The economic drivers of public support for the european union : an empirical analysis on survey data

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THESE

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LES DETERMINANTS ECONOMIQUES DU SOUTIEN A L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE:
UNE ANALYSE EMPIRIQUE SUR DONNEES DE SONDAGE

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PLAN DE THESE

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INTRODUCTION GENERALE

Un rapide historique du lien entre intégration européenne et opinion publique permet de délimiter trois périodes distinctes. Dans la première phase de la construction européenne, le soutien populaire au projet européen attirait peu l'attention. Du milieu des années 60 jusqu'à la fin des années 80, l'UE est perçue comme essentiellement économique et juridique. Elle n'affecte que très peu la vie des européens qui font confiance aux élites pour construire la coopération européenne. Cette période correspond à ce que Lindberg et Scheingold (1970) appellent « consensus permissif » et prend fin après la signature de l'Acte Unique Européen (1986). A ce moment, l'absence de consensus des élites politiques émerge et révèle ce qui constitue encore à l'heure actuelle les deux principales limites de l'Union Européenne : la régulation (ou non) du marché interne et la constitution d'une union politique. Ces problèmes sont très bien illustrés par la position de la Grande-Bretagne qui ne souhaite pas voir l'UE se développer au-delà d'un marché unique. En 1992, le traité de Maastricht remplace la Communauté Economique Européenne et donne naissance à l'Union Européenne. Le traité comprend plusieurs mesures importantes : la création de la monnaie unique, la définition des statuts de la BCE, la Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune (PESC), le conseil Justice et Affaires Intérieures (JAI) et enfin la citoyenneté européenne. Toutes ces éléments renforcent les pouvoirs de l'Union Européenne et en font un projet de plus en plus "politique". C'est à cette période que l'euroscepticisme[1] devient un phénomène important (Leconte, 2010). Nous pourrions définir une dernière phase qui serait celle dans laquelle se trouve actuellement l'Union Européenne et où s'insère la présente thèse : la crise et l'après-crise. Nous tenterons

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[1] Si la compréhension littérale du mot renvoie à une analyse critique de l'Europe (dont l'orientation ne doit pas être acceptée par principe mais selon qu'elle est bénéfique ou non pour les européens), dans le milieu académique, le terme "eurosceptique" a été introduit par Paul Taggart (1998) sous la définition suivante : « contingent and conditional opposition to European integration as well as total and unconditional opposition to it ». La définition est ensuite enrichie par les concepts de « hard euroscepticism » et « soft euroscepticism » (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). Ces concepts permettent de distinguer les positions qui consistent à vouloir quitter l'Union Européenne ou refuser d'y adhérer de celles qui expriment un mécontentement à l'égard de la direction prise par l'UE (mais reste favorable à l'unification des peuples européens).

au moyen de trois chapitres d'apporter de nouveaux résultats empiriques à l'analyse des déterminants du soutien à l'intégration européenne.

La crise économique qui a suivi la crise des subprimes nécessitait pour beaucoup d'observateur une action concertée de la part des Etats membres de l'Union Européenne. Pourtant, la concertation a été considérée comme insuffisante[2]. Alors que le choc ne s'était pas encore résorbé, la crise de la dette a explosé et a dévoilé les fragilités structurelles de la zone euro. L'idéologie qui a forgé le cadre institutionnel de l'Union Economique et Monétaire (UEM) prône la résorption des chocs par des politiques budgétaires indépendantes et une politique monétaire commune. La convergence quant à elle doit résulter de réformes structurelles (sur le marché des biens et sur le marché du travail). Nous définirons ainsi les arrangements institutionnels qui gouvernent la zone et qui l'ont mis en échec avec la crise de la dette grecque (Hall, 2014). En effet, 6 ans après, la Grèce n'est toujours pas sortie de la crise et continue à immobiliser l'UE. Si comme l'annonce les dirigeants européens, la crise de la dette est maintenant terminée, la crise politique dans l'Union Européenne ne sera endiguée que lorsque l'UE prendra une orientation commune pour l'avenir. La construction européenne est à l'arrêt et pourtant l'Union continue de s'élargir (le Croatie en 2013) tout comme la zone euro (Lettonie en 2014 et Lituanie en 2015). Rappelons que les Etats qui rejoignent l'UE s'engagent à terme à adopter la monnaie unique (Seuls le Royaume-Uni et le Danemark ont obtenu une clause d'opting-out qui leur permet de ne pas adopter la monnaie unique). A l'heure actuelle, la crise des dettes souveraines dans la zone euro semble avoir révélé que le cadre institutionnel de la zone euro génère du risque systémique, et renforce les déséquilibres (on observe notamment un phénomène de polarisation nord/sud) mais ne parvient pas à stimuler la croissance (autour de 1% en 2015). Pour répondre à cette situation les décideurs européens insistent sur la nécessité d'entreprendre des réformes structurelles, avec des effets mitigés sur les pays qui les entreprennent (en Espagne et au Portugal par exemple).

Le cadre théorique dans lequel s'insère la thèse est celui de l'économie politique. Il ne s'agit pas de l'économie politique classique telle que pratiquée par Adam Smith, mais de ce que l'on pourrait appeler « nouvelle économique politique ». Elle consiste à définir la décision économique comme intrinsèquement politique. En présence de contraintes politiques,

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[2] Pour une analyse détaillée, voir la note "Questions d'Europe n°130 de l'institut Robert Schuman"

appliquer une politique optimale est impossible. Or les contraintes politiques existent dès lors que les agents ont des intérêts distincts et qu'il faut faire des choix collectifs. L'hypothèse d'hétérogénéité des préférences des individus constitue alors la base de l'approche d'économie politique. Les choix politiques engendrent des gagnants et des perdants et créent des conflits de redistribution que les gouvernements vont implicitement résoudre en prenant leurs décisions. En économie standard, l'hétérogénéité des préférences est écartée au profit d'un individu représentatif dont il suffit de maximiser l'utilité pour maximiser l'utilité de la société dans son ensemble. L'économie politique retient les conséquences économiques et sociales des politiques comme principal déterminant des préférences des agents. Les agents forment des alliances en fonction de leurs intérêts, tandis que l'idéologie est considérée comme un déterminant secondaire des préférences politiques. Appliqué à la question du soutien à l'intégration, le cadre d'économie politique conduit à s'intéresser tout particulièrement à la théorie « utilitariste » proposée par le politologue américain Matthew Gabel (Gabel et Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998a; Gabel 1998b, Gabel 2009). L'approche utilitariste fait l'hypothèse que les individus évaluent l'UE en termes de gains à l'intégration. Ainsi, tout comme l'économie politique, le cadre utilitariste se préoccupe des questions de redistribution. Gabel (1998) avance deux hypothèses principales : la première porte sur le capital humain, la seconde sur le revenu. L'ouverture du marché du travail au sein de l'Union Européenne (composée de 15 membres à l'époque où l'article est rédigé) favorise les agents à capital humain élevé. Ceux-ci peuvent s'épanouir dans un marché internationalisé et ont les armes pour faire face à la concurrence. Par ailleurs, la libéralisation des marchés de capitaux et la coopération monétaire au sein de l'UE favorisent les hauts revenus. Ils sont plus à même de profiter des opportunités d'investissement, et la faible inflation bénéficie aux créditeurs. L'approche utilitariste explique bien les comportements des individus en période de faible croissance. C'est le cas pour les pays de l'Europe de l'ouest depuis la récession du début des années 90, période qui coïncide avec l'émergence de l'euroscepticisme. Depuis que l'UE est « contestée », nous pouvons citer deux facteurs qui exacerbent les critiques utilitaristes envers l'Union : la monnaie unique et l'élargissement à des pays moins développés. Aucune de ces avancées politiques ne semblent pouvoir générer que des gagnants, ou du moins, pas à court terme. L'introduction de l'euro a dans un premier temps créé une vague de mécontentement puisqu'elle coïncidait avec une hausse des prix substantielle. De même, respecter les critères de convergence a pu être associé à des réductions budgétaires. Le Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance est quant à lui un processus polémique, appliqué inégalement, telles que l'illustrent

l'absence de sanction envers la France et l'Allemagne en 2005 et la réforme du pacte qui a suivi. Enfin, l'élargissement de 2004 a renforcé les mécontentements de la part des pays contributeurs nets au budget européen (le budget européen comprend un volet cohésion, dont la logique est redistributive). Nous pouvons ajouter à cela les conflits entre politique de la concurrence européenne et politiques de subventions nationales.

Tous ces enjeux sont nationaux, pourtant les analyses empiriques effectuées dans cette thèse reposent principalement sur des données microéconomiques (les données de sondages). Nous avons fait ce choix pour des raisons aussi bien théoriques qu'empiriques. Tout d'abord, on ne peut pas limiter l'analyse du soutien à l'intégration européenne à une classification pays eurosceptiques contre pays europhiles. Ainsi, même si les hypothèses sont essentiellement fondées sur des mécanismes macroéconomiques (donc qui théoriquement affectent un pays dans son ensemble), nous tenterons de comprendre les comportements individuels sous-jacents. De plus, le sentiment vis-à-vis de l'intégration européenne n'est pas binaire et nous chercherons à l'aide de bases de données nouvelles à prendre en compte l'indifférence et l'ambivalence (chapitre 1), la confiance dans l'Union (chapitre 2) et le soutien à l'approfondissement (chapitre 3). Enfin, tout au long de l'analyse, nous insistons tout particulièrement sur le dimension socioéconomique (inspirée de la théorie utilitariste présentée ci-avant), notamment à travers la robustesse des résultats obtenus concernant les catégories socioprofessionnelles. Par ailleurs, les données microéconomiques se prêtent très bien à l'analyse d'enjeux macroéconomiques. La dimension inter-pays est donc très présente, notamment à l'aide de régressions par pays dans le premier chapitre et à l'introduction de variables macroéconomiques dans les chapitres suivants. Le chapitre 3 se focalise particulièrement sur la géographie du soutien à l'intégration, en décomposant trois niveaux de variation dans le soutien à l'intégration européenne : individuel, régional et national.

La thèse s'inscrit dans une période de crise économique, qui affecte tout particulièrement les institutions européennes. A l'aide de données récentes, nous tentons de cerner des continuités ou ruptures dans la perception que les citoyens ont de l'intégration européenne. Les principaux résultats de la thèse ne permettent pas d'offrir une réponse précise à la question très débattue des déterminants du soutien à l'intégration européenne. La question à laquelle nous tenterons principalement de répondre est : **Dans quelle mesure le soutien à l'intégration européenne est déterminé par des facteurs économiques ?**

Notre étude comprend un certain nombre d'apports empiriques. Tout d'abord nous avons choisi d'utiliser des données nouvelles. Nous utilisons les sondages ISSP et ESS pour analyser le soutien à l'intégration européenne, ce qui n'a jamais été fait à ma connaissance. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous faisons appel à la base de données Eurobaromètre qui est très souvent utilisée dans la littérature mais nous créons une base nouvelle en fusionnant des données sur 10 ans afin de se concentrer sur l'évolution dans le temps. Et nous travaillons sur la variable dépendante afin de cibler un aspect précis du soutien à l'intégration dans chaque chapitre, tout en adaptant les méthodes économétriques dans chacun d'eux (logit multinomial, logit simple et régression linéaire). Chacun des chapitres offrent des éléments de réponse à la problématique énoncée plus haut.

Le premier chapitre de la thèse est consacré à la question de la sortie de l'Union Européenne. Cette question n'est pas posée dans les enquêtes de l'Eurobaromètre, et revêt une importance capitale : est-ce que les carences de l'intégration sont telles que les citoyens européens remettent en cause l'adhésion même ? Ce chapitre s'appuie sur les données fournies par l'ISSP (International Social Survey Programme). Utiliser une question jamais traitée nous permet de faire un test de vérification des principaux résultats de la littérature, notamment la théorie utilitariste. Les estimations effectuées à l'aide d'un logit multinomial confirme l'existence d'un clivage entre le "oui" et le "non" à l'intégration. Nous nous focaliserons ensuite sur le passage d'un euroscepticisme modéré, à un euroscepticisme plus radical. La théorie utilitariste ne permet pas d'expliquer le passage de l'un à l'autre puisque l'on constate que le profil des citoyens pour la sortie de l'UE et celui de ceux qui sont indécis est à peu de chose près le même. Nous insistons sur le fait que le vote pour des partis extrêmes est la seule variable qui nous permet de distinguer ces deux types d'euroscepticisme, particulièrement en France et au Danemark. Sans présumer du sens de causalité, nous pouvons émettre l'hypothèse que les agendas des partis politiques peuvent encourager des européens indécis à se positionner contre l'Union Européenne. Ce premier chapitre souligne l'importance des déterminants économiques et leur rôle structurel mais évoque aussi les limites de ce type d'explications.

Le deuxième chapitre de la thèse se focalise sur la crise de la dette. Nous utilisons les données de l'Eurobaromètre et plus précisément la question de la confiance en l'UE, sur une période de 10 ans (2004-2014). Selon la théorie utilitariste, les individus évaluent l'Union en fonction des bénéfices qu'elle génère ou pourrait générer pour eux. Pendant et après la crise, on pouvait donc s'attendre à une recomposition des groupes sociaux vis-à-vis de leur soutien à l'intégration, avec les catégories les plus affectées par les crises qui deviennent plus méfiantes à

l'égard de l'Union. Or on observe une baisse uniforme de la confiance en l'UE. Les étudiants et les cadres restent les plus forts soutiens au processus d'intégration tandis que les travailleurs manuels sont les plus eurosceptiques, comme l'illustre le graphique ci-après. Le regain de confiance en 2014 semble également plutôt uniforme. Ce constat suggère une limite aux explications économiques du soutien à l'intégration. En effet, les individus les plus susceptibles de pâtir de la crise de la dette (et des coupes budgétaires qui en découlent), n'affichent pas une chute significativement plus forte de leur confiance en l'UE que les groupes sociaux les moins affectés.

Le deuxième chapitre montre également que les performances macroéconomiques (aussi bien nationale que sur l'ensemble de la zone) ont un impact sur la confiance accordée à l'Union Européenne ce qui confirme que l'économie joue un rôle dans la formation des préférences envers l'UE.

Dans les deux premiers chapitres les déterminants individuels fournissent l'essentiel du pouvoir explicatif des analyses économétriques. Dans le dernier chapitre, l'analyse est

approfondie à l'aide d'un modèle multi-niveaux. Nous testons l'impact différencié des variables micro-économiques selon les caractéristiques de la région et du pays dans lequel l'individu se situe. Nous nous intéressons plus particulièrement au niveau d'éducation. L'impact de cette variable varie fortement d'un pays à l'autre, ce qui amène à nuancer la théorie utilitariste. Car si l'on admet que les individus sont en mesure d'évaluer correctement les gains générés par l'intégration, ils restent ancrés dans un contexte national, dont l'impact ne peut pas être uniquement économique. Les déterminants économiques inclus dans l'analyse sont peu significatifs et une grande part de la variance reste inexpliquée.

Sur l'ensemble des chapitres, les écarts entre les groupes sociaux sont importants et très significatifs ce qui conduit à admettre que le statut socioéconomique est le déterminant le plus robuste du soutien à l'intégration européenne. Nous explorons néanmoins les limites des explications strictement économiques.

En plus de la problématique principale de la thèse qui vient d'être présentée, deux questions théoriques sont liées aux différents chapitres de la thèse.

