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International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events, Wolfgang Maennig et Andrew Zimbalist (Ed.) (2012) 37-69
The winner's curse: why is the cost of sports mega-events so often underestimated?
Wladimir Andreff 1
(2012)

Auction theory, when the bidders do not know the value of what is auctionned, is used to explain how the Olympic Games are allocated to competing bidding cities. It is a centralized allocation process with asymmetric information which usually comes out with a winner's curse. Various indicators of the latter are proposed and exemplified, the major one being the systematic ex ante underestimation of the Olympics costs.
1 :  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES)
CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne
Axe Développement et mondialisation
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economie et finances
auctions – bids – winner's curse – asymmetric information – cost underestimation – mega sporting events – Olympics
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