Organized crime, corruption and punishment
Thierry Verdier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 737748
- IdHAL : thierry-verdier
- IdRef : 035502037
Résumé
We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. Indeed, beyond a threshold, further increases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized crime to extend corruption rings, and ensuing impunity results in a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Organized crime, corruption and punishment
|
Résumé |
en
We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. Indeed, beyond a threshold, further increases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized crime to extend corruption rings, and ensuing impunity results in a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime.
|
Auteur(s) |
Maurice Kugler
1
, Thierry Verdier
2, 3
, Yves Zenou
1, 4, 5
1
Departement of Economics
( 215266 )
- Royaume-Uni
2
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
3
DELTA -
Département et Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée
( 25318 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan - 75014 Paris
- France
4
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics
( 215267 )
- Suède
5
GAINS -
Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux
( 198500 )
- Université du Maine - Avenue Olivier Messiaen - 72085 Le Mans cedex 9
- France
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2005-09
|
Volume |
89
|
Numéro |
9-10
|
Page/Identifiant |
1639-1663
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Deterrence, Organized crime, Corruption, Oligopoly, Free entry
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.005 |
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