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Preprints Working Papers ... Year : 2012

Solving the Yitzhaki Paradox: Income Tax Evasion and Reference Dependence under Prospect Theory

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of tax evasion under prospect theory. For prospect theory, reference dependence is a fundamental element (the utility function depends on gains and losses relative to a reference point and not on final wealths as in expected utility theory). In order to identify the determinants of the income tax evasion decision, a general reference income is used. We show that results obtained under expected utility theory are not robust. In particular, tax evasion is increasing in the tax rate as soon as a suitable relative risk aversion measure is larger with auditing, than without. With this simple and testable condition, prospect theory provides a general framework consistent with empirical evidence for the tax evasion behaviour problem.
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halshs-00793664, version 1 (22-02-2013)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00793664 , version 1

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Gwenola Trotin. Solving the Yitzhaki Paradox: Income Tax Evasion and Reference Dependence under Prospect Theory. 2012. ⟨halshs-00793664⟩
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Last update date on 5/26/24
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