de Sciences Economique
( 39903 )
- Département de Sciences Économiques Université de Montréal, CP 6128 Succ. Centre-ville, Montréal (Québec), Canada, H3C 3J7.
- Canada
-
Université de Montréal ( 302452 )
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Classification |
Classification JEL: C72 C91 H30 J22 Classification PsycINFO : 2360 2960 3040
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
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Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Psychologie
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Sciences cognitives/Psychologie
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Mots-clés |
en
social norms and sanctions, fairness and efficiency, experimental economics, emotions, Taxation and labor supply, Laffer curve, informational asymmetry, emotions.
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