En premier lieu, il est utile de se demander si les Européens ont réellement une opinion sur l'Union Européenne, indépendamment de la vie politique nationale. En effet, la connaissance des institutions et des politiques menées par l'Union Européenne est faible parmi les citoyens (Gabel, 1998). De plus, les sujets qui intéressent en premier lieu les Européens sont majoritairement du ressort de leurs gouvernements respectifs. A l'exception de la stabilité des prix, qui dépend de la politique de la BCE pour les pays ayant adoptés l'euro, les politiques budgétaires et fiscales, l'emploi et la santé publique restent des prérogatives nationales. Ces arguments sont de nature à remettre en cause l'existence d'un euroscepticisme populaire. Selon Lindbergh et Scheingold (1970) le "consensus permissif" des années 50 et 60 reflétait davantage de l'indifférence que de l'enthousiasme vis-à-vis de l'UE. On peut donc analyser les niveaux très élevés de soutien envers l'UE dans les années 80 comme une exception, plutôt que comme l'indication d'une tendance globale à la hausse interrompue par le traité de Maastricht. Dans ce contexte l'euroscepticisme peut être analysé comme la conséquence d'un malaise démocratique plus global. Le désenchantement vis-à-vis de la politique touche logiquement la politique européenne comme semble le confirmer le faible taux de participation aux élections européennes[3]. On observe également que les élections européennes

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[3] 42,54% lors des élections européennes de 2014, le plus faible niveau jamais enregistré

offrent les meilleurs scores aux partis contestataires. C'est particulièrement le cas en France où dès 1984 le Front National (FN) fait une percée, le FN est d'ailleurs arrivé en tête des élections européennes de 2014. En France, comme aux Pays-Bas, ces bons scores aux Européennes se sont traduits par des scores de plus en plus élevés lors des élections nationales. Ce qui peut s'interpréter comme un rejet du système politique dans son ensemble. Ce que l'on appelle euroscepticisme pourrait également être la conséquence d'une chute de la confiance dans les institutions nationales. En effet, il apparait dans la littérature (McLaren 2006) et nous le retrouvons dans le chapitre 2 : la confiance envers les institutions nationales est corrélée à la confiance envers les institutions européennes. Nous pouvons aussi considérer que le contexte macroéconomique influence la perception de l'Union Européenne et que donc l'évaluation que les européens font de l'Union Européenne ne porte pas sur l'UE en elle-même. La question du malaise démocratique n'est pas véritablement traitée dans cette thèse, bien que le premier chapitre s'intéresse à la monté des partis populiste et leur positionnement vis-à-vis de l'UE. En revanche, le chapitre 2 étudie précisément la confiance dans les institutions nationales et le rôle du contexte macroéconomique. Dans ce chapitre, nous tentons de défendre l'idée selon laquelle les individus en Europe ont une opinion spécifique sur l'Union Européenne. Le fait que les contextes nationaux et européens soient indissociables ne fait aucun doute, mais nous avons cherché à apporter des preuves empiriques de la capacité des européens à se forger une opinion sur les politiques de l'UE. Il existe en effet de bonnes raisons de croire que les citoyens européens sont capables d'évaluer l'UE elle-même et les politiques qu'elle contribue à mettre en place. Tout d'abord un certain nombre d'enjeux de redistribution sont inhérents au projet européen et la méfiance envers l'UE peut découler d'inquiétudes vis-à-vis des conséquences socio-économiques de l'intégration européenne. C'est la thèse proposée par Eichenberg et Dalton dans leur article de 2007 intitulé "Post-Maastricht blues". Le traité de Maastricht marque une rupture dans la perception que les européens ont de l'UE. Depuis l'entrée en vigueur du traité, les citoyens européens ont commencé à penser que les politiques de l'UE n'étaient pas neutres vis-à-vis de l'allocation des ressources entre les pays et à l'intérieur de ceux-ci, ce qui engendre des différences d'opinion entre les groupes sociaux et notamment un net fossé entre les européens les plus éduqués et les moins éduqués. La théorie utilitariste explique ces différences par le fait que les individus disposant d'un faible niveau de capital humain et financier (donc les individus les moins capables de s'épanouir dans un contexte mondialisé et concurrentiel) sont les moins susceptibles de bénéficier de l'intégration européenne et seront donc les plus méfiants envers

celle-ci. Cette théorie n'est pas réellement remise en cause, mais certaines données empiriques laissent penser que la base sociale de l'euroscepticisme aurait tendance à s'étendre à des individus appartenant à la classe moyenne, particulièrement en France et aux Pays-Bas (Leconte, 2010). La question de l'élargissement cristallise également beaucoup d'inquiétudes, sur le coût d'une nouvelle adhésion et les conséquences que celle-ci pourrait avoir sur le marché du travail. En plus de ces enjeux de redistribution au sein de l'UE, la question de l'identité européenne revêt une importance croissante. La crainte de perte de la souveraineté est particulièrement forte dans les petits pays. C'est l'une des principales explications données à la victoire du « non » lors des référendums de 2001 et 2008 en Irlande et en 2005 aux Pays-Bas. De surcroît, le rejet de l'immigration est fortement corrélé avec l'euroscepticisme. Cela s'explique soit par un système de valeur hostile envers l'autre, soit par le refus de perdre du contrôle sur la politique d'immigration domestique, des opinions forcément incompatibles avec le processus européen. Dans l'esprit des élites, l'identité européenne devait venir se superposer à l'identité nationale, ou même prévaloir sur cette dernière. Ce n'est pas la tendance que l'on observe actuellement. Peu d'Européens ont développé une identité européenne et beaucoup se sentent exclusivement nationaux. Parmi eux, un certain nombre sont des eurosceptiques « durs ». Et un nombre considérable d'Européens ne se sentent tout simplement pas attachés à l'UE[4]. Nous soutiendrons donc tout au long de cette thèse l'idée qu'il existe des enjeux spécifiques à l'Union européenne, que les Européens sont capables d'intégrer dans leurs préférences.

Il faut néanmoins se demander, et il s'agit de la seconde question théorique connexe à la thèse, comment définir le soutien à l'intégration ? On peut distinguer plusieurs niveaux de soutien envers l'Union européenne : le soutien à l'idée d'unification européenne, le soutien à l'adhésion, et le soutien à une intégration plus étroite. Si le soutien à l'unification de l'Europe et le soutien à l'adhésion apparait comme plutôt élevé dans la plupart des pays[5], les projets permettant une intégration politique plus forte n'ont jamais été plébiscités. Si la grande majorité des Européens ne se positionnent pas absolument contre l'Union européenne, un certain nombre se montrent sceptiques à l'égard des institutions et des politiques européennes (c'est ce que nous appelons euroscepticisme « soft »). De plus, l'UE est un catalyseur pour

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[4] Seulement 12.7% des européens s'identifient à l'Europe (Fligstein, 2008)

[5] Le second moins que le premier. En effet, le soutien à l'unification a toujours été élevé et a atteint 85% dans les années 90, tandis que le soutien à l'adhésion s'est montré plus volatile.

beaucoup d'inquiétudes liées à la mondialisation. Pour éclairer ces différentes dimensions nous utilisons des variables dépendantes très différentes dans chacun des chapitres. Nous présentons dans la dernière partie de l'introduction des statistiques descriptives sur les variables dépendantes utilisées afin de dresser un tableau des préférences des Européens selon la question posée. Le premier chapitre traite du maintien dans l'UE d'un pays membre, elle permet donc de juger du soutien à l'adhésion. Le deuxième chapitre se focalise sur la confiance en l'Union européenne, il s'agit d'une mesure plus générale du soutien puisqu'elle peut évoquer à la fois à l'Union européenne en elle-même (et ses institutions) et les politiques qu'elle mène. Le dernier chapitre se focalise spécifiquement sur le soutien pour une union plus étroite, donc la dimension la plus exigeante du soutien à l'UE. Pour analyser les différentes dimensions du soutien à l'intégration européenne, nous pouvons utiliser la théorie de David Easton sur le soutien institutionnel (Easton 1975). Les préférences des agents à l'égard des institutions peuvent prendre deux formes. Un soutien diffus, ou affectif, fondé sur l'idéologie et l'attachement culturel ce qui garantit une certaine stabilité dans le temps. Et un soutien spécifique (ou utilitariste), plus volatile, qui découle des potentiels gains de telle ou telle mesure. Dans le cas de l'UE, nous considérerons que le soutien affectif est fort, nous le définirons comme le soutien à l'unification de l'UE qui bénéficie d'une majorité stable auprès des citoyens européens[6]. En revanche, le soutien spécifique varie fortement d'un pays à l'autre, d'un individu à l'autre, et également dans le temps. De plus, certains chocs peuvent affecter le soutien affectif, comme le défendent Armingeon et Ceka (2013) à propos de la crise actuelle, ce qui peut fragiliser l'institution et conduire à sa remise en cause. Ainsi nous sommes tentés d'opposer deux grandes familles d'explication du soutien à l'intégration : les facteurs identitaires et les facteurs utilitaristes. En effet, les variables identitaires devraient en théorie expliquer le soutien affectif envers l'UE, ou son rejet pur et simple. Tandis que la théorie utilitariste explique le soutien spécifique à différentes orientation politique qui auront telles ou telles conséquences socioéconomiques. La théorie utilitariste était incontestée dans la littérature dans les années 80 et 90. A la fin des années 90, les explications fondées sur l'identité reprennent une grande importance. On peut évoquer ce que l'on appelle la

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[6] Nous pourrions également considérer que le soutien affectif est faible. En effet, le principal organe décisionnel, le Conseil européen, sert pour l'essentiel aux chefs de gouvernement à défendre leurs intérêts nationaux. Peut-on imaginer alors que les européens soient attachés au système politique européen ? Mais si le soutien affectif à l'UE était faible, alors l'adhésion à l'UE serait remise en question, c'est pourquoi nous considérerons que le soutien affectif est plutôt fort.

« cognitive incapacity objection » comme principale limite à la théorie utilitariste. En effet, avoir une vision précise de la façon dont l'UE nous affecte est très difficile. Les plus éduqués pensent être favorisés, tandis que les moins éduqués sont indécis vis-à-vis de l'Union. Ce que révèle la théorie utilitariste c'est l'appréciation subjective des différents groupes sociaux. On observe notamment que bien qu'elles soient plutôt favorisées par la législation européenne et les décisions de la cour de justice européenne, les femmes sont pourtant moins favorables à l'UE que la moyenne. Mau (2005) montre que l'évaluation subjective des gains potentiels de l'UE ne coïncide que partiellement avec les gains objectifs que l'on peut associer aux individus. Enfin, les auteurs qui mettent en valeur le rôle de l'identité ont tendance à opposer ce type d'explications aux explications utilitaristes et concluent bien souvent que les premières sont supérieures au seconde (Hooghe and Marks 2005 ; Marks and Hooghe 2004 ; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010 : 789). Cette conclusion est contestable d'un point de vue empirique, nous le verrons ci-après, mais elle peut aussi être contestée du point de vue théorique. Il est en effet possible de réconcilier ces deux visions à l'aide du cadre théorique présenté par Neil Fligstein dans son ouvrage de 2008 sur l'identité européenne. Selon lui c'est la multiplicité des interactions entre les individus qui crée l'identité collective. Ainsi, ce sont les plus éduqués et les plus riches qui ont l'occasion de rencontrer les autres européens et donc de développer une identité cosmopolite. Ils se sentiront donc plus européens que ceux qui n'ont pas ces opportunités d'échanges professionnels et culturels au sein de l'UE. Ce sont donc ceux que l'on peut identifier comme les gagnants de l'intégration européenne qui se sentent plus européens.

Enfin, deux questions méthodologiques se sont posées tout au long de la rédaction de la thèse. L'une des principales questions méthodologiques à laquelle nous avons été confrontées a été de démêler la part de chaque effet dans la formation des préférences. Un certain nombre d'auteurs de la littérature affirment que certaines variables expliquent mieux que les autres le soutien à l'intégration. Nous réfutons ce type d'analyse et défendons l'idée que l'économétrie ne permet pas d'aboutir à de telles conclusions. Hooghe and Marks (2005) insiste sur le fait que l'identité explique une part plus importante de la variance que les variables économiques[7]. Il faut garder à l'esprit le fait que prendre en compte le sentiment identitaire passe par

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[7] D'autres auteurs arrivent à la même conclusion. De Vreese et al (2008) dans leur étude sur la Turquie concluent que les variables identitaires ont un meilleur pouvoir explicatif que les autres variables

l'inclusion de variables d'opinion telle que "vous sentez-vous Européen?". Or, les variables que nous souhaitons expliquer dans chacun des chapitres sont des variables de préférences déclarées, des variables qui reflètent l'opinion des individus interrogés. Expliquer une opinion par une opinion ne semble pas très pertinent. Nous pensons que les opinions sont liées entre elles sans pouvoir établir de lien causal. Nous n'excluons pas la possibilité d'un point de vue théorique que l'identité joue un rôle sur le soutien à l'intégration, cependant, la façon dont cette relation a été modélisée jusqu'à présent ne nous semble pas rigoureuse. Si la variable dépendante est trop corrélée à la variable indépendante, alors on explique la variable par elle-même. La seule variable d'opinion qui sert de variable explicative dans la présente thèse se trouve dans le premier chapitre. Nous utilisons la mesure subjective du placement idéologique (les individus se placent sur une échelle gauche-droite allant de 1 à 10). Nous restons donc très prudents sur le lien de causalité entre notre variable dépendante et cette variable explicative. En dehors de la question idéologique, nous avons choisi de focaliser l'analyse sur des variables économiques (et nous utilisons des variables de contrôle objectives telles que l'âge, le genre et la nationalité) car nous espérons établir un début de relation causale entre le statut social et la formation des préférences vis-à-vis de l'Union européenne. Les principales variables de l'étude (statut d'emploi, revenu et catégorie socioprofessionnelle) sont fortement significatives et permettent de mettre en lumière les fortes disparités entre les groupes sociaux vis-à-vis de l'intégration Européenne. Pour prendre en compte le fait que des préférences puissent être déterminées simultanément nous utilisons des équations simultanées dans le deuxième chapitre. Armingeon et Ceka (2014) utilisent la confiance dans le gouvernement comme variable explicative de la confiance en l'UE (ils effectuent deux tests pour prouver le sens de causalité entre les deux). Nous proposons une autre approche et cherchons à différencier ces deux opinions afin de souligner la capacité des agents à avoir une opinion sur l'UE tout en prenant en compte leur situation nationale. Le dernier chapitre de la thèse confirme le résultat de Hooghe et Marks (2005), une fois les variables économiques incluses, une grande part de la variance individuelle reste inexpliquée. Nous choisissons de ne pas inclure de variables identitaires car elles seraient trop corrélées avec notre variable dépendante.

La deuxième question méthodologique essentielle qu'il a fallu résoudre est la prise en compte de plusieurs niveaux de données. Dans le premier chapitre nous avons choisi de faire des régressions par pays pour étudier les contextes politiques nationaux séparément. Dans les deuxième et troisième chapitres nous avons dû choisir entre un modèle à effets fixes ou un

modèle multi-niveaux. La structure des données dans le deuxième chapitre comprend deux niveaux : le niveau individuel et le niveau national. Nous ne disposons que d'une enquête Eurobaromètre pour les années 2004 à 2006, mais à partir de 2007, nous avons inclus deux enquêtes par an. Chaque enquête comprend 15 pays. Des effets fixes pays sont systématiquement ajoutés afin de purger les coefficients de tout effet commun entre des individus d'un même pays. L'introduction de variables macroéconomiques est rendue possible par la dimension temporelle des données : pour un même pays, la valeur du chômage varie d'une année à l'autre (nous ne disposons que d'une valeur par pays par année pour les variables macro-économiques, même lorsque l'année inclut deux enquêtes Eurobaromètre). L'utilisation d'effets fixes réduit la variance qui peut être exploitée par l'analyse économétrique. Ainsi, dans un premier temps, nous incluons une variable continue plutôt que des variables indicatrices afin de corriger de l'effet du temps. Nous faisons donc l'hypothèse que l'effet du passage de 2004 à 2014 est linéaire. Nous relâchons cette hypothèse dans la dernière section afin de contrôler la robustesse des résultats[8]. Enfin étant donné que des variables explicatives macro-économiques sont inclues dans la régression, nous avons fait le choix de ne pas mettre de variable indicatrice croisée pour enquêteXpays. En effet, les deux variables auraient été parfaitement colinéaires et les variables macro-économiques auraient donc été omises. Cette méthode nous a semblé pertinente car l'objectif du chapitre est d'identifier si les préférences des citoyens européens sont affectées par le contexte macroéconomique, et plus précisément le chômage et le taux d'intérêt sur la dette publique. Pour cela nous exploitons la dimension temporelle de nos données et utilisons un probit bivarié. Le deuxième chapitre ne comporte pas d'interaction entre les deux niveaux d'analyse, ce qui constitue le principal intérêt d'un modèle multi-niveaux. C'est pourquoi nous avons jugé que faire appel à un tel modèle aurait ajouté une complexité supplémentaire sans apporter une réelle valeur ajoutée. Le dernier chapitre de la thèse offre quant à lui une parfaite application d'un modèle multi-niveaux. Nous cherchons à estimer la part respective des trois niveaux de données à notre disposition : individuel, régional et national. Le modèle permet d'estimer une constante et un coefficient pour tous les pays et toutes les régions. Dans un second temps nous étudions comment les variables individuelles ont un impact différent sur la variable dépendante selon le contexte régional et national à l'aide de termes d'interaction.

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[8] Les résultats sont robustes pour notre principale variable d'intérêt : le chômage

Lorsqu'on dresse un bilan de l'euroscepticisme en Europe, nous pouvons diviser l'opinion publique en trois grandes catégories : Une majorité sont pour une unification de l'Europe en général, sans en considérer les enjeux concrets. Une large minorité (20%) sont indécis et une faible minorité (entre 10 et 15%) sont opposés à l'unification européenne (Leconte, 2010). Est-ce que nos données corroborent ce bilan?

Chapitre 1: referendum pour rester membre de l'Union Européenne

Echantillon total (France, Irlande, Danemark, Finlande et Grande-Bretagne)

	Frequency	Percentage	Total
Pour	3818	58.46	6531
Contre	1651	25.28	6531
Indécis	996	15.25	6531
Non réponse	66	1.01	6531

Les données du chapitre 1 ont été récoltées en 2013. L'impact de la crise apparait assez nettement puisque 25% de l'échantillon voterait pour une sortie de l'Union européenne. C'est plus que les 15% évoqués en 2010 par Cécile Leconte. S'agit-il d'une tendance structurelle? Les données du deuxième chapitre fournissent un élément de réponse.

Chapitre 2: confiance en l'Union Européenne

Echantillon total (15 pays)

Year		Frequency	Percentage	Total
2004	Tend not to trust	4716	38,1	12388
	Tend to trust	7672	61,9	12388
2005	Tend not to trust	5856	46,3	12645
	Tend to trust	6789	53,7	12645
2006	Tend not to trust	5325	42,8	12449
	Tend to trust	7124	57,2	12449
2007	Tend not to trust	9329	36,9	25259
	Tend to trust	15930	63,1	25259
2008	Tend not to trust	10302	40,7	25343
	Tend to trust	15041	59,3	25343
2009	Tend not to trust	10897	42,6	25599
	Tend to trust	14702	57,4	25599
2010	Tend not to trust	13160	50,9	25840
	Tend to trust	12680	49,1	25840
2011	Tend not to trust	14457	56,2	25729
	Tend to trust	11272	43,8	25729
2012	Tend not to trust	16646	63,6	26174
	Tend to trust	9528	36,4	26174
2013	Tend not to trust	17316	65,9	26295
	Tend to trust	8979	34,1	26295
2014	Tend not to trust	15956	61,4	26002
	Tend to trust	10046	38,6	26002

Avant 2008, la confiance fluctue autour de 60%. Après 2008, elle affiche une baisse significative qui se stabilise en 2012 autour de 35%, avant de repartir à la hausse en 2014. Nos données ne nous permettent pas de dire si la confiance retrouvera son niveau d'avant crise mais on observe que la confiance est fortement influencée par le contexte. Ce qui laisse penser que la confiance en l'UE informe sur le soutien spécifique plutôt que sur le soutien

affectif, il s'agit donc a priori du soutien à la gouvernance de l'UE pendant la crise des dettes souveraines.

