Abstract : We consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer
and a retailing network when retailers have private information
and the organization is run through bilateral contracts. We
highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the
manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each
relationship. We characterize the set of allocations robust to such
opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints.
Those constraints limit the manufacturer’s ability to use
yardstick competition among retailers. They simplify contracts and
restore a rent/efficiency trade-off even with correlated information.
We show that sell-out contracts are optimal under a wide range of
circumstances.
Vianney Dequiedt, David Martimort. Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism. The American Economic Review, 2015, 105 (7), pp.1-43. 〈10.1257/aer.20121640〉. 〈halshs-01273256〉
