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Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

Abstract : We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player.
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Olivier Gossner. Simple bounds on the value of a reputation. Econometrica, Econometric Society, 2011, 79 (5), pp.1627-1641. ⟨10.3982/ECTA9385⟩. ⟨halshs-00654683⟩

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