Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Nicolas Jacquemet
(1, 2)
,
Frédéric Koessler
(1, 3)
Nicolas Jacquemet
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 12676
- IdHAL : nicolas-jacquemet
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5056-9225
- IdRef : 103289860
Frédéric Koessler
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 740979
- IdHAL : frederickoessler
- ORCID : 0000-0001-7707-4217
- IdRef : 059897775
Résumé
This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. While the empirical value of information does not always coincide with the theoretical prediction, the qualitative properties of the value of information are satisfied in the laboratory: (i) it is never negative, (ii) it decreases with the number of repetitions, (iii) it is bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game, and (iv) it is bounded above by the value of the one-shot game. In line with the theory, the empirical use of private information is almost complete when it should be, and decreases in longer interactions.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
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Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
|
Résumé |
en
This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. While the empirical value of information does not always coincide with the theoretical prediction, the qualitative properties of the value of information are satisfied in the laboratory: (i) it is never negative, (ii) it decreases with the number of repetitions, (iii) it is bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game, and (iv) it is bounded above by the value of the one-shot game. In line with the theory, the empirical use of private information is almost complete when it should be, and decreases in longer interactions.
|
Auteur(s) |
Nicolas Jacquemet
1, 2
, Frédéric Koessler
1, 3
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
BETA -
Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 93745 )
- Université de Lorraine, UFR Droit Sciences Economiques et Gestion, 13 place Carnot CO 70026, 54035 Nancy Cedex
Université de Strasbourg, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 67085 Strasbourg Cedex
- France
3
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Volume |
78
|
Page/Identifiant |
103-120
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2013-03
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
|
Version du document |
version éditeur
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
Voir aussi |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Indexation contrôlée |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Concealment of information, Laboratory experiments, Value of information, Zero-sum repeated games
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.002 |
ProdINRA | 316329 |
UT key WOS | 000315062500008 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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