Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Pré-publication, Document de travail |
Titre |
en
Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination
|
Résumé |
en
The paper provides a micro-founded differentiated duopoly illustration of a beauty contest, in which the weight put on the strategic vs. the fundamental motive of the payoffs is not exogenous but may be manipulated by the players. We emphasize the role of the competition component of the strategic motive as a source of conflict with the fundamental motive. This conflict, already present in an oligopolistic setting under perfect information, is only exacerbated when information is imperfect and dispersed. We show how firm owners ease such conflict by opting for some cooperation, thus moderating the competitive toughness displayed by their managers. By doing so, they also influence the managers’ strategic concern for coordination and consequently the weight put on public relative to private information.
|
Auteur(s)
|
Camille Cornand
1
, Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira
2
1
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
-
École normale supérieure de Lyon ( 6818 )
;
-
Université Lumière - Lyon 2 ( 33804 )
;
-
Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 ( 194495 )
;
-
Université de Lyon ( 301088 )
;
-
Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne ( 300284 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR5824 ( 441569 )
2
BETA -
Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 93745 )
- Université de Lorraine, UFR Droit Sciences Economiques et Gestion, 13 place Carnot CO 70026, 54035 Nancy Cedex
Université de Strasbourg, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 67085 Strasbourg Cedex
- France
-
Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique UMR1443 ( 92114 )
;
-
Université de Strasbourg ( 199013 )
;
-
Université de Lorraine ( 413289 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR7522 ( 441569 )
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date de production/écriture |
2015
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculations
-
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E1 - General Aggregative Models/E.E1.E12 - Keynes • Keynesian • Post-Keynesian
-
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E4 - Money and Interest Rates/E.E4.E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
-
L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
|
Référence interne |
-
Working paper GATE 2015-01
|
Mots-clés |
en
beauty contest, dispersed information, public information, competition, cooperation, coordination, delegation game, differentiated duopoly, dispersed information JEL codes: D43, D82, L13, L21
|