Chapitre 3: soutien à l'approfondissement de l'Union Européenne

Echantillon total (21 pays)

	Frequency	Percentage	Total
1	4,083	10.95	37289
2	9,746	26.14	37289
3	8,325	22.33	37289
4	11,271	30.23	37289
5	3,864	10.36	37289

La question posée dans le dernier chapitre de la thèse constitue le niveau de soutien le plus fort: le soutien pour une union plus poussée. La valeur 1 correspond à "l'unification est déjà trop poussée" tandis que la valeur 5 affiche une volonté d'union plus étroite. Nous avons recodé la variable qui est constituée de 11 modalités à l'origine, pour que les données soient plus lisibles. Il apparait que 40% des européens sont favorables à une union plus approfondie, ce qui est assez élevé. On peut se dire que la crise a révélée le besoin d'aller plus loin dans l'intégration pour éviter que l'UE ne finisse par se désunir. On retrouve bien ici les 20% de citoyens indifférents ou indécis qui répondent 3 (5 pour la variable d'origine) c'est-à-dire une position que l'on peut assimiler au statu quo.

Pour limiter les biais liés à la composition de l'échantillon, nous proposons une analyse du cas de la France.

	Frequency	Percentage	Total
Pour	1225	61.47	1993
Contre	460	23.08	1993
Indécis	280	14.05	1993
Non réponse	28	1.40	1993

Year		Frequency	Percentage	Total
2004	Tend not to trust	413	44,7	924
	Tend to trust	511	55,3	924
2005	Tend not to trust	507	56,6	896
	Tend to trust	389	43,4	896
2006	Tend not to trust	497	55,7	892
	Tend to trust	395	44,3	892
2007	Tend not to trust	776	42,9	1808
	Tend to trust	1032	57,1	1808
2008	Tend not to trust	893	47,9	1864
	Tend to trust	971	52,1	1864
2009	Tend not to trust	978	53,2	1840
	Tend to trust	862	46,8	1840
2010	Tend not to trust	1055	57,0	1852
	Tend to trust	797	43,0	1852
2011	Tend not to trust	1126	61,4	1833
	Tend to trust	707	38,6	1833
2012	Tend not to trust	1136	61,7	1840
	Tend to trust	704	38,3	1840
2013	Tend not to trust	1254	67,6	1856
	Tend to trust	602	32,4	1856
2014	Tend not to trust	1244	66,6	1869
	Tend to trust	625	33,4	1869

	Frequency	Percentage	Total
1	199	10.36	1921
2	518	26.97	1921
3	466	24.26	1921
4	570	29.67	1921
5	168	8.75	1921

On observe que la France se situe dans la moyenne européenne haute en termes de soutien: un soutien un peu plus fort au maintien de la France dans l'UE et une plus forte confiance. Concernant le soutien à l'approfondissement de l'UE, davantage de français s'expriment en faveur du statu quo et donc un peu moins (38,4%) soutiennent une Union plus étroite.

CHAPTER I

DO POLITICAL CONFLICTS OVER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SHAPE PREFERENCES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION?

RESUME

Dans le contexte de crise actuel, l'euroscepticisme est au plus haut. Les élections européennes de 2014 ont été le théâtre de la montée des partis eurosceptiques. Nous utilisons les données de l'ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) 2013 "National identity". A ma connaissance, il s'agit de la seule enquête qui contienne une question sur la volonté de sortir de l'Union européenne. Un scénario qui est aujourd'hui réaliste, notamment dans le cas de la Grande-Bretagne puisque suite à sa réélection, le Premier ministre David Cameron a promis d'organiser un référendum en 2017 pour la sortie de l'Union Européenne. Notre échantillon comprend des données sur cinq pays : le Danemark, la Finlande, la France, l'Irlande et la Grande-Bretagne. La question posée dans le questionnaire ISSP est : *Si un référendum avait lieu aujourd'hui pour décider si [PAYS] devait ou non rester dans l'Union Européenne, seriez-vous pour ou voteriez-vous contre ?* Les interrogés peuvent également choisir la catégorie "ne peut pas choisir". Nous utiliserons donc cette catégorie pour désigner les Européens ambivalents (c'est-à-dire qui éprouve des sentiments à la fois positifs et négatifs envers l'UE, on peut également les qualifier d'eurosceptiques "doux" en référence à la qualification de "soft euroscepticism" issue de Taggart (1998)). Nous nous intéressons tout particulièrement à un euroscepticisme que nous qualifierons de "dur" ("hard euroscepticism") c'est-à-dire les individus qui préfèrent voter contre le maintien dans l'Union européenne plutôt que toute autre réponse. Nous utilisons un modèle de logit multinomial pour marquer la distinction entre soutien, rejet et ambivalence. Nous soutenons l'idée selon laquelle la vie politique nationale joue un rôle essentiel dans la polarisation de l'opinion vis-à-vis de l'UE.

Nous présentons les modèles de conflits politiques sur l'UE pour décrire comment les partis vont se positionner par rapport à celle-ci. Mais ce qui nous intéresse en premier lieu c'est la façon dont offre politique et demande politique vont se retrouver sur les questions européennes. Currubba (2001) a montré qu'avant 1992 la théorie du "policy mood" permettait le mieux d'expliquer la relation entre l'opinion publique et les élites politiques. Cette théorie a été introduite par Stimson en 1991 et insiste sur les coûts d'information. Les individus investissent dans des informations seulement si les choix politiques auxquels ils sont confrontés sont trop loin de leur politique idéale. Van der Eikk and Franklin (2004) soulignent que les positions des partis politiques et de leurs électeurs divergent à partir des années 1990,

on parle de "sleeping giant". Le référendum français sur le traité établissant une constitution pour l'Europe en 2005 a en effet révélé de fortes divisions au sein même des partis politiques. La théorie de Marks et Wilson (2000) appelée "cleavage theory of party response to European integration" met en avant le fait que les partis ne peuvent pas uniquement maximiser leurs chances d'être élus, leur positionnement doit prendre en compte à la fois leur idéologie et les attentes de leur électorat. Cela peut expliquer le fait que peu de partis politiques se soient saisis de la question européenne jusqu'à présent. Les partis d'extrême droite sont les plus à même d'exploiter les doutes des Européens à des fins électorales puisque les problématiques européennes s'insèrent naturellement dans leur discours anti-mondialisation. De plus on observe l'opportunisme de certains partis politique. Le Front National par exemple ne s'est positionné contre l'intégration européenne que dans les années 1990.

Les estimations sur l'échantillon comprenant les cinq pays font apparaitre un clivage entre les Européens qui soutiennent l'UE et les autres. Les "europhiles" sont plus éduqués et ont de plus hauts revenus que la moyenne. Les étudiants sont, comme souvent évoqué dans la littérature, la catégorie de la population qui exprime le plus fort soutien à l'intégration européenne. Ces clivages sont bien connus mais comme évoqué précédemment ce qui nous intéresse particulièrement dans cette étude c'est de confronter la catégorie "ne peut pas choisir" à la catégorie "contre". Quatre variables sont plus fortement associées à un rejet de l'union européenne par rapport aux individus indécis : l'appartenance à un syndicat, un emploi peu qualifié, et un positionnement aux extrêmes de l'axe droite/gauche. Dans un second temps, nous effectuons des régressions par pays. La significativité est plus faible dans l'ensemble, ce qui s'explique en partie par la taille de l'échantillon. Néanmoins, un certain nombre de résultats sont confirmés. Les plus éduqués soutiennent l'UE et le vote pour une partie de la droite populiste réduit le soutien dans quatre pays (Finlande, Danemark, France et Irlande). On observe plus particulièrement en France qu'un vote Front de Gauche ou Debout la République concerne les eurosceptiques ambivalents tandis que les électeurs du Front National ou de l'UMP se déclarent plus volontiers comme de véritables eurosceptiques votant en faveur d'un retrait pur et simple de l'UE.

Pour tester la robustesse de ces résultats, nous effectuons la même estimation en retirant à chaque fois l'un des pays. Le fait d'appartenir à un syndicat n'a plus d'effet sur les préférences européennes lorsque la Finlande est exclue de l'échantillon. Le fait d'être de gauche a un effet sur le soutien mais ne permet pas d'expliquer le passage d'un euroscepticisme modéré

(ambivalence ou indécision via la catégorie "can't choose") à un euroscepticisme plus radical dès lors que l'on exclut le Danemark, l'Irlande ou la Grande-Bretagne. Occuper un emploi très peu qualifié ("elementary occupation") réduit la probabilité d'être indécis par rapport au fait de s'exprimer contre l'UE de façon robuste (sauf lorsque l'on exclut le Danemark de l'échantillon) néanmoins l'effet reste faiblement significatif. L'impact du positionnement à l'extrême droite a quant à lui un impact fort et significatif à 1% quel que soient les pays inclus dans l'échantillon. Nous pouvons donc conclure que le fait d'être d'extrême droite est l'élément le plus robuste associé à l'euroscepticisme radical dans l'UE. Notre étude ne permet pas néanmoins d'établir un sens de causalité. Il est possible que les citoyens votent pour l'extrême droite justement parce que ces partis se positionnent contre l'intégration européenne. La conclusion la plus prudente est de dire que la connexion électorale se fait dans les deux sens avec une adaptation de l'offre et de la demande politique l'une à l'autre.

L'interprétation que nous faisons des résultats de cette étude est que l'offre politique polarise les préférences des citoyens. Les doutes sur l'Union européenne présents chez les électeurs ont pu pousser les partis extrêmes à un certain opportunisme politique, ce qui leur a permis d'attirer des électeurs déjà eurosceptiques. Mais un second effet essentiel à prendre en compte est la capacité de ces partis à récupérer le vote de personnes qui étaient indécises. En effet, les citoyens ambivalents ont plutôt un profil d'individus abstentionnistes et peu politisés, ils peuvent donc certainement être récupérés par des partis politiques opportunistes.

INTRODUCTION

In the context of the recent European debt crisis, anti-EU ideas are widespread. Euroscepticism has reached unprecedented levels and the European parliament elections in 2014 have seen the rise of eurosceptic parties. To our knowledge ISSP 2013_National identity III is the only survey that explicitly asks respondents whether they want their country to remain in the European Union. The survey question goes further the usual questions about the EU. People are not only asked to evaluate the EU, they are asked whether they would vote to remain a member state. Such a scenario is no longer fictional since David Cameron has pledged to hold an in-out referendum by 2017. We analyze the impact of the European integration process on 5 West European party systems: Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, and Great Britain.

Multinomial estimates allow distinguishing between support, rejection and ambivalence vis-à-vis the EU. In this study, the focus is on what we call "hard Euroscepticism", here citizens who would rather oppose membership (category "against") than being ambivalent (category "can't choose"). Put differently, we focus on people who choose "against EU membership" above any other possible response. The paper aims to contribute to the literature on how conflicts over European integration interact with the dimensions of contestation that structure politics within European societies. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that utilitarian variables hardly explain why citizens would rather be opposed to the European Union than ambivalent be towards it. However, in France, and Finland votes for populist right parties have a significant and positive impact on vote against EU membership. We argue political agendas have a strong influence on the emergence of eurosceptical views for people who could just as well have been indifferent towards the EU.

THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK

Four models describe the association between a party left/right location and its support for EU policies. The "international relations model" argues that the political conflict over the EU is structured around a single dimension: more or less integration (i.e. national sovereignty vs supranational governance). The "regulation model" (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000) show that party positioning on left/right coincide with their positioning on European integration: leftwing parties defend more regulation while rightwing parties pushes for deregulation. In the Hix-Lord model, left/right conflicts emerge among "functional groups", whereas European integration (more vs less integration) concerns territorial groups. Hence, the position that a person takes on one dimension does not constrain her position on the other dimension. The two dimensions coexist and they are orthogonal. Finally, the Hooghe-Marks model predicts that the two dimensions partially overlap which creates an opposition between "regulated capitalism" and "neoliberalism" (see figure in the next page).

MODELS OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS OVER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Less Integration
(defend national
sovereignty) ←――――――――→ More Integration
(promote supranational
governance)

1A. International Relations Model

More Integration
↑
Left ←―――――+―――――→ Right
↓
Less Integration

1B. Hix Model: Two Orthogonal Dimensions

Left
(high regulation) ←――――――――→ Right
(low regulation)

1C. Regulation Model

More Integration
↑
Regulated Capitalism
Left ←―――――+―――――→ Right
Neoliberalism
↓
Less Integration

1D. Hooghe-Marks Model

Source: Marks and Streenbergen, 2002

Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002) examine seven issue areas and conclude that a party's position on the "new politics" dimension (Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) tradition/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN)) has a stronger ability to predict its support for integration than its position on the left/right scale[9]. Items that locate on the new politics dimension include protecting consumers, controlling immigration, increasing EU transparency, protecting human rights, and protecting national cultures. The Center-Left supports European integration in social and unemployment policies, environmental regulation, and upgrading the European parliament. Those on the right of this dimension oppose European integration because it threatens the national community. The new right is located on the TAN side of the new politics divide, which leads to a fierce opposition to the EU. The European orientations of market liberals are more nuanced. They support EU policies that can facilitate market integration but oppose European "reregulation". In summary, opposition to the integration process crystallizes around the loss of national autonomy. On the left there might be concerns that recommendation emanating from Brussels pushes towards deregulation while on the right the regulations might constrain national economies too much. Far-right parties are concerned with the loss of control over immigration, which might cause the national identity to dilute.

LITERATURE

The above mentioned models are useful tools to analyze the structure of party opposition to the European Union. However, the real issue in the literature is to match political demand with political offer in the context of European politics. The role of ideology in public support for the EU has been documented; the most uncontested result is that extreme political ideologies are associated with more eurosceptical opinions (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). Some scholars have argued that citizens' votes at EU elections do not express their preferences about representation at the European level (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). On the other hand, national elections fail to reveal the preferences of citizens on EU policy (Mair, 2001). Van der Eikk and Franklin (2004) introduced the notion of 'sleeping giant' explaining

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[9] radical right, right-populist and conservative right parties drive the overall relationship

that by the end of the 1990s, the positions of parties and their voters concerning European integration began to diverge. The authors show that a large proportion of voters display meaningful variation in EU preferences. However, their views are not expressed in elections because EU issues are subsumed into the left/right dimension by political parties. Political entrepreneurs had not yet exploited conflict potential among voters on the issue of European integration. The French European Constitution referendum in 2005 for example has revealed that mainstream political parties are indeed divided regarding the EU. Far left and far right political entrepreneurs, have a strategic incentive to mobilize the EU issue in order to reap electoral gains (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004; Hix, 1999, taggart, 1998). The opposite is true for mainstream parties: They have been part of governing coalitions and were therefore largely responsible for the course of integration. Thus they are generally supportive of the integration process.

Carrubba, (2001) demonstrates that public opinion helps shape elite preferences concerning the EU. The author tests for an electoral connection in EU politics. The author confronts the three theory of representations. The permissive consensus theory proposed by Lindberg and Scheingold in 1970 states that citizens in the EU have been generally positively predisposed toward integration. As long as European issues didn't impact individual citizens, the political elites were free to pursue unification. In 1991, Stimson introduced the policy mood theory which lays emphasis on information costs. A rational individual will only make that investment when policy choices are far enough away from its ideal point. Policy-makers are prompted to stay within this zone of public acceptance which creates an electoral connection. Cue-taking theories offer a competing explanation for why one might observe an electoral connection in EU politics. If citizens are uninformed they might have weakly held preferences which make it easy for political elites to influence their votes. The correlation between public preferences and elite positions is reversed compared to the policy mood theory. Two research questions are raised: Why European integration has proceeded? And why one might observe an electoral connection? Manifesto data between the years 1977 and 1992 are used to measure elite positions. Ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares models are implemented. The results in Currubba (2001) suggest the existence of an electoral connection. In both model specifications, the positions of the electorates and their representatives go together. In order to establish a causal relationship, two approaches are used: selecting only individuals with no party affiliation and instrumental variables. Both tests give credit to the policy mood theory.

Thus, the empirical study in Currubba (2001) shows that before 1992, elite and voters' preferences go hand and hand. Steenbergen et al. (2007) use the same methodology using data from 1984–2002 and find that party elites both respond to and shape the views of their constituency.

Paul Taggart (1998) defines euroscepticism as « contingent and conditional opposition to European integration as well as total and unconditional opposition to it ». Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) distinguish between « hard euroscepticism » and « soft euroscepticism ». Hard eurosceptical agents want to withdraw from the European Union. Soft eurosceptical agents are disatisfied with the course of European integration but remain supportive of the unification of the peoples of Europe. Stoeckel (2013) explores ambivalence towards the EU defined as the presence of both positive and negative thoughts. Using multinomial regression analysis, they compare ambivalent views to positive, and negative ones, as well as indifference. The author builds a theoretical framework based on affective and cognitive cues. Stoeckel uses EU knowledge, news media consumption, and elite division to proxy cognitive cues, and trust in European institutions to proxy affective cue. In the multinomial model presented in Stoeckel (2013) the effect of elite division shows that in countries in which political parties are more divided over the EU, the probability for respondents to express indifference and positive views of European integration significantly decreases while greater party differentiation on European integration leads to higher levels of ambivalence. Affective cue makes univalent views about the EU more likely because it overrides competing cognitive cues. Overall the results provide insights on politicization of EU politics. Party politicization appears to increase the involvement of citizens but it might also spread ambivalence. Duchesne et al (2013) use focus group methods to analyze the nature of the relations linking European citizens to the EU. They challenge previous findings in the literature by showing that dominant feelings among citizens in the EU are indifference and ambivalence (as opposed to euroscepticism). They conclude that a European identity has not emerged yet, on the contrary national and social differences are wide. Additionally, national, European and global politics seem intermingled.

Individual-level attitudes towards the EU are well documented (Gabel 2009; McLaren 2002; Hooghe & Marks 2005). Much of the research concludes that socio-economic background explains attitudes towards European integration. Privileged social classes are more likely to

benefit from integration and consequently they strongly support the EU. Variables such as occupation, income level and education are robust predictors of public support for the EU.

