Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation

Nicolas Jacquemet (1)

1 GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game : Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces con°icting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players settings. We set up two experiments varying in the exogeneity of the delegation relationship. The experimental evidence supports the delegation effect. This, in turn, could account for the deterrence effect of wage on corruption even in the absence of detection.

Mots clés: corruption; enforcement; principal-agent relationship; reciprocity

Mots clés: réciprocité; relation principal-agent; salaire d'efficience

Domaines: Economies et finances

Nicolas Jacquemet. Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation. 2005. ⟨halshs-00180044⟩