Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch

Abstract : In this paper, we propose a new mechanism able to explain the occurrence of credit crunches. Considering a credit market with an asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders, we assume that borrowers have to pay a cost to reveal information on the quality of their project. They decide to be transparent if it is necessary for getting a loan or for paying a lower interest rate. Two types of competitive equilibria may exist: an opaque equilibrium in which all projects receive funding without revealing information; a transparent one in which only the best projects reval information and receive funding. It is also possible to get multiple equilibria. Incorporating this microeconomic mechanism in an OLG model, the economy may experience fluctuations due to the change of regime, and indeterminacy may occur.
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Yuanyuan Li, Bertrand Wigniolle. Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch. 2016. ⟨halshs-01277539⟩

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