HYPOTHESIS

In their seminal work 'Cleavage Systems. Party Systems, and Voter Alignments', Lipset and Rokkan (1967) describe how European party systems are shaped by a series of conflicts that took place from the Protestant Reformation to the Industrial Revolution. These conflicts created highly durable identities. Marks and Wilson (2000) propose a cleavage theory of party response to European integration arguing that although political parties now operate in a more competitive electoral environment, the stance they adopt still cannot be predicted as an efficient response to electoral incentives. As a consequence, political responses to the EU depend on pre-existing ideologies, as well as constituency ties. Following Marks and Wilson (2000) we formulate hypothesis on how political parties position on European integration. The classic left opposes economic integration because it threatens social achievements. A modernized left has emerged in most European countries inspired by the "third way" of the British Labour Party. This modern left adopts a positive attitude towards globalization (Giddens, 1998). Christian democratic parties have been closely associated with the founding of the EU and thus remain strong supporters of the European process. Liberal radical parties are also traditional supporters of the EU. Conservative and liberal conservative parties traditionally defend national traditions and national sovereignty. Thus they will be more or less supportive on the EU depending on the cultural threat perceived from the EU. Finally, the new populist right opposes European integration, because it fits into its more general opposition to globalization. They propose simple solutions that attract voters; economic issues are mostly left aside.

Socioeconomic determinants include occupation, income and trade union membership. Gabel and Palmer (1995) make the hypothesis that high income citizens are best able to grasp the opportunities associated with capital market liberalization (investment opportunities and low inflation) and find empirical evidence supporting this assumption. Anderson and Reichert (1995) draw similar conclusion. Thus citizens belonging to high income families are expected

to be more supportive of the EU than lower incomes. Gabel (2009) assumes that labor market liberalization benefits high-skilled workers because they are in a better position to compete on an international labor market. High-skilled positions such as managers and professionals are expected to be the most supportive occupational categories and low-skilled occupations (plant and machin operators, and elementary workers) to be more eurosceptical. Until the end of the 1980s, trade unions have been supportive of European integration (Leconte, 2010). Along with mainstream political parties, most European trade unions had adopted a pro-European position. However the prospect of a "social Europe" has been challenged by the completion of the internal market, the enlargements and EU legislation such as the Posted Worker Directive (1996)[10]. Koopmans (2007) explains that although trade unions are supportive of the process of integration; they are very critical towards the direction that the EU has been taking. The economic crisis has intensified this trend. See Leconte (2010) for details on trade Unions' position on European integration. As a result, trade union membership is expected to be correlated with soft eurosceptical views on Europe.

EUROSCEPTISM AND POLITICAL PARTIES

France is among the six original members. The general evaluation of European integration is good in France (61.47% membership supporters in the sample). However, the process of European integration was not smooth and remains a salient issue in the political sphere. The European Constitution was rejected by 55% of voters in the referendum held in 2005 and was interpreted as more than just a movement of humor (Cautrès, 2005). Left-wing eurosceptic parties are critical towards the political agenda of the EU, but they support the unification of European countries. Indeed, the major left-wing party (the Left Front or 'Front de Gauche') considers a withdrawal as a last resort and defends a complete recasting of the EMU. The National Front (Front National) (which falls into the new populist right category) is the major anti-EU party in France. The FN is gaining momentum and became the first French party at the 2014 European elections with 25% of the votes (see the appendix).

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[10] The directive states that firms seconding workers in another member state have to abide by the host country's conditions in terms of the minimum legal wage and working time limits. It led to several controversial decisions from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Trade Unions accused the ECJ of prioritizing market integration over workers' rights.

Irish people traditionally display high support for European integration; this is supported by the ISSP data with 77% of positive attitudes towards the EU in the sample (see appendix). The party most critical of the EU in Ireland is Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin urged a "No" vote in the referendum held in Ireland in 2008 on the Lisbon Treaty. However, in the context of the referendum in the UK (Sinn Féin is also active in Northern Ireland) the party announced that the party will campaign to stay within the EU because a withdrawal would have disastrous economic consequences, especially in Northern Ireland. It aligns itself with the European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) parliamentary group (see details of European Parliamentary elections in the appendix). The United Left Alliance (ULA) was also skeptical towards the EU. ULA was an electoral alliance in the 2011 general election. They consisted of the Socialist Party, the People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA), and the Workers and Unemployed Action Group (WUAG). They campaigned for a "no" vote in the 2012 European Fiscal Compact referendum.

The UK has nowadays reasons to mobilize against EU membership. Their cultural heritage is based on isolation and the economic benefits from a closer union are expected to be limited. Kriesi (2007) concludes that Euroscepticism "has been able to stimulate a restructuring of the party system – with the conservative right becoming the decisive restructuring force". Thus mainstream parties are openly eurosceptical. David Cameron- Leader of the Conservative Party and newly reelected- has pledged to hold an in-out referendum by 2017.

In Denmark issue salience and partisan conflict regarding European integration are high (De Vries, 2007). During the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 the Denmark notified the Council of the European Communities of their decision to opt out of the euro. All member states, other than Denmark and the United Kingdom, have either adopted the euro or are legally bound to adopt it eventually. In September 2000 the adoption of the euro was rejected by 53.2% of the Danish electorate (with an electoral turnout of 87.6%). The Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) is the main eurosceptical party in Denmark (along with People's Movement against the EU). The electoral success of Dansk Folkeparti in the 2014 EP elections might encourage less eurosceptical parties to become more critical to certain EU policies in the future. A central theme in the campaign for EP elections in Denmark was the claim of benefit tourism as a threat to the Danish welfare state, a view mainly defended by the

Danish People's Party and partially taken up by Venstre, the Conservatives and the Social Democrats. Eurosceptic parties received about one third of the votes (34.7%). The good result for the Danish People's Party is explained both by national issues (Kristian Thulesen Dahl DF party leader since 2012 has become more nuanced and places more emphasis on welfare issues, while Lars Røkke Rasmussen's Venstre leader was in the heart of a scandal) and EU specific protest (such as benefit tourism).

The Finns are among the least Europhile citizens in the EU, as reflected in the ISSP data (only 45% approval rate for Finland to remain an EU member state). The European sovereign debt crisis was a crucial issue in the Finnish parliamentary election, 2011. Portugal applied for an EU bailout the very month elections were held. The governing coalition supported Finland's participation in the bailout and all four opposition parties (Social Democrats, Left Alliance, Christian Democrats and the True Finns) opposed it. Such context helped Soini become the main opposition figure. In the next elections, in 2015, a right-wing coalition is formed, including The Finns Party. Timo Soini becomes Deputy Prime Minister of Finland and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

THE DATA

ISSP 2013_National identity III includes the following question:

> *If there were a referendum today to decide whether [COUNTRY] does or does not remain a member of the European Union, would you vote in favor or would you vote against?*

Respondents have three possible answers: vote in favor, vote against or can't choose. Descriptive statistics in the appendix displays the distribution of responses from our dependent variable. There is a strong bias towards status quo, 58% of respondents choose to remain EU members. However, there is a significant amount of citizens who claim to vote in favor of an exit from the EU (25%) or are undecided (15%). People who refused to answer might be considered as indifferent citizens, their percentage is negligible (1%).

The analysis involves 5 countries: Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, and Great Britain. Respondents are asked about the party they voted for in the last general elections in their respective countries:

- Finland: April 2011 (parliamentary elections)
- Ireland: February 2011
- Denmark: September 2011
- France: April 2012 (first round of the 2012's French Presidential Election)

Except for Great Britain where the question is: "If there were a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?"

The political parties included in the analysis are detailed in the appendix.

At the 2011 elections the incumbent coalition in Denmark led by Venstre (centre-right) lost power. With 44 seats in parliament, the Social Democrats established a centre-left coalition with the People's Socialist Party, and the Social-Liberal party. The Finnish parliamentary election, 2011 saw the breakthrough of the True Finns. The incumbent coalition (Centre Party, National Coalition Party (NPC), Green League and the Swedish People's Party) lost its majority and a coalition including 6 parties rules from 2011 to 2014[11]: the NCP, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Left Alliance, the Green League, the Swedish People's Party (SPP) and the Christian Democrats. In France, François Hollande, the Socialist Party candidate won the presidential elections in 2012 (over the incumbent UMP president Nicolas Sarkozy). In 2011 the incumbent governing party in Ireland (Fianna Fáil) and his leader Brian Cowen (Taoiseach of Ireland since 2008) have undergone a historic defeat. Fine Gael won 76 seats and became the largest party in the Dáil. Enda Kenny became Taoiseach, in a coalition with the second largest party (the Labor Party).

In the pooled regression, parties are then recoded on a left-right scale composed of 5 categories: Far left (communist etc.) 3.98 %, Left, center left 18.83 % Center, liberal 13.06% Right, conservative 20.75% Far right (fascist etc.) 2.39%. The remaining 40% did not vote in the last election.

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[11] In 2014 the Left Alliance and the Green League successively departed the government

The variable "trade union membership" always takes the value 0 for Great-Britain[12]. Thus when included in the pooled regression, British respondents might bias the coefficient for trade union membership. In the robustness checks section, table 13, Great-Britain is removed from the sample and the coefficient is unchanged.

ESTIMATION STRATEGY

The dependent variable encompasses three choices: "vote in favour", "vote against" and "can't choose". Following Stoeckel (2013) a multinomial logit is estimated (Greene, 2012, 763-766). Multinomial models compute the influence of an independent variable on the likelihood to fall into a respective category (for example can't choose) compared to the reference category (for example vote against). Therefore, absolute probability cannot be inferred from Multinomial estimates.

The determinants of support for the European integration are tested when the categories "in favor" and "against" are confronted. Such estimates give an opportunity to test the relevance of the usual predictors of public support for the European Union with a different survey question. The study focuses more specifically on the categories "against" and "can't choose". Our paper seeks to identify if ideology helps explaining the difference between these two categories. To account for ideology we use a left-right scale self-identification and the party voted for in the last election.

The baseline model corresponds to a pooled regression including the 5 countries that can be defined as:

$$VoteEUreferendum = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D + \beta_2 E + \beta_3 P + \beta_4 C + \varepsilon_2$$

D is a vector of individual socio-demographic characteristics (age and gender). E measures the socioeconomic position of individuals (ISCO classification, employment status, income and trade union membership). C is a country dummy which accounts for any omitted country-specific influence. P stands for partisanship (either a left-right scale self-identification or the

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[12] In the original variable "UNION", 0 corresponds to the category "refused to answer"

party voted for in the last election). The results are presented in table 1 to table 3. To deepen the analysis, the baseline model is estimated at the country-level:

$$VoteEUreferendum = \delta_0 + \delta_1 D + \delta_2 E + \delta_3 P + \varepsilon_1$$

In the survey, respondents are asked which party they voted for in the last election. We use the political party which won the election as reference category: The Social Democratic Party in Denmark, the Socialist Party in France, the National Coalition Party in Finland and Fine Gael in Ireland. David Cameron, leader of the Conservative Party has been prime Minister of the United-Kingdom since 2010. Consequently, the Conservative Party serves as reference in the country regression.

Categorical dependent variable models adopt the maximum likelihood estimation[13] method that requires an assumption about probability distribution. Logistic models treat as explanatory variable the likelihood of an event conditionally on the exogenous variables.

With k categorical outcomes and 1 is set as base outcome, the probability that the response for the jth observation is equal to the ith outcome is

$$p_{ij} = Pr(y_j = i) = \begin{cases} \dfrac{1}{1+\sum\limits_{m=2}^{k} exp(X_j\beta_m)}, & \text{if } i = 1 \\[4mm] \dfrac{exp(X_j\beta_i)}{1+\sum\limits_{m=2}^{k} exp(X_j\beta_m)}, & \text{if } i > 1 \end{cases}$$

Where x_j is the vector for observed values of the independent variables for the jth observation and β_m is the vector for outcome m.

The log pseudo likelihood is:

$$lnL = \sum_j \sum_{i=1}^{k} I_i(y_j)\, ln\, p_{ik}$$

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with $I_i(y_j) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1, if\ y_j = i \\ 0, otherwise \end{array} \right.$

In a logistic regression, it is assumed that the logit transformation of the outcome variable has a linear relationship with the predictor variables. The interpretation of the regression coefficients is thus difficult. In order to facilitate interpretation, we present Relative Risk Ratios (RRR). They are obtained by exponentiating the multinomial logit coefficients. RRR are commonly interpreted as odds ratios: For a unit change in the predictor variable, the RRR of outcome m relative to the referent group is expected to change by a factor of the respective parameter estimate given the variables in the model are held constant.

RESULTS

In table 1, votes in favor of the membership of one's country in the European Union are used as reference category and compared to the votes against membership and indecision ("can't choose"). The main characteristics of people willing to exit the EU are trade union membership, low-skilled occupations, low income, and extreme political ideologies. Those findings confirm the previous results of the literature about support for the EU. Holding other variables at fixed value, the odds of voting against membership raises by 37.3% for trade union members compared to non members. Belonging to the highest family income category reduces the odds of rejecting EU membership by 30%. Turning to ambivalent voters, the picture is not too different. The determinants of undecided and negative views are roughly the same, except coefficient are inferior and less significant which suggests that ambivalent preferences are least firmly held. The strongest determinants of indecision are female gender, and electoral abstention. Additionally, highly skilled occupations such as managers and professionals result in less undecided respondents: being a manager or a professional reduces the odds of answering "can't choose" by 40% and 50% respectively. Regression tables without left-right self-placement are available upon request. They display no alteration of the results presented above[14].

Table 1: multinomial estimates. Pooled regression. Base outcome: in favor

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[14] and we observe that the R2 is decreased when the variable is removed

Base outcome: vote in favour	Against		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
female	1.060	(0.75)	1.894***	(6.64)
age	1.048**	(3.26)	1.015	(0.89)
age2	1.000**	(-2.62)	1.000	(-0.79)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	0.895	(-0.63)	1.025	(0.12)
in education	0.491***	(-3.33)	0.625*	(-2.11)
retired	0.831	(-1.42)	0.905	(-0.62)
inactive	1.046	(0.27)	0.967	(-0.18)
other	0.806	(-0.95)	1.027	(0.10)
Member of a trade union	1.373**	(3.14)	1.052	(0.43)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	1.544*	(2.14)	1.231	(0.90)
Managers	0.829	(-1.13)	0.598**	(-2.59)
Professionals	0.625**	(-3.25)	0.504***	(-4.23)
Associate professionals	0.985	(-0.11)	0.804	(-1.43)
Serv and sales	1.676***	(3.57)	1.348	(1.92)
Agri, forestry and fishery	1.824*	(2.49)	1.088	(0.27)
Trade workers	1.916***	(3.88)	1.594*	(2.37)
Plant and machin operators	2.085***	(4.09)	1.515	(1.94)
Elementary occupations	2.702***	(5.46)	1.609*	(2.27)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	0.975	(-0.21)	0.953	(-0.34)
Family income Q2	1.193	(1.64)	1.142	(1.05)
Family income Q4	0.809	(-1.94)	0.893	(-0.88)
Family income Q5	0.702**	(-3.09)	0.692**	(-2.59)
reference category: Denmark				
Finland	2.483***	(8.31)	2.096***	(5.60)
France	1.054	(0.45)	0.997	(-0.02)
Ireland	0.509***	(-4.61)	0.559***	(-3.48)
Great Britain	4.559***	(10.14)	3.361***	(6.87)
reference category: Center, liberal				
Did not vote	1.570***	(3.73)	1.826***	(4.38)
Far left	2.684***	(5.67)	1.669*	(2.32)
Left, center left	1.032	(0.25)	0.928	(-0.50)
Right, conservative	1.231	(1.65)	1.055	(0.36)
Far right	8.221***	(10.79)	2.757***	(3.80)
Log likelihood	-4604.0	**N**	5469	
pseudo R-sq	0.106	**Chi2**	1097.2	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 2: multinomial estimates. Pooled regression. Base outcome: can't choose

Base outcome: can't choose	In favour		Against	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
female	0.528***	(-6.64)	0.560***	(-5.54)
age	0.986	(-0.89)	1.033	(1.80)
age2	1.000	(0.79)	1.000	(-1.35)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	0.976	(-0.12)	0.873	(-0.63)
in education	1.600*	(2.11)	0.786	(-0.90)
retired	1.105	(0.62)	0.918	(-0.50)
inactive	1.034	(0.18)	1.082	(0.39)
other	0.974	(-0.10)	0.785	(-0.84)
Member of a trade union	0.950	(-0.43)	1.305*	(1.97)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.812	(-0.90)	1.254	(0.87)
Managers	1.674**	(2.59)	1.387	(1.45)
Professionals	1.985***	(4.23)	1.241	(1.15)
Associate professionals	1.243	(1.43)	1.224	(1.17)
Serv and sales	0.742	(-1.92)	1.243	(1.27)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.920	(-0.27)	1.677	(1.59)
Trade workers	0.628*	(-2.37)	1.202	(0.87)
Plant and machin operators	0.660	(-1.94)	1.376	(1.42)
Elementary occupations	0.622*	(-2.27)	1.679*	(2.43)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	1.050	(0.34)	1.023	(0.15)
Family income Q2	0.876	(-1.05)	1.044	(0.32)
Family income Q4	1.120	(0.88)	0.907	(-0.70)
Family income Q5	1.445**	(2.59)	1.014	(0.09)
reference category: Denmark				
Finland	0.477***	(-5.60)	1.185	(1.17)
France	1.003	(0.02)	1.058	(0.34)
Ireland	1.788***	(3.48)	0.909	(-0.48)
Great Britain	0.298***	(-6.87)	1.357	(1.58)
reference category: Center, liberal				
Did not vote	0.548***	(-4.38)	0.860	(-0.97)
Far left	0.599*	(-2.32)	1.608*	(1.98)
Left, center left	1.078	(0.50)	1.112	(0.63)
Right, conservative	0.948	(-0.36)	1.167	(0.92)
Far right	0.363***	(-3.80)	2.982***	(4.19)
Log likelihood	-4604.0	N	5469	
pseudo R-sq	0.106	Chi2	1097.2	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3: multinomial estimates. Pooled regression. Base outcome: against

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
female	0.944	(-0.75)	1.787***	(5.54)
age	0.955**	(-3.26)	0.968	(-1.80)
age2	1.000**	(2.62)	1.000	(1.35)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	1.117	(0.63)	1.145	(0.63)
in education	2.035***	(3.33)	1.272	(0.90)
retired	1.203	(1.42)	1.089	(0.50)
inactive	0.956	(-0.27)	0.924	(-0.39)
other	1.241	(0.95)	1.275	(0.84)
Member of a trade union	0.728**	(-3.14)	0.766*	(-1.97)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.648*	(-2.14)	0.797	(-0.87)
Managers	1.207	(1.13)	0.721	(-1.45)
Professionals	1.599**	(3.25)	0.806	(-1.15)
Associate professionals	1.015	(0.11)	0.817	(-1.17)
Serv and sales	0.597***	(-3.57)	0.804	(-1.27)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.548*	(-2.49)	0.596	(-1.59)
Trade workers	0.522***	(-3.88)	0.832	(-0.87)
Plant and machin operators	0.480***	(-4.09)	0.727	(-1.42)
Elementary occupations	0.370***	(-5.46)	0.595*	(-2.43)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	1.026	(0.21)	0.977	(-0.15)
Family income Q2	0.838	(-1.64)	0.958	(-0.32)
Family income Q4	1.236	(1.94)	1.103	(0.70)
Family income Q5	1.425**	(3.09)	0.986	(-0.09)
reference category: Denmark				
Finland	0.403***	(-8.31)	0.844	(-1.17)
France	0.949	(-0.45)	0.946	(-0.34)
Ireland	1.966***	(4.61)	1.100	(0.48)
Great Britain	0.219***	(-10.14)	0.737	(-1.58)
reference category: Center, liberal				
Did not vote	0.637***	(-3.73)	1.163	(0.97)
Far left	0.373***	(-5.67)	0.622*	(-1.98)
Left, center left	0.969	(-0.25)	0.899	(-0.63)
Right, conservative	0.813	(-1.65)	0.857	(-0.92)
Far right	0.122***	(-10.79)	0.335***	(-4.19)
Log likelihood	-4604.0	N	5469	
pseudo R-sq	0.106	Chi2	1097.2	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

In table 2 we compare the vote against and in favor of EU membership using "can't choose" as reference category. As expected, a very limited number of variables allow discriminating between undecided respondents and those would reject the European Union. Being a woman is one of them. Women are much less likely to display negative attitudes than ambivalent ones. The opposite is true for far right voters; they are highly more inclined to vote against the European Union than to be undecided on the issue. Far left voters also stand out but the effect is smaller and the significance weaker.

