Mixed Bundling Auctions
Résumé
We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Mixed Bundling Auctions
|
Résumé |
en
We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.
|
Auteur(s) |
Philippe Jehiel
1, 2, 3
, Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn
4
, Benny Moldovanu
4
1
PJSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1312 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
UCL -
University College of London [London]
( 300875 )
- Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT
- Royaume-Uni
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
Universität Bonn = University of Bonn
( 63690 )
- D-53012 Bonn
- Allemagne
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2007-05
|
Volume |
134
|
Numéro |
1
|
Page/Identifiant |
494-512
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Mixed bundling, Auction, Revenue maximization
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.001 |
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