Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool
Louis Lévy-Garboua
(1, 2, 3)
,
Claude Montmarquette
(3)
,
Jonathan Vaksmann
(4)
,
Marie-Claire Villeval
(5)
1
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics
3 CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations
4 GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux
5 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics
3 CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations
4 GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux
5 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
Louis Lévy-Garboua
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 839811
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5232-2699
- IdRef : 059361034
Claude Montmarquette
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 845297
Jonathan Vaksmann
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 839891
- IdRef : 083510869
Marie-Claire Villeval
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 596
- IdHAL : marie-claire-villeval
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8578-5449
- IdRef : 029244730
Résumé
We study mutual-aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution-based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no-insurance equilibrium while contribution-based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a \dual interior equilibrium". That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co-existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool
|
Résumé |
en
We study mutual-aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution-based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no-insurance equilibrium while contribution-based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a \dual interior equilibrium". That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co-existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.
|
Auteur(s) |
Louis Lévy-Garboua
1, 2, 3
, Claude Montmarquette
3
, Jonathan Vaksmann
4
, Marie-Claire Villeval
5
1
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
CIRANO -
Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations
( 37218 )
- 2020, rue University, 25e étage Montréal, Québec, H3A 2A5
- Canada
4
GAINS -
Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux
( 198500 )
- Université du Maine - Avenue Olivier Messiaen - 72085 Le Mans cedex 9
- France
5
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2017-02
|
Date de publication électronique |
2016
|
Volume |
19
|
Numéro |
1
|
Page/Identifiant |
198-218
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
mutual-aid games
|
DOI | 10.1111/jpet.12181 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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