Businessman Candidates
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 743571
- IdHAL : ekaterina-zhuravskaya
- ORCID : 0000-0002-3496-2086
- IdRef : 177655267
Résumé
Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that "businessman candidacy" and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for office. When such institutions are weak, businessmen can subvert policy irrespective of whether they hold office, but they may run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials. Evidence from Russian gubernatorial elections supports the model's predictions. Businessman candidates emerge in regions with low media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises. Among regions with weaker institutions, professional politicians crowd out businessmen when the rents from office are especially large.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Businessman Candidates
|
Résumé |
en
Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that "businessman candidacy" and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for office. When such institutions are weak, businessmen can subvert policy irrespective of whether they hold office, but they may run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials. Evidence from Russian gubernatorial elections supports the model's predictions. Businessman candidates emerge in regions with low media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises. Among regions with weaker institutions, professional politicians crowd out businessmen when the rents from office are especially large.
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Auteur(s) |
Scott Gehlbach
1
, Konstantin Sonin
2, 3, 4
, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
2, 5, 6
1
University of Wisconsin-Madison
( 44110 )
- Madison, WI 53706
- États-Unis
2
NES -
New Economic School
( 154522 )
- Suite 1721, Nakhimovskii Prospekt 47, 117418 Moscow
- Russie
3
CEFIR -
Center for Economic and Financial Research
( 143571 )
- Nakhimovsky prospect 47, office 920, 922 & 720, 17418 Moscow
- Russie
4
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
5
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
6
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2010-07
|
Volume |
54
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
718-736
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
|
Version du document |
version éditeur
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Voir aussi |
|
Indexation contrôlée |
|
DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00456.x |
ProdINRA | 316702 |
UT key WOS | 000279020100009 |
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