Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Partial Language Competence

Abstract : This paper proposes an equilibrium concept, Language-Based Expectation Equilibrium , which accounts for partial language understanding in sender-receiver cheap talk games. Each player is endowed with a privately known language competence which represents all the messages that he understands. For the messages he does not understand, he has correct but only coarse expectations about the equilibrium strategies of the other player. In general, a language-based expectation equilibrium outcome differs from Nash and communication equilibrium outcomes, but is always a Bayesian solution. Partial language competence of the sender rationalizes information transmission and lies in pure persuasion problems, and facilitates information transmission from a moderately biased sender.
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [23 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01988076
Contributor : Caroline Bauer <>
Submitted on : Monday, January 21, 2019 - 3:05:52 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, July 21, 2020 - 3:37:29 AM

File

wp1906_.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : halshs-01988076, version 1

Collections

Citation

Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler. Partial Language Competence. 2019. ⟨halshs-01988076⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

108

Files downloads

345