On the existence of Pairwise stable weighted networks

Philippe Bich (1, 2) , Lisa Morhaim (3)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics
3 CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit

We provide the existence of pairwise stable weighted networks under assumptions similar to Nash theorem. In particular, contrarily to the case of unweighted networks, the existence of closed improving cycles does not prevent the existence of Pairwise stable weighted networks. Then, we extend our existence result, allowing payoffs to depend on some game-theoretic strategies. Many applications are given.

Mots clés: Pairwise Stable Network; Weighted Network

Domaines: Economies et finances

Philippe Bich, Lisa Morhaim. On the existence of Pairwise stable weighted networks. 2017. ⟨halshs-01564591⟩