Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games

Francis Bloch (1, 2) , Annevan den Nouwelandb (3)

1 PSE - Paris School of Economics
2 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
3 University of Oregon [Eugene]

This paper revisits the analysis of stable sets in two-player strategic-form games. Our two main contributions are (i) to establish a connection between myopic stable sets and the stable matchings of an auxiliary two-sided matching problem and (ii) to identify a structural property of 2-player games, called “the block partition property,” which helps characterize the strategy profiles that are indirectly dominated by a fixed profile. Our analysis also generalizes and unifies existing results on myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player games.

Mots clés: Strategic-form game; Myopic stable set; Farsighted stable set; Core

Domaines: Economies et finances

Francis Bloch, Annevan den Nouwelandb. Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 130, pp.663-683. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.004⟩. ⟨halshs-03672258⟩