On "Acquisition of information in Financial Markets"
Christophe Chamley
(1, 2, 3)
Christophe Chamley
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1373011
Résumé
In their paper "Information Acquisition in Financial Markets" (this journal, 2000), Barlevy and Veronesi present a model of a one-period financial market, and claim that for an open set of parameter values, the value of information increases with the mass of informed agents. That claim is shown here to be false. The property of strategic substitution is robust in their model.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
On "Acquisition of information in Financial Markets"
|
Résumé |
en
In their paper "Information Acquisition in Financial Markets" (this journal, 2000), Barlevy and Veronesi present a model of a one-period financial market, and claim that for an open set of parameter values, the value of information increases with the mass of informed agents. That claim is shown here to be false. The property of strategic substitution is robust in their model.
|
Auteur(s) |
Christophe Chamley
1, 2, 3
1
PJSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1312 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
BU -
Boston University [Boston]
( 63395 )
- One Silber Way, Boston, MA 02215
- États-Unis
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2008-12
|
Volume |
75
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Numéro |
4
|
Page/Identifiant |
1081-1084
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00502.x |
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