Bargaining through Approval
Matias Nunez
(1)
,
Jean-François Laslier
(2, 3)
Jean-François Laslier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 10499
- IdHAL : jean-francois-laslier
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8334-1350
- IdRef : 069975124
Résumé
The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.
Domaines
Economies et finances| Format du dépôt | Notice |
|---|---|
| Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
| Titre |
en
Bargaining through Approval
|
| Résumé |
en
The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.
|
| Auteur(s) |
Matias Nunez
1
, Jean-François Laslier
2, 3
1
THEMA -
Théorie économique, modélisation et applications
( 10592 )
- 33, boulevard du Port 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
| Langue du document |
Anglais
|
| Nom de la revue |
|
| Vulgarisation |
Non
|
| Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
| Audience |
Internationale
|
| Date de publication |
2015-10
|
| Volume |
60
|
| Page/Identifiant |
63-73
|
| Domaine(s) |
|
| Financement |
|
| Mots-clés |
en
Two-agents, Approval Voting, Partial honesty
|
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015 |
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