Table 3 summarizes the previous findings. The true cleavage is between anti and pro-EU citizens. The traditional supporters of European integration are students, professionals and high income families. On the other side, low skilled occupations, trade union membership and extreme political ideologies are associated with euroscepticism. However, the significance is weak (5%) for elementary occupations, trade union membership and far-left self-placement. It turns out difficult to draw distinctions between undecided citizens and opponents of European integration. They appear as less informed citizens with a high potential for political entrepreneurs to influence their votes.

In table 4 to 8 country estimates are presented. Against is the base outcome[15]. Contrary to the pooled regression where political orientations corresponded to a left-right scale self identification, we now rely on data about the political parties respondents voted for in the last general elections (the political parties are presented in the appendix). The number of observations is reduced compared to the previous tables, thus the significance is much lower. Additionally, certain categories (such as LO voters in France) contain a very limited number of respondents, which leads to aberrant values.[16]

First we want to confirm the results presented in the pooled regression. Although the significance is weak, high-skilled workers are more inclined to support the EU while low-skilled workers oppose it. Trade union membership declines support in France and Finland. Vote in the last election is a good predictor of preference in European politics at the country-level. As expected, in each country, votes towards far right parties reduce support for

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[15] Tables using "in favour" and "can't choose" as base outcomes are available upon request. However, they do not provide any additional piece of information

[16] see also the employment status "other" and the political vote for the green party in Ireland, which have an extremely high relative risk ratio

remaining in the European Union: The National Front in France, the Danish Peoples party in Denmark, the True Finns in Finland, and Christian Solidarity in Ireland. Far right ideology in Great Britain is represented by the British National Party; unfortunately, this category is not included in our dataset. Finally, in all the countries women are more undecided than eurosceptic.

Let's give a closer look at preferences of voters towards the EU according to the party they voted for. In France, Ireland and Finland, government party sympathizers are the most supportive of the EU. In France, Green party voters are more supportive of the European Union compared to the Socialist Party that won the elections in 2012[17]. It should nevertheless be noted that the Green party allied with the Socialist Party in the second round of the election and Green Ministers were appointed in the first ruling government. In Ireland, the only party affiliation that is more supportive of the European Union is also the Green Party[18]. In Denmark the situation is more complex since the Social Democratic Party made an alliance with two other parties to obtain the majority number of sites: The Radical Liberal Party and the Socialist Peoples Party. The Radical Liberal Party is slightly more supportive of European integration while the Socialist Peoples Party is clearly less so (although the coefficient is not significant). Voters of Venstre, the governing party before the elections, are more inclined to support the remaining of Denmark in the EU than the new ruling political party. In Great Britain, supporters of the British conservative party are the most eurosceptical voters in the country. These results are consistent with the hypothesis presented in the theoretical framework.

The multinomial design allows us to distinguish between hard and soft euroscepticism. In France for example, voting for the Left Front strongly reduces support for the EU, however, the preferences of Left Front voters are not significantly different from the category "can't choose". Arise the Republic also attract voters who are either ambivalent or eurosceptic. National Front and UMP voters though appear as hard euroscepticism with strong anti-EU preferences. In Finland, the True Finns also seem to capture the votes of hard eurosceptic citizens in the EU.

The Danish Dansk Folkeparti is the only rightwing populist party affiliation that does not lead to hard eurosceptical views. Hard euroscepticism do not seem to thrive in Ireland. Two party

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[17] although the coefficient is non-significant

[18] The dummy variable is not significant because the green party voters in the survey (10 respondents) all claimed they would vote for Ireland to remain a member state of the European Union

affiliations show significantly different preferences for the maintenance of their country in the EU: Sinn Fein and Christian Solidarity. In both cases, respondents support EU membership less than the party in office. In Ireland, a large part of the population still suffers from the austerity program[19] and Sinn Fein is leading the opposition[20].

If the political parties position as hypothesized, the results weigh in favor of an electoral connection. Party affiliation allows us to discriminate between undecided and eurosceptic citizens. However, the estimation procedure does not allow proving this correlation and inferring the direction of causality. It is reasonable to think that it is a two-way relationship with political offer and demand shaping each other.

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[19] although the country has returned to growth (4.8% in 2014)
[20] See the Right2Water campaign

Table 4: Multinomial estimates. France

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
gender_fem	0.971	(-0.18)	1.814**	(2.60)
age	0.978	(-0.77)	0.986	(-0.37)
age2	1.000	(0.76)	1.000	(0.32)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	1.597	(1.27)	0.631	(-0.90)
in education	3.791*	(2.14)	1.025	(0.03)
retired	1.579	(1.75)	1.303	(0.73)
inactive	2.006	(1.58)	0.884	(-0.20)
other	1.022	(0.07)	0.548	(-1.19)
Member of a trade union	0.651**	(-2.61)	0.524**	(-2.67)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.934	(-0.16)	1.600	(0.87)
Managers	2.370*	(2.51)	0.696	(-0.70)
Professionals	3.381***	(3.66)	0.725	(-0.66)
Associate professionals	1.580	(1.62)	0.799	(-0.60)
Serv and sales	0.777	(-0.82)	0.979	(-0.05)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.812	(-0.48)	0.647	(-0.66)
Trade workers	0.693	(-1.07)	0.846	(-0.36)
Plant and machin operators	0.806	(-0.62)	1.215	(0.44)
Elementary occupations	0.591	(-1.28)	1.061	(0.12)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	0.979	(-0.09)	1.364	(0.96)
Family income Q2	1.150	(0.64)	1.202	(0.63)
Family income Q4	1.316	(1.21)	1.017	(0.05)
Family income Q5	1.333	(1.19)	1.061	(0.16)
reference category: PS				
Did not vote	0.444**	(-3.18)	0.923	(-0.24)
Worker's Struggle - LO	0.687	(-0.32)	0.00000316	(-0.02)
New Anticapitalist Party - NPA	0.319	(-1.31)	0.863	(-0.12)
Left Front - FG	0.370***	(-3.69)	0.874	(-0.36)
Green Party - EELV	4.073	(1.88)	2.075	(0.77)
Democratic Movement - MoDem	0.973	(-0.08)	1.281	(0.49)
Union for a Popular Movement - UMP	0.647*	(-2.12)	0.541*	(-1.98)
Arise the Republic - DLR	0.134**	(-2.89)	1.049	(0.07)
National front - FN	0.126***	(-8.16)	0.350**	(-3.03)
Invalid ballot, Vote blank	0.338**	(-3.26)	1.446	(0.94)
Log likelihood	-1077.0	N	1425	
pseudo R-sq	0.133	Chi2	329.6	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5: Multinomial estimates. Denmark

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
gender_fem	1.223	(1.18)	1.955**	(2.73)
age	0.918*	(-2.09)	0.927	(-1.35)
age2	1.001	(1.82)	1.001	(1.15)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	3.146	(1.92)	2.549	(1.27)
in education	1.015	(0.04)	1.133	(0.23)
retired	0.803	(-0.67)	0.726	(-0.67)
inactive	1.050	(0.11)	1.869	(1.17)
other	0.612	(-0.79)	1.164	(0.19)
Member of a trade union	0.867	(-0.49)	1.273	(0.58)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.491	(-1.74)	0.301*	(-2.16)
Managers	0.854	(-0.39)	0.801	(-0.43)
Professionals	1.243	(0.61)	0.654	(-0.92)
Associate professionals	0.806	(-0.64)	0.561	(-1.37)
Serv and sales	0.710	(-0.93)	0.412	(-1.89)
Agri, forestry and fishery	1.213	(0.23)	0.000000805	(-0.02)
Trade workers	0.823	(-0.49)	0.567	(-1.06)
Plant and machin operators	0.298*	(-2.46)	0.316	(-1.67)
Elementary occupations	0.448	(-1.89)	0.247*	(-2.31)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	1.639	(1.59)	1.290	(0.60)
Family income Q2	0.597*	(-2.07)	0.749	(-0.84)
Family income Q4	1.145	(0.58)	0.950	(-0.15)
Family income Q5	1.478	(1.54)	1.032	(0.09)
reference category: SD				
Did not vote	1.169	(0.47)	2.817*	(2.36)
Radical Liberal Party - RV	2.399*	(2.40)	1.669	(0.93)
Conservative Peoples Party - KP	2.133	(1.80)	2.605	(1.63)
Socialist Peoples Party - SF	0.706	(-1.25)	1.251	(0.55)
Christian Peoples Party - KRF	0.263	(-1.24)	0.000000432	(-0.01)
Danish Peoples Party - DF	0.150***	(-6.24)	0.545	(-1.42)
Liberal Party - V	1.915**	(2.90)	2.596**	(2.90)
New Alliance - NA	1.637	(0.93)	1.819	(0.82)
Leftwing Alliance - EL	0.400**	(-2.97)	0.630	(-0.92)
Other Party	2.558	(0.85)	8.727	(1.80)
Voted blank	0.675	(-0.81)	1.594	(0.74)
Log likelihood	-954.5	N	1221	
pseudo R-sq	0.114	Chi2	245.5	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 6: Multinomial estimates. Ireland

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
gender_fem	1.023	(0.08)	2.578*	(2.25)
age	1.037	(0.56)	1.069	(0.77)
age2	1.000	(-0.43)	0.999	(-0.85)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	1.036	(0.07)	0.642	(-0.56)
in education	5.110	(1.48)	8.442	(1.81)
retired	3.667*	(2.08)	3.689	(1.65)
inactive	0.698	(-0.94)	0.433	(-1.49)
other	4231595.6	(0.01)	7902275.9	(0.02)
Member of a trade union	1.217	(0.75)	1.071	(0.20)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.493	(-1.18)	0.896	(-0.15)
Managers	0.863	(-0.29)	0.602	(-0.73)
Professionals	0.673	(-0.97)	0.614	(-0.93)
Associate professionals	1.395	(0.68)	1.210	(0.32)
Serv and sales	0.519	(-1.58)	0.719	(-0.63)
Agri, forestry and fishery	1.015	(0.01)	0.000000434	(-0.01)
Trade workers	0.288*	(-2.01)	1.213	(0.25)
Plant and machin operators	0.466	(-1.36)	0.505	(-0.82)
Elementary occupations	0.0806***	(-3.54)	2.72e-09	(-0.00)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	1.066	(0.15)	0.729	(-0.56)
Family income Q2	0.562	(-1.56)	0.759	(-0.59)
Family income Q4	1.718	(1.24)	0.970	(-0.05)
Family income Q5	1.058	(0.14)	0.695	(-0.65)
reference category: Fine Gael				
Did not vote	0.480*	(-2.05)	0.635	(-0.94)
Labour Party	0.621	(-1.07)	0.892	(-0.20)
Fianna Fail	1.024	(0.05)	1.376	(0.51)
Sinn Fein	0.165***	(-3.81)	0.449	(-1.25)
United Left Alliance	0.146*	(-2.00)	0.450	(-0.59)
Green Party	1765755.8	(0.01)	0.560	(-0.00)
Christian Solidarity	0.0288**	(-2.66)	4.64e-14	(-0.00)
Independent	0.524	(-1.13)	0.956	(-0.06)
Other - Multiple parties selected	0.727	(-0.79)	0.780	(-0.46)
Log likelihood	-500.5	**N**	878	
pseudo R-sq	0.125	**Chi2**	143.0	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 7: Multinomial estimates. Finland

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
gender_fem	0.918	(-0.44)	1.845*	(2.45)
age	0.901*	(-2.38)	0.931	(-1.34)
age2	1.001*	(1.99)	1.001	(1.04)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	0.599	(-1.15)	1.196	(0.38)
in education	1.455	(0.88)	0.924	(-0.15)
retired	1.721	(1.57)	1.192	(0.40)
inactive	0.700	(-0.46)	2.517	(1.42)
other	2.366	(1.56)	1.061	(0.08)
Member of a trade union	0.486**	(-2.97)	0.651	(-1.45)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.717	(-0.55)	1.629	(0.65)
Managers	0.912	(-0.20)	0.986	(-0.02)
Professionals	1.145	(0.40)	1.248	(0.47)
Associate professionals	0.802	(-0.66)	1.646	(1.13)
Serv and sales	0.458*	(-2.27)	1.049	(0.11)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.219**	(-2.90)	0.916	(-0.14)
Trade workers	0.498	(-1.82)	1.832	(1.22)
Plant and machin operators	0.501	(-1.55)	1.144	(0.22)
Elementary occupations	0.239***	(-3.31)	1.124	(0.24)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	1.228	(0.61)	1.669	(1.26)
Family income Q2	0.707	(-1.30)	1.064	(0.19)
Family income Q4	1.114	(0.42)	2.026*	(2.25)
Family income Q5	1.831*	(2.19)	1.077	(0.19)
reference category: KOK				
Did not vote	0.253***	(-4.60)	0.514	(-1.79)
Social Democratic Party - SDP	0.561	(-1.93)	0.728	(-0.81)
Centre Party of Finland - KESK	0.320***	(-3.73)	0.658	(-1.07)
Left Alliance - VAS	0.392*	(-2.56)	0.389	(-1.85)
Swedish Peoples Party - SFP/RKP	0.310*	(-2.48)	0.330	(-1.53)
Green League - VIHR	0.649	(-1.24)	0.546	(-1.28)
Christian Democrats - KD	0.147**	(-3.24)	0.575	(-0.97)
True Finns - PS	0.163***	(-5.23)	0.434*	(-1.98)
Other Party	0.174	(-1.74)	0.233	(-1.16)
Log likelihood	-842.3	N	934	
pseudo R-sq	0.117	Chi2	223.1	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8: Multinomial estimates. Great Britain

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
gender_fem	0.851	(-0.81)	1.793*	(2.50)
age	0.959	(-1.34)	0.982	(-0.54)
age2	1.000	(0.92)	1.000	(0.41)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	0.925	(-0.18)	1.504	(0.91)
in education	1.948	(1.00)	0.283	(-1.09)
retired	0.658	(-1.29)	0.827	(-0.53)
inactive	0.863	(-0.45)	0.778	(-0.73)
other	2.239	(0.62)	5.782	(1.30)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.852	(-0.11)	0.00000215	(-0.02)
Managers	1.445	(1.02)	0.763	(-0.64)
Professionals	1.962*	(2.04)	0.770	(-0.66)
Associate professionals	0.892	(-0.34)	0.541	(-1.55)
Serv and sales	0.556	(-1.76)	1.115	(0.33)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.232	(-1.29)	0.212	(-1.33)
Trade workers	0.473	(-1.81)	0.745	(-0.66)
Plant and machin operators	0.440*	(-1.97)	0.743	(-0.67)
Elementary occupations	0.460	(-1.94)	0.692	(-0.90)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	0.865	(-0.51)	0.547	(-1.94)
Family income Q2	0.998	(-0.01)	0.963	(-0.12)
Family income Q4	1.321	(0.99)	0.751	(-0.93)
Family income Q5	1.088	(0.30)	0.538	(-1.95)
reference category: CONS				
Did not vote	1.118	(0.44)	1.537	(1.60)
Labour - LAB	2.734***	(4.15)	1.511	(1.50)
Liberal Democrats - SLD	2.437**	(3.09)	1.251	(0.64)
Scottish National Party - SNP	1.494	(0.42)	0.564	(-0.48)
Plaid Cymru - PC	2.147	(0.69)	0.731	(-0.25)
Green Party	0.396	(-0.78)	1.221	(0.21)
Other party	0.566	(-0.68)	1.005	(0.01)
Log likelihood	-759.1	**N**	777	
pseudo R-sq	0.089	**Chi2**	148.9	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

In table 9 to 13, each of the 5 countries is excluded one by one in order to make sure that the results in the pooled regression are not driven by an outlier.

