Abstract Economies with Endogenous Sharing Rules

Abstract : Endogenous sharing rules was introduced by Simon and Zame to model payoff indeterminacy in discontinuous games. Their main result concerns the existence of a solution, i.e., a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. This note extends their result to abstract economies where, by definition, players are restricted to pure strategies, and provide an interpretation of Simon and Zame's model in terms of preference incompleteness.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, July 21, 2015 - 4:12:16 PM
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Philippe Bich, Rida Laraki. Abstract Economies with Endogenous Sharing Rules. 2015. ⟨halshs-01179102⟩

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