Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Pré-publication, Document de travail |
Titre |
en
Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law
|
Résumé |
en
How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group’s value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate, may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.
|
Auteur(s)
|
Roberto Galbiati
1, 2
, Emeric Henry
1, 2
, Nicolas Jacquemet
3, 4
1
ECON -
Département d'économie (Sciences Po)
( 226874 )
- 28 rue des Saints-Pères - 75007 Paris
- France
-
Sciences Po ( 301587 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR 8259 ( 441569 )
2
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
3
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne UMR8174 ( 7550 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR8174 ( 441569 )
4
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement ( 577435 )
|
Licence |
Paternité - Pas de modifications
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date de production/écriture |
2019-04
|
Commentaire |
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
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C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
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D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
-
K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K49 - Other
-
P - Economic Systems/P.P1 - Capitalist Systems/P.P1.P16 - Political Economy
-
Z - Other Special Topics/Z.Z1 - Cultural Economics • Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology
|
Référence interne |
-
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers No. 2019-06, revised version
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Enforcement, Social values, Cooperation, Learning, Spillovers, Persistence of institutions, Repeated games, Experiments
|
Spire (Sciences Po) |
2441/6unm655ita9ojbuuc83c9h0is8 |