Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
Jeanne Hagenbach
(1)
,
Frédéric Koessler
(2, 3)
Jeanne Hagenbach
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 739711
- IdHAL : jeanne-hagenbach
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2372-8718
- IdRef : 090956958
Frédéric Koessler
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 740979
- IdHAL : frederickoessler
- ORCID : 0000-0001-7707-4217
- IdRef : 059897775
Résumé
We consider a class of coordination games with asymmetric information. Agents have different ideal actions and disclose private information strategically. Complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. We provide conditions on information certifiability for the complete information outcome to be implementable under private and public communication.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
|
Résumé |
en
We consider a class of coordination games with asymmetric information. Agents have different ideal actions and disclose private information strategically. Complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. We provide conditions on information certifiability for the complete information outcome to be implementable under private and public communication.
|
Auteur(s) |
Jeanne Hagenbach
1
, Frédéric Koessler
2, 3
1
X-DEP-ECO -
Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique
( 444480 )
- École Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2016-02
|
Volume |
139
|
Page/Identifiant |
5-7
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Certifiability, Coordination, Information disclosure, Multi-divisional organizations
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.002 |
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