Oligopoly equilibria ‘à la Stackelberg’ in pure exchange economies

Ludovic Julien (1) , Fabrice Tricou (2)

1 LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion
2 EconomiX - EconomiX

This paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and of strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and the configuration of strategic interactions. In the context of a simple pure exchange economy, asymptotic identification and welfare results are thus obtained, about Stackelberg general equilibria, compared to Cournot general equilibria and to the competitive equilibrium.

Keywords: Oligopoly equilibria; Stackelberg; Economies

Domains: Economics and Finance

Ludovic Julien, Fabrice Tricou. Oligopoly equilibria ‘à la Stackelberg’ in pure exchange economies. Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, 2010, 76 (2), pp.175-194. ⟨10.3917/rel.762.0175⟩. ⟨halshs-01228027⟩