The traditional opposition between supporters and opponents (confronting "against" and "in favor") offers robust results and confirms what is usually found in the literature (students are strong supporters of the EU, as well as professionals and high income households). Four variables increase the probability to vote against membership rather than the undecided category ("can't choose"): elementary occupation, trade union membership, far left ideology and far right ideology. We will focus more specifically on these variables.

The influence of elementary occupation is robust, although weakly significant. Except when Denmark is excluded from the sample, the least skilled are on average 40% less likely to be undecided than to oppose EU membership.

The influence of trade union membership appears to be heavily driven by Finland. When Finland is excluded from the sample the coefficient is no longer significant (even when "against" is opposed to "in favor"). France also seems to play a major role, when excluded, the significance falls to 10% for supporters of the EU and the category can't choose is not relevant anymore. When Great-Britain is removed from the sample (table 13), the coefficient for trade union membership is roughly the same compared to table 3: if the respondent is unionized being in favor of EU membership decreases by 28% and 27% respectively. However, the opposition between "can't choose" and "against" do not come out anymore. The exclusion of Denmark and Ireland does not affect our main result.

Far left self-positioning reduces the relative risk ratio of being in favor of EU membership but also being undecided. For the second category however, the significance is weak (10% at best) and the coefficient becomes insignificant when Denmark, Ireland or Great-Britain are excluded from the sample. Far right self-positioning on the other hand has a strong and robust influence and increases the relative risk of being against EU membership compared to the two other possible response. Far-right political ideology is the most robust predictor of genuine anti-EU attitudes in our study.

CONCLUSION

The present analysis has proposed to explore the preferences of European citizens on EU membership in five member states. The strongest determinants of ambivalence are female gender, and electoral abstention. We found that four characteristics distinguish people willing to exit the EU from ambivalent people: elementary occupation, trade union membership, far left ideology and far right ideology. Among them, only far right ideology is robust. If the political parties position as hypothesized, the results weigh in favor of an electoral connection, most likely a two-way relationship with political offer and demand shaping each other. Although the relationship goes both ways, we argue that the party people vote for is critical to determine if criticism towards the EU will remain indecision or become hard euroscepticism because national politics play a major part in the polarization of public opinion. Finally, government parties are used as a reference category to test whether voters of opposition parties have distinct preferences about European integration. In 3 of the 5 countries in the analysis, the governing parties are the most pro-EU. Several opposition parties are gaining votes. So it is relevant to wonder what would happen to the European process if governing parties are not longer supportive of the EU. In Finland, Juha Sipilä became Prime Minister in May 2015 and formed a centre-right coalition, appointing Timo Soini as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. So far, the True Finns have toned down the Eurosceptical rhetoric and joined the consensus to contribute to the Greek rescue plan. Nonetheless, changing governing parties might change the consensus as well, notably if anti-EU parties were to rule a major country like France.

Is the sleeping giant waking up? Giving the low number of non-response and limited number of "can't choose" answer, one may be tempted to say yes. On the other hand, the empirical evidence provides only weak evidence that political parties are able to exploit the concerns about European integration.

APPENDICES

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION, 2014

Many eurosceptical parties have gained ground in the 2014 elections. Several of them came out ahead in the polls: The National Front in France (Front National), the Danish People's Party in Denmark (Dansk Folkeparti), Law and Justice in Poland (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) and the Hungarian Civic Alliance in Hungary (Fidesz). However not all the eurosceptical parties are right-wing (notably Siriza). It should be noted that right-wing parties are losing ground in Romania, Slovakia, Belgium and the Netherlands. In fact sovereignist parties appear to be the biggest winners: True finns (Finland), Dansk Folkeparti (Denmark), Alternative for Germany and Ukip (UK). The elections displayed a 43,11% voter participation. The European People's Party won the elections with 28,89 % of votes and Jean-Claude Juncker was elected President of the European Commission.

Summary of the results

EPP	221
S&D	191
ECR	70
ALDE	67
GUE/NGL	52
Greens/EFA	50
EFDD	48
NI	52

source: The European Parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/

EPP: European People's Party
S&D: Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists
ALDE: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group
GUE/NGL: European United Left–Nordic Green Left
G-EFA: The Greens–European Free Alliance
EFD: Europe of Freedom and Democracy
NI: Non-Inscrits

PARTIES	%	Seats	EPP	S&D	ECR	ALDE	GUE/NGL	Greens/EFA	EFDD	NI
DENMARK	100	13	1	3	4	3	1	1	0	0
O. (DF) : Dansk Folkeparti	26.60	4			4					
A. (S) : Socialdemokratiet	19.10	3		3						
V. (V) : Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti	16.70	2				2				
F. (SF) : Socialistisk Folkeparti	11.00	1						1		
C. (KF) : Det Konservative Folkeparti	9.10	1	1							
N. : Folkebevægelsen mod EU	8.10	1					1			
B. (RV) : Det Radikale Venstre	6.50	1				1				
I. (LA) : Ny Alliance	2.90	0								
FINLAND	100	13	3	2	2	4	1	1	0	0
KOK : Kansallinen Kokoomus	22.60	3	3							
KESK : Suomen Keskusta	19.70	3				3				
PS : Perussuomalaiset	12.90	2			2					
SDP : Finlands Socialdemokratiska Parti	12.30	2		2						
VAS : Vasemmistoliitto	9.30	1					1			
VIHR : Vihreä liitto	9.30	1						1		
SFP (RKP) : Svenska folkpartiet	6.80	1				1				
KD : Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit	5.20	0								
Other parties	1.90	0								
FRANCE	100	74	20	13	0	7	4	6	1	23
FN : Front national	24.86	23								23
UMP : Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	20.81	20	20							
Parti Socialiste - Parti radical de gauche	13.98	13		13						
Alternative (UDI+MoDem)	9.94	7				7				
Europe Ecologie	8.95	6						6		
Coalition Front de gauche	6.33	3					3			
DLR : Debout la République	3.82	0								
Nouvelle Donne : Nouvelle Donne	2.90	0								
LO : Liste ouvrière	1.00	0								
NPA : Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste	0.30	0								
UOM : Union pour les Outre-Mer	0.00	1					1			
Ind. : Indépendant	0.00	1							1	
Other parties	7.11	0								
IRELAND	100	11	4	1	1	1	4	0	0	0
Independents + other parties	25.64	3		1		1	1			
FF : Fianna Fáil Party	22.31	1			1					
FG : Fine Gael Party	22.28	4	4							
SF : Sinn Féin	19.52	3					3			
Lab. : Labour Party	5.33	0								
GP : Green Party	4.92	0								

UNITED KINGDOM	100	73	0	20	20	1	1	6	24	1
UKIP : United Kingdom Independence Party	26.77	24							24	
Lab. : Labour Party	24.74	20		20						
Cons. : Conservative Party	23.31	19			19					
GP : Green Party	7.67	3						3		
LDP : Liberal Democrats Party	6.69	1				1				
SNP : Scottish National Party	2.40	2						2		
BNP : The British National Party	1.11	0								
PL-PW : Plaid Cymru - Party of Wales	0.69	1						1		
SF : Sinn Féin	0.66	1					1			
DUP : Democratic Unionist Party	0.54	1								1
UUP : Conservative & Ulster Unionist Alliance	0.35	1			1					
SDLP : Social Democratic & Labour Party	0.34	0								
Other parties Great Britain	4.02	0								
Other parties Northern Ireland	0.71	0								

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

	Parties	Frequency	Percentage
	Did not vote	155	11,99
	Social Democratic Party - SD, Socialdemokraterne	266	20,57
	Radical Liberal Party - RV, Det Radikale Venstre	111	8,58
	Conservative Peoples Party - KP, Det Konservative Folkeparti	63	4,87
	Socialist Peoples Party - SF, Socialistik Folkeparti	112	8,66
Denmark	Christian Peoples Party - KRF, Kristend	4	0,31
	Danish Peoples Party - DF, Dansk Folkeparti	95	7,35
	Liberal Party - V, Venstre	320	24,75
	New Alliance - NA, Ny Alliance	37	2,86
	Leftwing Alliance - EL, Enhedslisten	78	6,03
	Other Party	10	0,77
	Voted blank	42	3,25
	Total	**1293**	**100**

	Parties	Frequency	Percentage
	Did not vote	218	11,98
	Worker's Struggle - LO -	8	0,44
	New Anticapitalist Party - NPA -	11	0,6
	Left Front - FG -	135	7,42
France	Socialist Party - PS -	478	26,26
	Green Party - EELV -	56	3,08
	Democratic Movement - MoDem -	114	6,26
	Union for a Popular Movement - UMP	493	27,09
	Arise the Republic - DLR -	17	0,93
	National front - FN -	175	9,62
	Invalid ballot, Vote blank	115	6,32
	Total	**1820**	**100**

	Parties	Frequency	Percentage
Finland			
	Did not vote	260	24,44
	Social Democratic Party - SDP	151	14,19
	Centre Party of Finland - KESK	134	12,59
	National Coalition Party - KOK	194	18,23
	Left Alliance - VAS	67	6,3
	Swedish Peoples Party - SFP/RKP	33	3,1
	Green League - VIHR	92	8,65
	Christian Democrats - KD	30	2,82
	True Finns - PS	97	9,12
	Other Party	6	0,56
	Total	**1064**	**100**

	Parties	Frequency	Percentage
Ireland			
	Did not vote	219	19,13
	Fine Gael	354	30,92
	Labour Party	121	10,57
	Fianna Fail	138	12,05
	Sinn Fein	54	4,72
	United Left Alliance	11	0,96
	Green Party	10	0,87
	Christian Solidarity	3	0,26
	Independent	60	5,24
	Other - Multiple parties selected	175	15,28
	Total	**1145**	**100**

	Parties	Frequency	Percentage
Great-Britain			
	Did not vote	232	28,61
	Conservative - CONS	232	28,61
	Labour - LAB	208	25,65
	Liberal Democrats - SLD	108	13,32
	Scottish National Party - SNP	7	0,86
	Plaid Cymru - PC	5	0,62
	Green Party	7	0,86
	Other party	12	1,48
	Total	**811**	**100**

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Referendum to remain member state of the EU			
	Vote against or can't choose	Vote in favour	Total
Occupation			
Armed forces	43.80	56.20	100.00
Managers	28.69	71.31	100.00
Professionals	25.39	74.61	100.00
Associate professionals	37.16	62.84	100.00
Service and sales managers	40.03	59.97	100.00
Clerks	53.31	46.69	100.00
Agriculture, forestry and fishery	45.78	54.22	100.00
Trade workers	54.79	45.21	100.00
Plant and machin operators	56.51	43.49	100.00
Elementary occupations	62.50	37.50	100.00
Employment status			
In paid work	40.04	59.96	100.00
Unemployed	48.16	51.84	100.00
In education	33.88	66.12	100.00
Retired	41.72	58.28	100.00
Inactive	48.49	51.51	100.00
Other	41.64	58.36	100.00
Left-right scale			
Did not vote	47.41	52.59	100.00
Far left	47.37	52.63	100.00
Left, center left	35.33	64.67	100.00
Center, liberal	29.23	70.77	100.00
Right, conservative	38.14	61.86	100.00
Far right	74.16	25.84	100.00
Family income			
Q1	43.08	56.92	100.00
Q2	48.28	51.72	100.00
Q3	45.22	54.78	100.00
Q4	36.16	63.84	100.00
Q5	30.74	69.26	100.00
Total	**40.68**	**59.32**	**100.00**

Referendum to remain member state of the EU	France	Ireland	Denmark	Finland	Great Britain	Total
Vote in favour	1225	909	838	546	300	**3818**
Vote against	460	144	322	406	319	**1651**
Cant choose	280	119	161	246	190	**996**
No answer	28	7	0	16	15	**66**
Total	**1993**	**1179**	**1321**	**1214**	**824**	**6531**

Referendum to remain member state of the EU	France	Ireland	Denmark	Finland	Great Britain	Total
Vote in favour	61.47	77.10	63.44	44.98	36.41	**58.46**
Vote against	23.08	12.21	24.38	33.44	38.71	**25.28**
Cant choose	14.05	10.09	12.19	20.26	23.06	**15.25**
No answer	1.40	0.59	0.00	1.32	1.82	**1.01**
Total	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**

SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable	Frequency	Percentage	Total
Referendum to remain member state of the EU (recoded)			
Vote against+can't choose	2,647	40.94	6,465
Vote in favour	3,818	59.06	6,465
Referendum to remain member state of the EU			
Vote in favour	3,818	58.46	6,531
Vote against	1,651	25.28	6,531
Cant choose	996	15.25	6,531
No answer	66	1.01	6,531
Gender			
male	3,029	46.44	6,522
female	3,493	53.56	6,522
Employment status			
In paid work	3,528	54.02	6,531
Unemployed	274	4.20	6,531
In education	426	6.52	6,531
Retired	1,656	25.36	6,531
Inactive	370	5.67	6,531
Other	277	4.24	6,531

Member of a trade union			
No	3,183	49.26	6,462
Yes (currently or previously)	3,279	50.74	6,462
Occupation			
Armed forces	355	5.62	6,314
Managers	629	9.96	6,314
Professionals	1,224	19.39	6,314
Associate professionals	1,243	19.69	6,314
Service and sales managers	656	10.39	6,314
Clerks	844	13.37	6,314
Agriculture, forestry and fishery	167	2.64	6,314
Trade workers	499	7.90	6,314
Plant and machin operators	368	5.83	6,314
Elementary occupations	329	5.21	6,314
Family income			
Q1	1,145	19.95	5,738
Q2	1,147	19.99	5,738
Q3	1,148	20.01	5,738
Q4	1,147	19.99	5,738
Q5	1,151	20.06	5,738
Country			
Denmark (DK)	1,321	20.23	6,531
Finland (FI)	1,214	18.59	6,531
France (FR)	1,993	30.52	6,531
Breat Britain (GB)	824	12.62	6,531
Ireland (IE)	1,179	18.05	6,531
Left-right scale			
Did not vote	2,001	30.64	6,531
Far left	362	5.54	6,531
Left, center left	1,416	21.68	6,531
Center, liberal	1,026	15.71	6,531
Right, conservative	1,456	22.29	6,531
Far right	270	4.13	6,531
Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**N**
age	50.51912	17.24454	6486
age2	2849.51	1769.285	6486

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Table 9: Multinomial estimates, pooled regression (France excluded)

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
female	0.947	(-0.60)	1.770***	(4.76)
age	0.955**	(-2.66)	0.964	(-1.75)
age2	1.000*	(1.98)	1.000	(1.24)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	1.015	(0.07)	1.292	(1.07)
in education	1.769*	(2.46)	1.290	(0.88)
retired	1.128	(0.78)	1.068	(0.33)
inactive	0.804	(-1.18)	0.944	(-0.26)
other	1.696	(1.59)	2.195*	(2.04)
Member of a trade union	0.734*	(-2.30)	0.856	(-0.89)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.565*	(-2.44)	0.641	(-1.44)
Managers	0.989	(-0.06)	0.742	(-1.18)
Professionals	1.312	(1.66)	0.783	(-1.18)
Associate professionals	0.883	(-0.77)	0.820	(-1.00)
Serv and sales	0.559***	(-3.51)	0.752	(-1.46)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.460*	(-2.55)	0.605	(-1.29)
Trade workers	0.486***	(-3.71)	0.825	(-0.80)
Plant and machin operators	0.433***	(-3.91)	0.604	(-1.88)
Elementary occupations	0.334***	(-5.32)	0.538*	(-2.57)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	1.057	(0.39)	0.838	(-1.00)
Family income Q2	0.806	(-1.70)	0.839	(-1.13)
Family income Q4	1.174	(1.27)	1.027	(0.17)
Family income Q5	1.405*	(2.58)	0.930	(-0.42)
reference category: Center, liberal				
Did not vote	0.683**	(-2.94)	1.176	(0.98)
Far left	0.339***	(-5.08)	0.545*	(-2.05)
Left, center left	0.864	(-1.05)	0.886	(-0.66)
Right, conservative	0.854	(-1.14)	0.950	(-0.28)
Far right	0.0916***	(-8.13)	0.281**	(-3.25)
reference category: Denmark				
Finland	0.379***	(-8.42)	0.805	(-1.42)
Ireland	1.850***	(3.98)	1.111	(0.50)
Great Britain	0.214***	(-8.88)	0.784	(-1.09)
Log likelihood		-3439.3	N	4000
pseudo R-square		0.107	Chi2	826.2

Table 10: Multinomial estimates, pooled regression (Denmark excluded)

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
female	0.874	(-1.51)	1.768***	(4.83)
age	0.970	(-1.93)	0.980	(-1.07)
age2	1.000	(1.50)	1.000	(0.69)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	0.951	(-0.26)	1.040	(0.17)
in education	2.419***	(3.35)	1.321	(0.87)
retired	1.285	(1.71)	1.211	(1.01)
inactive	0.967	(-0.18)	0.845	(-0.76)
other	1.374	(1.27)	1.297	(0.82)
Member of a trade union	0.713**	(-3.09)	0.719*	(-2.27)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.664	(-1.61)	1.067	(0.21)
Managers	1.323	(1.52)	0.672	(-1.55)
Professionals	1.650**	(3.12)	0.839	(-0.84)
Associate professionals	1.058	(0.37)	0.854	(-0.81)
Serv and sales	0.540***	(-3.86)	0.895	(-0.60)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.471**	(-2.93)	0.648	(-1.30)
Trade workers	0.430***	(-4.46)	0.875	(-0.57)
Plant and machin operators	0.481***	(-3.75)	0.790	(-0.97)
Elementary occupations	0.315***	(-5.54)	0.657	(-1.82)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	1.041	(0.29)	1.084	(0.48)
Family income Q2	0.867	(-1.16)	1.062	(0.40)
Family income Q4	1.209	(1.52)	1.173	(1.00)
Family income Q5	1.379*	(2.46)	1.042	(0.23)
reference category: Center, liberal				
Did not vote	0.676**	(-3.03)	1.127	(0.73)
Far left	0.424***	(-3.58)	0.746	(-0.92)
Left, center left	1.147	(0.98)	0.999	(-0.01)
Right, conservative	0.739*	(-2.18)	0.731	(-1.72)
Far right	0.153***	(-7.82)	0.380**	(-3.06)
reference category: Finland				
France	2.170***	(6.21)	1.019	(0.12)
Ireland	4.673***	(10.88)	1.254	(1.22)
Great Britain	0.531***	(-4.27)	0.840	(-0.96)
Log likelihood		-3552.6	N	4207
pseudo R-square		0.117	Chi2	944.7

