Pessimistic information gathering
Elisabetta Iossa
(1, 2, 3)
,
David Martimort
(4, 5)
David Martimort
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1043577
- ORCID : 0000-0002-4185-8703
- IdRef : 070009635
Résumé
An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following “good news” with a fixed low-powered option otherwise.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following “good news” with a fixed low-powered option otherwise.
|
Titre |
en
Pessimistic information gathering
|
Auteur(s) |
Elisabetta Iossa
1, 2, 3
, David Martimort
4, 5
1
University of Rome "Tor Vergeta"
( 147967 )
- Italie
2
EconomiX -
EconomiX
( 2564 )
- Bâtiment G
200 Avenue de la République
92001 NANTERRE CEDEX
- France
3
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
4
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
|
Version du document |
version éditeur
|
Page/Identifiant |
75-96
|
Volume |
91
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2015-05
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
Voir aussi |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Information gathering, Moral hazard, Asymmetric information, Pessimism
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.014 |
ProdINRA | 312600 |
UT key WOS | 000356989600007 |
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