Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath
Jérôme Hergueux
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 932306
- IdHAL : jeromehergueux
- ORCID : 0000-0003-0294-7938
Nicolas Jacquemet
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 12676
- IdHAL : nicolas-jacquemet
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5056-9225
- IdRef : 103289860
Résumé
Public good games are at the core of many environmental challenges. In such social dilemmas, a large share of people endorse the norm of reciprocity. A growing literature complements this finding with the observation that many players exhibit a self-serving bias in reciprocation: "weak reciprocators" increase their contributions as a function of the effort level of the other players, but less than proportionally. In this paper, we build upon a growing literature on truth-telling to argue that weak reciprocity might be best conceived not as a preference, but rather as a symptom of an internal trade-off at the player level between (i) the truthful revelation of their private reciprocal preference, and (ii) the economic incentives they face (which foster free-riding). In truth-telling experiments, many players misrepresent private information when this is to their material benefit, but to a significantly lesser extent than what would be expected based on the profit-maximizing strategy. We apply this behavioral insight to strategic situations, and test whether the preference revelation properties of the classic voluntary contribution game can be improved by offering players the possibility to sign a classic truth-telling oath. Our results suggest that the honesty oath helps increase cooperation (by 33% in our experiment). Subjects under oath contribute in a way which is more consistent with (i) the contribution they expect from the other players and (ii) their normative views about the right contribution level. As a result, the distribution of social types elicited under oath differs from the one observed in the baseline: some free-riders, and many weak reciprocators, now behave as pure reciprocators.
Format du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath
|
Résumé |
en
Public good games are at the core of many environmental challenges. In such social dilemmas, a large share of people endorse the norm of reciprocity. A growing literature complements this finding with the observation that many players exhibit a self-serving bias in reciprocation: "weak reciprocators" increase their contributions as a function of the effort level of the other players, but less than proportionally. In this paper, we build upon a growing literature on truth-telling to argue that weak reciprocity might be best conceived not as a preference, but rather as a symptom of an internal trade-off at the player level between (i) the truthful revelation of their private reciprocal preference, and (ii) the economic incentives they face (which foster free-riding). In truth-telling experiments, many players misrepresent private information when this is to their material benefit, but to a significantly lesser extent than what would be expected based on the profit-maximizing strategy. We apply this behavioral insight to strategic situations, and test whether the preference revelation properties of the classic voluntary contribution game can be improved by offering players the possibility to sign a classic truth-telling oath. Our results suggest that the honesty oath helps increase cooperation (by 33% in our experiment). Subjects under oath contribute in a way which is more consistent with (i) the contribution they expect from the other players and (ii) their normative views about the right contribution level. As a result, the distribution of social types elicited under oath differs from the one observed in the baseline: some free-riders, and many weak reciprocators, now behave as pure reciprocators.
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Auteur(s) |
Jérôme Hergueux
1, 2
, Nicolas Jacquemet
3, 4
, Stéphane Luchini
5
, Jason Shogren
6
1
BETA -
Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 1001961 )
- Université de Lorraine, UFR Droit Sciences Economiques et Gestion, 13 place Carnot CO 70026, 54035 Nancy Cedex
Université de Strasbourg, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 67085 Strasbourg Cedex
- France
2
D-GESS -
Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences [ETH Zürich]
( 545393 )
- Haldeneggsteig 4, 8006 Zürich
- Suisse
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
5
AMSE -
Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
( 526949 )
- 5-9 Boulevard Bourdet
CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
- France
6
UW -
University of Wyoming
( 303412 )
- 1000 E. University Ave. Laramie, WY 82071
- États-Unis
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URL éditeur |
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10640-021-00641-2
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Nom de la revue |
|
Licence |
Paternité
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Vulgarisation |
Non
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
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Audience |
Internationale
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Date de publication |
2022-03
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Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Volume |
81
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
591-616
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Date de publication électronique |
2022-01-24
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Projet(s) ANR |
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Financement |
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Domaine(s) |
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Référence interne |
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Truth-telling oath, Public goods, Social preferences, Reciprocity, Cooperation
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DOI | 10.1007/s10640-021-00641-2 |
UT key WOS | 000745753700001 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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