Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching

Abstract : Top trading cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03029897
Contributor : Caroline Bauer <>
Submitted on : Sunday, November 29, 2020 - 2:46:03 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 19, 2021 - 11:09:06 AM

Identifiers

Citation

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, Olivier Tercieux. Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching. American Economic Review: Insights, 2020, 2 (4), pp.425-442. ⟨10.1257/aeri.20190307⟩. ⟨halshs-03029897⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

39