Evolutionarily stable in-group altruismin intergroup conflict

Guillaume Cheikbossian (1)

1 CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010

We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest, we show that the larger the number of groups competing against one another or the larger the degree of complementarity between individual efforts, the more likely group members are altruistic towards their teammates under preference evolution.

Mots clés: Indirect evolutionary approach; Evolutionary stability; Groups; Altruism; Conflicts

Domaines: Economies et finances

Guillaume Cheikbossian. Evolutionarily stable in-group altruismin intergroup conflict. 2019. ⟨halshs-02291876⟩