Endogenous efforts on communication networks under strategic complementarity

Mohamed Belhaj (1) , Frédéric Deroïan (1)

1 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first characterize both dominant and dominated equilibria. Second, we examine the issue of social coordination in order to reduce the social dilemma.

Mots clés: Communication Network; Endogenous Efforts; Strategic Complements

Domaines: Economies et finances

Mohamed Belhaj, Frédéric Deroïan. Endogenous efforts on communication networks under strategic complementarity. 2008. ⟨halshs-00339159⟩