Table 11: Multinomial estimates, pooled regression (Ireland excluded)

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
female	0.969	(-0.38)	1.753***	(5.14)
age	0.949***	(-3.50)	0.964*	(-2.01)
age2	1.000**	(2.73)	1.000	(1.58)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	1.129	(0.63)	1.218	(0.87)
in education	1.876**	(2.86)	1.064	(0.22)
retired	1.188	(1.25)	1.053	(0.29)
inactive	1.091	(0.45)	1.136	(0.57)
other	1.036	(0.15)	0.957	(-0.14)
Member of a trade union	0.645***	(-3.91)	0.722*	(-2.16)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.741	(-1.33)	0.807	(-0.75)
Managers	1.302	(1.47)	0.742	(-1.24)
Professionals	1.864***	(3.94)	0.816	(-1.00)
Associate professionals	1.067	(0.43)	0.817	(-1.10)
Serv and sales	0.640**	(-2.83)	0.816	(-1.10)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.548*	(-2.33)	0.639	(-1.35)
Trade workers	0.579**	(-3.07)	0.806	(-0.97)
Plant and machin operators	0.514***	(-3.41)	0.759	(-1.16)
Elementary occupations	0.421***	(-4.50)	0.642*	(-2.00)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	1.020	(0.16)	1.008	(0.05)
Family income Q2	0.866	(-1.26)	0.955	(-0.32)
Family income Q4	1.223	(1.76)	1.109	(0.70)
Family income Q5	1.433**	(2.99)	0.986	(-0.08)
reference category: Center, liberal				
Did not vote	0.682**	(-2.77)	1.357	(1.74)
Far left	0.427***	(-4.66)	0.717	(-1.32)
Left, center left	1.168	(1.12)	1.010	(0.05)
Right, conservative	0.925	(-0.58)	0.976	(-0.13)
Far right	0.137***	(-9.86)	0.375***	(-3.63)
reference category: Finland				
France	2.197***	(6.45)	1.077	(0.46)
Great Britain	0.484***	(-4.86)	0.800	(-1.20)
Denmark	2.433***	(8.08)	1.177	(1.12)
Log likelihood		-4033.6	N	4577
pseudo R-square		0.098	Chi2	873.9

Table 12: Multinomial estimates, pooled regression (Finland excluded)

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
female	0.940	(-0.71)	1.817***	(4.95)
age	0.958**	(-2.70)	0.973	(-1.35)
age2	1.000*	(2.21)	1.000	(1.02)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	1.395	(1.58)	1.156	(0.55)
in education	1.973**	(2.58)	1.309	(0.81)
retired	1.100	(0.65)	1.040	(0.20)
inactive	0.959	(-0.24)	0.806	(-0.98)
other	1.132	(0.49)	1.243	(0.66)
Member of a trade union	0.842	(-1.49)	0.795	(-1.44)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.645*	(-1.98)	0.725	(-1.11)
Managers	1.278	(1.34)	0.715	(-1.38)
Professionals	1.660**	(3.08)	0.752	(-1.34)
Associate professionals	1.031	(0.19)	0.701	(-1.81)
Serv and sales	0.640**	(-2.72)	0.814	(-1.06)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.728	(-1.08)	0.422	(-1.87)
Trade workers	0.575**	(-2.89)	0.750	(-1.17)
Plant and machin operators	0.477***	(-3.67)	0.709	(-1.37)
Elementary occupations	0.431***	(-4.04)	0.535*	(-2.48)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	1.018	(0.14)	0.941	(-0.35)
Family income Q2	0.876	(-1.09)	0.946	(-0.36)
Family income Q4	1.256	(1.82)	0.996	(-0.02)
Family income Q5	1.313*	(2.09)	0.957	(-0.25)
reference category: Center, liberal				
Did not vote	0.443***	(-5.37)	0.966	(-0.18)
Far left	0.264***	(-6.90)	0.527*	(-2.42)
Left, center left	0.705*	(-2.23)	0.758	(-1.32)
Right, conservative	0.558***	(-3.69)	0.703	(-1.67)
Far right	0.0868***	(-11.49)	0.282***	(-4.46)
reference category: Denmark				
France	1.037	(0.29)	0.964	(-0.21)
Ireland	1.844***	(4.03)	1.028	(0.13)
Great Britain	0.244***	(-8.90)	0.749	(-1.39)
Log likelihood		-3559.5	N	4413
pseudo R-square		0.112	Chi2	901.4

Table 13: Multinomial estimates, pooled regression (Great Britain excluded)

Base outcome: against	In favour		Can't choose	
Variable	RRR	Std-Error	RRR	Std-Error
female	1.015	(0.17)	1.855***	(5.13)
age	0.935***	(-3.86)	0.955*	(-2.02)
age2	1.001***	(3.46)	1.000	(1.75)
reference category: paid work				
Unemployed	1.163	(0.77)	1.030	(0.12)
in education	2.148***	(3.33)	1.425	(1.23)
retired	1.302	(1.76)	1.063	(0.30)
inactive	0.999	(-0.00)	0.938	(-0.25)
other	1.259	(0.99)	1.188	(0.57)
Member of a trade union	0.718**	(-3.24)	0.776	(-1.84)
reference category: clerks				
armed forces	0.624*	(-2.21)	0.812	(-0.75)
Managers	1.167	(0.80)	0.744	(-1.09)
Professionals	1.520*	(2.55)	0.837	(-0.81)
Associate professionals	1.035	(0.22)	0.897	(-0.55)
Serv and sales	0.619**	(-2.92)	0.751	(-1.39)
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.588*	(-2.04)	0.630	(-1.29)
Trade workers	0.557**	(-3.13)	0.903	(-0.42)
Plant and machin operators	0.497***	(-3.45)	0.770	(-0.99)
Elementary occupations	0.361***	(-4.90)	0.601*	(-2.00)
reference category: Q3				
Family income Q1	0.976	(-0.18)	1.008	(0.04)
Family income Q2	0.781*	(-2.08)	0.984	(-0.10)
Family income Q4	1.325*	(2.34)	1.214	(1.20)
Family income Q5	1.614***	(3.66)	1.003	(0.02)
reference category: Center, liberal				
Did not vote	0.707**	(-2.59)	1.174	(0.91)
Far left	0.421***	(-4.73)	0.612	(-1.92)
Left, center left	0.967	(-0.23)	0.822	(-1.01)
Right, conservative	1.002	(0.02)	0.925	(-0.40)
Far right	0.136***	(-9.89)	0.341***	(-3.97)
reference category: Finland				
France	2.298***	(6.91)	1.128	(0.75)
Ireland	5.177***	(11.69)	1.347	(1.60)
Denmark	2.463***	(8.16)	1.171	(1.08)
Log likelihood		-3787.6	N	4679
pseudo R-square		0.100	Chi2	845.2

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

CHAPTER II

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO ZONE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE DEBT CRISIS

RESUME

La confiance en l'Union européenne a enregistré une chute vertigineuse des suites de la crise économique. Pourtant la réaction des Européens ne s'apparente pas à un mouvement d'humeur. Nos données montrent que la confiance en l'UE a fortement baissé en 2010 c'est-à-dire lorsque la crise de la dette a pris de l'ampleur, tandis que la confiance envers le gouvernement avait commencé à baissé un an avant. Nous testons l'hypothèse selon laquelle les citoyens de la zone euro évaluent la réponse donnée par les institutions européennes à la crise des dettes publiques et in fine considèrent l'UE (au moins en partie) responsable des performances macroéconomiques dans la zone. L'analyse inclut les quinze pays de l'Union ayant adopté l'Euro au moment de la crise : Autriche, Allemagne, Belgique, Espagne, Finlande, France, Irlande, Italie, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Grèce, Slovénie, Chypre et Malte. Nous avons construit une base de données sur 10 ans (2004-2014) à l'aide des données eurobaromètre qui nous permettent de mesurer l'évolution de la confiance sur la période. Nous nous intéressons à l'impact de deux variables macroéconomiques sur la confiance : le taux de chômage et le taux d'intérêt de long terme (données eurostat).

La littérature sur les déterminants du soutien à l'intégration européenne est abondante en sciences politiques. Inglehart et Rabier (1978) sont les premiers auteurs à avoir introduit des variables macroéconomiques pour expliquer les attitudes individuelles envers l'UE. De nombreuses études publiées dans les années 1990 (et portant sur les périodes antérieures) s'appuient sur le contexte macroéconomique pour expliquer le soutien à l'UE (Anderson et Kaltenthaler, 1996 ; Eichenberg et Dalton, 1993 ; etc). En 2007 Eichenberg et Dalton publient "Post-Maastricht Blues". Dans cet article, les auteurs expliquent que les variables macroéconomiques n'ont plus un impact significatif sur le soutien. En effet, les bénéfices d'une plus forte intégration commerciale et de prix plus stables sont maintenant acquis et de nouveaux enjeux prennent de l'importance (en lien notamment avec l'état social et la préservation de la souveraineté nationale). Comme un certain nombre d'auteurs (Hobolt et Tilley, 2014 ; Kuhn et Stoeckel, 2014 ; Gomez, 2014) nous pensons que les variables macroéconomiques devraient à nouveau jouer un rôle important dans la période récente car les citoyens européens considèrent l'UE comme l'acteur principal pour endiguer la crise des

dettes souveraines et lui assignent une forte responsabilité. Armingeon et Ceka (2010) utilisent des données similaires aux nôtres (données eurobaromètre) mais sur une plus courte période (2007-2011) et en incluant tous les pays de l'UE (27 pays). Nos résultats diffèrent très nettement des résultats présentés par ces auteurs. En effet, ils trouvent que les variables macroéconomiques n'ont pas d'impact et que c'est la confiance dans le gouvernement national qui explique la confiance en l'UE. Nous défendons l'idée selon laquelle un nombre croissant d'Européens sont capable de ses former une opinion spécifique sur l'UE. Nous pensons que la forte corrélation (de 0.45 dans notre échantillon) entre confiance dans le gouvernement domestique et dans l'UE s'explique davantage par l'existence de variables qui influencent les deux niveaux de confiance que par une relation causale entre les deux.

La variable de l'enquête eurobaromètre utilisée est la suivante: *Je voudrais maintenant vous poser une question à propos de la confiance que vous inspirent certaines institutions. Pour chacune des institutions suivantes, pourriez-vous me dire si vous avez plutôt confiance ou plutôt pas confiance en elle ?* Pour modéliser ce choix binaire nous estimons un logit. La modèle inclut des variables socioéconomiques individuelles (âge, genre, occupation), des variables macroéconomiques (taux de chômage et taux d'intérêt de long terme) ainsi qu'une dummy qui prend en compte la mise sous tutelle du FMI. La deuxième étape consiste à subdiviser l'échantillon en deux périodes (2004-2009 puis 2010-2014) puis nous estimons également le modèle sur la période 2010-2012 qui constitue le moment le plus fort de la crise des dettes souveraines. Enfin nous estimons un probit bivarié pour estimer conjointement les déterminants de la confiance envers le gouvernement et envers l'UE. A l'aide de ce modèle nous estimons des *predictive margins*[21].

Le premier modèle reproduit les résultats bien connus de la littérature, déjà présents dans le premier chapitre : les managers et les étudiants expriment la plus forte confiance en l'UE, et le contraire est vrai pour les travailleurs manuels. Les chômeurs constituent la catégorie la moins confiante en l'Union européenne ce qui est conforme à notre hypothèse selon laquelle l'UE est un niveau de gouvernance pertinent en période de crise économique. La mise sous tutelle du FMI réduit le soutien de 20%, en effet les citoyens des pays les plus fortement touchés par la crise ont développé sur la période une relative méfiance envers l'UE. Le taux de chômage réduit fortement le soutien (baisse de 35% par écart type). Une hausse du taux d'intérêt

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[21] prédictions moyennes de l'échantillon pour une valeur fixe de l'une des variables

diminue également le soutien mais l'impact est moins fort (5% seulement lorsque le taux de chômage est inclus également). L'impact fort et robuste du taux de chômage sur la confiance se confirme lorsque l'on considère les trois sous-périodes. On constate néanmoins que la baisse de confiance est la plus forte sur la période 2010-2012 (moins 38%). Le coefficient du taux d'intérêt change de signe avec un impact positif avant la crise et qui devient négatif ensuite. Pour la dernière partie de l'analyse, nous nous focalisons sur la période post-crise (2010-2014). A l'aide d'un probit bivarié, on compare les déterminants du soutien au gouvernement à ceux du soutien à l'UE. Les termes d'erreur de ces deux variables sont bien corrélés (la valeur du rho est proche de 0,8) ce qui confirme la pertinence de la méthode d'estimation. Il apparait notamment que le taux d'intérêt de long terme a un impact opposé sur la confiance envers le gouvernement et envers l'UE. L'impact négatif sur l'UE est robuste sur la période 2010-2012. Dans notre analyse le rôle du taux de chômage est plus détaillé. Nous considérons le taux de chômage national, le taux de chômage européen (moyenne des taux de chômage des pays de l'échantillon) et l'écart entre ces deux valeurs. Le taux de chômage a un impact négatif fort et robuste sur les deux niveaux de confiance, que l'on considère le taux de chômage national ou celui de la zone euro. Lorsqu'on considère l'écart entre les deux, il apparait que les citoyens des pays où le chômage est plus faible que la moyenne européenne expriment une plus forte confiance envers les deux niveaux de gouvernance. L'estimation de *predictives margins* confirme que cette relation prévaut dans la plupart des cas (73% de l'échantillon fait confiance soit aux deux institutions, soit à aucune d'entre elles). Nous nous focalisons donc sur les 27% de l'échantillon restant: ceux qui ont confiance en leur gouvernement mais pas en l'UE, et ceux qui ont confiance en l'UE mais pas en leur gouvernement. On observe notamment que c'est lorsque le chômage du pays est proche de la moyenne européenne (9%) que les individus ont le plus de chance de faire confiance en l'UE plutôt qu'en leur gouvernement. L'effet est faible et l'intervalle de confiance est large mais cela nous donne une intuition intéressante. On peut se dire en effet que les citoyens seront d'autant plus enclin à déléguer des compétences à l'Union que leur pays se situe dans une situation moyenne au sein de la zone. Cette intuition est confirmée lorsqu'on considère l'écart entre chômage national et européen. On trouve une relation en U inversé où la probabilité de faire plus confiance en l'UE qu'en son propre gouvernement est de plus en plus élevé à mesure que l'on se rapproche de 0 (écart nul entre le taux de chômage européen et celui de son pays) et diminue ensuite lorsque les performances en termes de chômage sont meilleures que la moyenne de la zone. Une fois encore les intervalles de confiance sont très larges et les

résultats doivent être interprétés avec prudence. Ces résultats illustrent bien la situation dans la zone euro car l'hétérogénéité des situations macroéconomiques rend plus difficile l'adhésion à une politique commune et fragilise la volonté d'approfondir l'intégration européenne.

INTRODUCTION

Trust has been declining during the Great Recession. In the euro zone, trust in the EU started to drop in 2010 while trust in the government had already began falling one year before. This might show that citizens consider the European Union as a relevant level of governance and that it is therefore held responsible when crisis occurs. In the following paper we shall test the hypothesis under which trust in the EU was influenced by the economic governance during the debt crisis. Indeed, European institutions and a "European government" were on the spotlight and made decisions that had large media/press coverage with critical consequences in domestic policies and economic outcomes. Using a unique database combining Eurobarometer surveys from 2004 to 2014, trust is used as a proxy for the value people give to the EU response to the crisis. The focus is on the euro zone and the sovereign debt crisis which started in November 2009. Fifteen EU members are included in the study. A logistic regression is estimated to test the impact of macro variables on trust. We rely on a bivariate probit model to document the relationship between national government trust and EU trust.

Our empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that citizens blame the EU for the poor macroeconomic performances in the area. Unemployment has a strong and robust negative influence on trust in the EU. Bivariate probit estimates show that macroeconomic conditions might have a different impact on trust in the European Union compared to trust in national governments. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a considerable proportion of EU citizens are now able to make an informed opinion on EU politics and EU trust is not a proxy for evaluations of national policies. Predictive margins derived from the bivariate probit model suggest that citizens living in countries with economic performances close to the Euro zone average are more likely to trust the European Union. The analysis underlines the political challenges an increasingly heterogeneous European Union poses.

