Preferences over income distribution: Evidence from a choice experiment
Max Lobeck
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1113665
- ORCID : 0000-0002-3131-0787
- IdRef : 260036862
Claudia Senik
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 743549
- IdHAL : claudia-senik
- ORCID : 0000-0001-6236-9389
- IdRef : 035112328
Thierry Verdier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 737748
- IdHAL : thierry-verdier
- IdRef : 035502037
Résumé
Using a choice experiment in the lab, we assess the relative importance of different attitudes to income inequality. We elicit subjects’ preferences regarding pairs of payoff distributions within small groups, in a firm-like setting. We find that distributions that satisfy the Pareto-dominance criterion attract unanimous suffrage: all subjects prefer larger inequality provided it makes everyone weakly better off. This is true no matter whether payoffs are based on merit or luck. Unanimity only breaks once subjects’ positions within the income distribution are fixed and known ex-ante. Even then, 75% of subjects prefer Pareto-dominant distributions, but 25% of subjects engage in money burning at the top in order to reduce inequality, even when it does not make anyone better off. A majority of subjects embrace a more equal distribution if their own income or overall efficiency is not at stake. When their own income is at stake and the sum of payoffs remains unaffected, 20% of subjects are willing to pay for a lower degree of inequality.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Preferences over income distribution: Evidence from a choice experiment
|
Résumé |
en
Using a choice experiment in the lab, we assess the relative importance of different attitudes to income inequality. We elicit subjects’ preferences regarding pairs of payoff distributions within small groups, in a firm-like setting. We find that distributions that satisfy the Pareto-dominance criterion attract unanimous suffrage: all subjects prefer larger inequality provided it makes everyone weakly better off. This is true no matter whether payoffs are based on merit or luck. Unanimity only breaks once subjects’ positions within the income distribution are fixed and known ex-ante. Even then, 75% of subjects prefer Pareto-dominant distributions, but 25% of subjects engage in money burning at the top in order to reduce inequality, even when it does not make anyone better off. A majority of subjects embrace a more equal distribution if their own income or overall efficiency is not at stake. When their own income is at stake and the sum of payoffs remains unaffected, 20% of subjects are willing to pay for a lower degree of inequality.
|
Auteur(s) |
Sophie Cetre
1
, Max Lobeck
2
, Claudia Senik
2, 3, 4
, Thierry Verdier
2, 3
1
Sciences Po -
Sciences Po
( 301587 )
- 27, rue Saint-Guillaume - 75337 Paris cedex 07
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1171428 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
SU -
Sorbonne Université
( 413221 )
- 21 rue de l’École de médecine - 75006 Paris
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2019-10
|
Volume |
74
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2019.102202 |
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