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Economic Science and Political Influence

Gilles Saint-Paul 1, 2, 3, 4

(11/2012)

When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order infuence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statisticall institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between di¤erent schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and .nally how the attempt to preserve in.uence can lead to degenerative research programs.

1 :	Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
	CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] – Ecole des Ponts ParisTech – Ecole normale supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris – Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)
2 :	Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics (EEP-PSE)
	Ecole d'Économie de Paris
3 :	Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
	Toulouse School of Economics
4 :	New York University Abu Dhabi
	New York University Abu Dhabi

Discipline

:

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economie et finances

Mots-Clés : Ideology – Macroeconomic Modelling – Self-con.rming equilibria – Polarization  – Autocoherent Models  – Intellectual Competition  – Degenerative Research Programs  – Identification

halshs-00759057, version 1

http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00759057

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Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>

Soumis le : Jeudi 29 Novembre 2012, 22:00:18

Dernière modification le : Lundi 3 Décembre 2012, 17:21:17