Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion

Abstract : This article shows that if an allocation rule can be implemented with unlimited information certification, then it can also be implemented with limited information certification if the designer can use ambiguous communication mechanisms, and if agents are averse to ambiguity in the sense of maxmin expected utility. The reverse implication is true if there is a single agent and a worst outcome.
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Article dans une revue
Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2017, 82 (3), pp.327-339. 〈10.1007/s11238-016-9575-7〉
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01503765
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Soumis le : vendredi 7 avril 2017 - 14:58:57
Dernière modification le : jeudi 13 juillet 2017 - 16:43:27

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Mehdi Ayouni, Frédéric Koessler. Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion. Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2017, 82 (3), pp.327-339. 〈10.1007/s11238-016-9575-7〉. 〈halshs-01503765〉

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