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Economic Science and Political Influence
Gilles Saint-Paul 1, 2, 3, 4

When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order infuence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statisticall institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between di¤erent schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and .nally how the attempt to preserve in.uence can lead to degenerative research programs.
1 :  Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) – École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris – Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)
2 :  Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics (EEP-PSE)
Ecole d'Économie de Paris
3 :  Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Toulouse School of Economics
4 :  New York University Abu Dhabi
New York University Abu Dhabi
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economie et finances
Ideology – Macroeconomic Modelling – Self-con.rming equilibria – Polarization  – Autocoherent Models  – Intellectual Competition  – Degenerative Research Programs  – Identification
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