"Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?
Laurent Lamy
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1332977
- IdRef : 245401423
Résumé
Of primary importance in auction design is the set of strategies available to the seller at the auction stage. We first formalize hold-up regarding entry costs that preys on second-price auctions when the seller may engage in a costly shill-bidding activity. We derive the optimal reserve and show how shill bidding can make posted prices outperforming auctions. Second, we advocate for a new regulation where shills would be banned but with the possibility of canceling sales ex post, which offers some valuable flexibility: the English auction with jump bids implements, then, the first best in general environments.
Domaines
Economies et finances| Format du dépôt | Notice |
|---|---|
| Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
| Titre |
en
"Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?
|
| Résumé |
en
Of primary importance in auction design is the set of strategies available to the seller at the auction stage. We first formalize hold-up regarding entry costs that preys on second-price auctions when the seller may engage in a costly shill-bidding activity. We derive the optimal reserve and show how shill bidding can make posted prices outperforming auctions. Second, we advocate for a new regulation where shills would be banned but with the possibility of canceling sales ex post, which offers some valuable flexibility: the English auction with jump bids implements, then, the first best in general environments.
|
| Auteur(s) |
Laurent Lamy
1, 2
1
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
| Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
| Vulgarisation |
Non
|
| Langue du document |
Anglais
|
| Nom de la revue |
|
| Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
| Date de publication |
2013-06
|
| Volume |
44
|
| Numéro |
2
|
| Page/Identifiant |
194-214
|
| Domaine(s) |
|
| Financement |
|
| Projet(s) ANR |
|
| Mots-clés |
fr
Auction Design
|
| DOI | 10.1111/1756-2171.12017 |
Loading...