Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations

Francis Bloch (1, 2) , Bhaskar Dutta (3)

1 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
2 Ecole Polytechnique
3 University of Warwick [Coventry]

This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalitionproof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.

Mots clés: correlated equilibrium; coalitions; information sharing; games with positive externalities

Domaines: Economies et finances

Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta. Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations. 2006. ⟨halshs-00410457⟩