LITERATURE

Our paper relates to a large body of work that has studied public support for the EU. Inglehart & Rabier (1978) are the first authors who introduced macroeconomic variables as determinants of public support for European integration. They showed that growth and

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inflation matter but long-term influences such as the length of membership or the cognitive mobilization (the mobilization of public support for European institutions require a relatively high level of political skills) are stronger predictors of attitudes towards the EU. The link between citizens' support towards the EU and economic conditions has been further developed in the 1990's. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) confirm the impact of growth and inflation while the rate of unemployment had the strongest impact on the period considered (1973-93). Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) find a significant impact of inflation and intra-EC trade. Anderson and Reichert (1995) evaluate direct (EU budget) and indirect (from trade) benefits at the country and individual levels. They find EU budget is the strongest determinant of EU support for the 12 countries included in the study. During that period scholars agreed that macroeconomic conditions had an influence although its significance and magnitude would markedly vary depending on the sample and the time-period considered. Since the early 1990s and especially after the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, the literature has shown that macroeconomic conditions have become less significant (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). In the context of the current sovereign debt crisis, several scholars advance the hypothesis that macroeconomic variables could regain influence on citizens' evaluation. Not only has the EU acquired more competencies over years and citizens may hold it accountable for economic outcomes (Hobolt & Tilley 2014) but the context of the crisis gives an opportunity for citizens to evaluate the European governance based on decisions with a domestic impact. Citizens do not identify a 'European government': as a consequence, they will lose trust in the EU altogether when they blame it for poor performance. Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014) support the idea that citizens consider the EU as a relevant actor to tackle the sovereign debt crisis. They use a 2011 Eurobarometer wave and focus on European economic governance questions[22]. Institutions in the Euro area (mainly the European Council) have had to take measures such as financing bailout package that might be costly to the typical 'winners of European integration' in certain countries. Thus the authors draw a distinction between EU support and preferences for economic governance. They find that European economic governance is not evaluated through the benefits of membership but rather on their country's macro-economic situation. Gomez (2014) uses the Eurobarometer database from September 2007 to May 2011 and brings evidence that European citizens blame the EU for the bad

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[22] more specifically the 5 questions deal with coordination and financial regulation which are indicators of re-regulation within the EU

economic situation in their home country. They find robust results for unemployment and interest rates suggesting that there might be a feeling that the EU has failed to solve the sovereign debt crisis. Gomez (2014) further analyses the preferences of younger Europeans (aged 30 or less in the study) and finds that the effects of economic growth and interest rates are significantly stronger for this segment of the population. Roth et al. (2014) seek to measure the impact of the rate of unemployment on trust in the European Central Bank. They use fixed effects Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) on panel date over the period 1999-2012. To do so, they calculate "net trust" by subtracting the percentage of those who trust from those who do not trust. They separate pre-crisis from post-crisis periods and also differentiate between core (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). They find a robust negative relationship between unemployment and trust in the European Central Bank in times of crisis especially in periphery countries. Serricchio et al. (2013) study the effect of growth, inflation and unemployment on Euroscepticism using a logistic regression model. They compare data from 2007 and 2010 in order to capture the impact of the current financial crisis. They find a negative impact of GDP growth in 2007 that becomes insignificant in 2010. Inflation and unemployment have no impact in their model.

Armingeon and Ceka (2014) also focuses on macroeconomic variables to explain trust in the EU during the great recession. Additionally, they take a stand on the debate about whether European preferences do exist or they reflect solely national politics. They use 5 waves of Eurobarometer surveys over the period 2007-2011 and estimate a multilevel logistic regression including 27 EU countries. To explain trust in the EU they draw on cue theory (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Cue theory states that cognitive short-cuts, contextual factors and elite cues help citizens form opinions about issues they have little knowledge about. Armingeon and Ceka argue that citizens tend to use national context to evaluate the EU and it should be even more the case during the great recession because when discontent is high it extends to any level of government. On the other hand if economic and social conditions are good there are no reasons to distrust any government. Trust in national government and trust in the EU are correlated by 0.67 in their sample[23] and the regression analysis enhances that trust in the government is the strongest determinant of EU trust. None of the macro-economic indicators included in the analysis are significant suggesting that they do not affect trust in the

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[23] In our sample the correlation coefficient is r=0.457

period studied. Armingeon and Ceka elaborate on a causal relationship between trust in national governments and trust in the EU, showing that national elections and domestic economic conditions affect trust in the European Union. They reach the conclusion that attitudes towards national governments prime the attitudes towards the EU. Anderson (1998) is one of the first papers dealing with the interplay between national and European politics. The empirical study in the paper tends to prove that trust in the EU is a proxy for trust in national governments. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) and Munoz et al (2011) also show that national institutions influence preference towards the European Union. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) highlight that distrust in national institutions have a positive influence on support for the European Union. Citizens in countries where corruption is high are more inclined to transfer sovereignty to European institutions. Munoz et al (2011) confirm that living in a country with low trust institutions increases trust in the European Union. All these empirical contributions may as well support the idea that trust in the EU and trust in national governments are influenced by the same factors but do not necessarily influence one another. It would be wishful thinking to imagine that trust in different level of institutions could be perfectly independent. In the context of European integration, where decision-making is heavily intergovernmental it is even more unlikely for citizens to compartmentalize both level of governments. The present paper provides empirical evidence describing the interplay between national and European politics, especially how macroeconomic variables influence institutional trust at the national and European level.

At the micro level, EU support has been constantly related to favorable status on the labor market and more generally in the society. Gabel argues that gains and losses from the EU are unevenly distributed among citizens. European citizens base their preferences on a cost-benefit analysis. He formulates two main hypothesis based on human capital and income respectively. Labor market liberalization within the EU benefits high-skilled workers while capital market liberalization and cooperation in monetary policy benefits high income citizens. High-skilled workers can compete in the international market; on the other hand Europeans with high incomes are able to take advantage of investment opportunities and low inflation. Studies based on the utilitarian theory find a strong and robust effect (Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998).

THE DATA

We use a unique database combining Eurobarometer surveys from 2004 to 2014 and macroeconomic variables[24]. The micro variables are demographic controls for age and gender as well as indicators for occupation. As for macro variables we want to test whether market pressure and employment perspectives shapes preferences towards the EU. To the extent that only the adoption of the single currency is binding in terms of macroeconomic policies, we limited the sample to the 15 EU member states that had adopted the Euro when the crisis occurred: Austria, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta[25]. Two variables are included: Long-term interest rates and unemployment rate. The variables are standardized (variable with mean 0 and standard deviation 1). The analysis covers a 10-year period and includes notably returning confidence after 2012.

Most empirical analyses use the membership question from the Eurobarometer to evaluate public support for the European Union (Gabel, 2009; Kuhn et al, 2014). The question is as follows:

"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the European Community (Common Market) is a bad thing (1), neither good nor bad (2), or a good thing (3)?"

This question offers a subjective evaluation of the overall benefits of the European Union which is an essential dimension of support for the EU, and it is of course highly correlated to institutional trust. Nevertheless, by using the "trust" question we aim to target another dimension of support for the EU: the evaluation of the governance of the euro zone. Although it is clear that both dimensions (the evaluation of benefits and institutional trust in the EU) are jumbled together when individuals respond to surveys, we assume that the governance of the euro zone is likely to have affected institutional trust the most.

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[24] A detailed description is provided in the appendix

[25] 11 countries participated in the official launch of the euro on 1 January 1999 (Austria, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal); Greece adopted the single currency in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008.

Our dependent variable is "Trust in the European Union". Citizens were asked the following question:

> "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it".

Respondents are presented with several institutions, one of which being the European Union. Along with "tend to trust" and "tend not to trust", respondents can also use a third category of answer "don't know". As can be seen in the appendix, the amount of don't know answers are negligible, they are thus treated as missing values when logistic regressions are computed.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

The empirical analysis seeks to explain trust in the European Union. The dependent variable encompasses two choices: tend to trust and tend not to trust. Thus a logistic regression is estimated. It can be expressed as:

$$P_i = Prob\ (Y_{1i} = 1\ |X_i) = F(X_i\delta) \quad \forall i = 1,..,N$$

With $F(z) = e^z/(1+e^z)$, the cumulative logistic distribution function. The parameter vector δ, is estimated by maximum likelihood.

Logistic models are latent variable models, Y^*_{1ij}, the latent variable is defined as follow:

$$Y_{1i} = \begin{cases} 1\ if\ Y^*_{1ij} > 0 \\ 0\ otherwise \end{cases}$$

The baseline model includes standard socioeconomic characteristics and basic controls:

$$Y^*_{1ij} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 D_i + \delta_2 O_i + \delta_3 S_i + \delta_4 C_j + \varepsilon_{1i}$$

Where *i* characterizes individuals and *j* represents countries. D is a vector of individual socio-demographic characteristics (age and gender). O represents the occupation of individuals. S is a continuous variable capturing a trend in surveys over time. A continuous variable is used to

avoid the multiplication of time dummies that might reduce the significance of the whole model. We assume that the decline in trust is constant over time and implicitly put aside any shocks common to a particular survey. This hypothesis is relaxed in the robustness checks section. C stands for country dummies which accounts for any omitted country-specific influence and ε_{1i} is the error term. Country dummies control for omitted variables and measurements errors. Therefore within country variation is exploited.

Secondly macroeconomic variables are included one by one and altogether:

$$Y_{2_{ij}} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 D_i + \gamma_2 O_i + \gamma_3 S_i + \gamma_4 C_j + \gamma_5 M_j + \varepsilon_{2i}$$

Following Armingeon and Ceka (2014), we want to see if being under IMF's surveillance affected EU trust. A dummy variable for the intervention of the "Troika"[26] is included. It takes the value 1 for Greece in 2010, for Ireland and Portugal in 2011 and for Cyprus in 2012. Only the first year of IMF supervision takes the value 1. Our goal is to capture the effect of a placement under supervision of the IMF. We do not assume that this is a one-shot event but if we were to include all the years when EU countries were under IMF supervision, the shock we are interested in would be diluted among several other negative shocks such as the austerity programs and financial rating agency fluctuations.

In a next step, three sub-samples are created in order to disentangle the consequences of the crisis. We identify the announcement by Papandreou's government in early November 2009 as the start of the public debt crisis in Europe[27]. Consequently, the pre-crisis sample includes surveys from 2004 to 2009, the post crisis from 2010 to 2014, and the peak of the crisis pool surveys from 2010 to 2012.

In the second part of the analysis, trust in the European Union and trust in national governments are jointly considered. We make the assumption that there are unobserved variables that influence people to both trust (or distrust) the EU and their government. Both

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[26] The alliance between the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund to monitor the bailout plans in the Euro zone during the debt crisis

[27] previous data on government debt levels and deficits had been misreported : in November 2009 Greece runs a year deficit of 12.7% of GDP, and a public debt of $410 billion

opinions are determined by the same variables so that the error terms of the equations below are correlated. Like the seemingly unrelated regression model, bivariate probit models assume that the i.i.d. errors are correlated.

$$\begin{cases} Y_{2_{ij}} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D_i + \alpha_2 O_i + \alpha_3 S_i + \alpha_4 C_j + \alpha_5 M_j + \varepsilon'_{2i} \\ Y_{3_{ij}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 O_i + \beta_3 S_i + \beta_4 C_j + \beta_5 M_j + \varepsilon_{3i} \end{cases}$$

α and β are vectors of unknown parameters. The subscript i denotes an individual observation. ε'_{2i} and ε_{3i} are the error terms. They are assumed to be normally distributed$(N(\mu, \sigma^2) = N(0,1))$.

We write $Cov\ (\varepsilon'_{2i}, \varepsilon_{3i} \mid X_{2i}) = \rho$

If $\rho = 0$, the error terms are uncorrelated and both equations can be estimated separately.

If $\rho \neq 0$, separated estimates would be biased.

See the appendix for details on likelihood functions.

The tables display odd ratios to facilitate the interpretation. Odd ratios are exponentiated coefficient. Let b be the unexponentiated coefficient, s its standard error, and b_0 and b_1 the reported confidence interval for b. In exponentiated form, the point estimate is e^b, the standard error e^bs, and the confidence interval e^{b0} and e^{b1}. P-values are the same as those for b, as are Z and t statistics.

We use standardized values of unemployment rates and long term interest rates to ease the interpretation of the results. Variables have been rescaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one[28]. Each case's value on the standardized variable indicates its difference from the mean of the original variable in number of standard deviations (of the original variable). For example, 2 indicates that a case has a value two standard deviations higher than the mean

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[28] the mean (of the original variable) is subtracted from the value for each case, and the difference between the individual's score and the mean is divided by the standard deviation (of the original variable). By definition (because the sample includes only Euro zone countries), the mean of the unemployment rate variable is the average Euro zone unemployment rate over the 10 years considered.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

ADVERSE SHOCKS

Figure 1: Unemployment from 2004 to 2014

Figure 1 shows a surge in unemployment and a diverging trend between member states. Such raise in unemployment on one side, and the involvement of the European Union in the crisis on the other side is likely to create mixed opinions among European citizens.

Figure 2: Long term interest rates in Central Europe

Figure 3: Long term interest rates in periphery Europe

Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of long-term interest rates for central Europe. One can see a downward trend and more dispersion at the end of the period. Peripheral countries (figure 3) conversely, display an upward trend with an even greater dispersion in 2014.

The consequences of the crisis are well-known: low growth or recession, rising unemployment, growing deficits and public debts. Figures 1 to 3 highlight its asymmetric economic consequences among the member states. The diverging trend clearly appears from 2010 onwards between the center and the periphery of the European Union, but also within the sub-groups.

TRUST

Figure 4: trust in the European Union from 2004 to 2014[29]

The loss of trust does not seem to reflect the immediate impact of the crisis. The peak of the crisis is around October-November 2008. However the confidence level in this survey

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[29] We present ratios for each categories

remains high. The share of citizens who tend not to trust the EU starts to increase in May 2010 which corresponds to the onset of the Greek government-debt crisis. Indeed, the announcement was made in early November 2009, the data collection of EB 72.4 took place in October 2009, so the first survey included in our dataset that take into account the debt crisis is EB 73.4 in May 2010. The curves of trust and distrust reversed in late 2010. For the first time since the start of the EMU, more citizens distrust the European Union than trust it. Trust starts to roll upward in 2013 with a clear increase in 2014. The evolution of the curves suggests that they might reverse again in the next few years. Additionally, figure 4 shows that indifference towards the EU tends to decline in the euro zone.

Figure 5: Trust in the EU and trust in national governments

In figure 5, trust in the government is compared to trust in the EU over the period 2004-2014. Both institutions have suffered from the crisis. Strikingly, before 2008 the curves seem symmetric with a clearly higher level of trust in the European Union. From 2008 the curves show different tendencies. Trust in national governments started to decrease in 2009 while trust in the EU remains constant at that time (which is apparent in figure 4 also). Trust in the EU drops constantly from 2010 to 2012 while the path of government trust is more erratic.

Overall trust in the EU has reduced a lot more, as a result in 2014 trust in the two institutions end up at comparable levels in 2013. In what we can call the post-crisis period, trust in the EU seems to recover better. Descriptive statistics in the appendix reveal that 27% of the sample has responded differently for trust in the EU and trust in national government. We hypothesize that many citizens are now able to make an informed opinion on EU politics.

THE IMPACT OF MACRO VARIABLES ON TRUST

Figure 6: Correlation between mean trust in the EU and rate of unemployment by countries in 2004

Figure 7: Correlation between mean trust in the EU and rate of unemployment by countries in 2014

Figure 8: Correlation between mean trust in the EU and interest rates by countries in 2004

Figure 9: Correlation between mean trust in the EU and interest rates by countries in 2014

Figure 6 and 7 give an idea of the relationship that might exist between trust and unemployment. In 2004 (figure 6) the relationship seems inexistent. In 2014 however (figure 7), a trend has appeared, although it is mainly driven by outermost countries. We observe the same phenomenon for interest rates (figure 8 and 9). Overall, figure 6 to 9 suggest that macroeconomic variables are correlated to trust in the European Union after the debt crisis.

RESULTS

Model 1 presents the baseline model: a logistic regression including standard socioeconomic characteristics and basic controls. The model replicates the previous findings in the literature (see Gomez, 2014). Managers and students are the most pro-EU social classes while manual workers trust European integration the least. Unemployed people are among the least confident towards the EU, they trust the European Union 43% less than white collars. This result is in line with our main hypothesis that the EU is accountable for macroeconomic

outcomes. In model 2 the dummy "Troika" is highly significant and reports that those direct interventions in domestic politics decrease trust by 20%. Model 3 and 4 add macroeconomic variables one by one. The unemployment rate has the strongest impact (trust decreases by 35% as unemployment increases by one standard deviation) and one standard deviation increase in interest rates reduce trust by 18%[30]. Model 5 includes the macro variables altogether. Their significance remains high but the impact of long term interest rates on trust is weaker (a reduction of only 4%). The pseudo R-squared is 0,056 for both models 3 and 5 which imply that long term interest rates do not improve the explanatory power of the model.

Model 6 to 11 run estimates on three sub-samples: The pre-crisis (2004-2009), the post crisis (2010-2014) and the peak of the crisis (2010-2012). The most striking result is that macroeconomic variables explain public trust the best after the crisis (R2 goes from 0.038 to 0.042). Unemployment has a greater impact on trust during the peak of the crisis but the impact remains strong and highly significant in each of the subsample. The role played by long term interest rates is more ambiguous. Before the crisis long term interest rates had a positive impact on trust in the EU. The impact remains positive at the heart of the crisis and reversed in the post crisis period. One line of explanation would be that before the crisis, high interest rates countries are those who benefited from the adoption of the single currency the most (notably through access to credit). During the crisis, they have requested solidarity from other member states through bailouts of great amount. However from 2010 there is a strong diverging trend in long term interest rates (as shown in figure 2 and 3) which has exacerbated the lack of solidarity between member states within the euro zone and might have reduced trust in the EU from citizens in countries with high interest rates.

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[30] the impact of changes in the unemployment rate was tested too, but the results were not significant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
ref cat: male					
female	0.943***	0.943***	0.940***	0.941***	0.940***
	(-6.66)	(-6.68)	(-6.97)	(-6.84)	(-6.99)
ref cat: 25-39					
15-24	1.199***	1.200***	1.197***	1.202***	1.197***
	(9.19)	(9.20)	(9.01)	(9.27)	(9.03)
40-54	0.881***	0.880***	0.884***	0.882***	0.884***
	(-10.62)	(-10.68)	(-10.28)	(-10.53)	(-10.28)
Above 55	0.969*	0.967*	0.955**	0.961**	0.955**
	(-2.23)	(-2.33)	(-3.17)	(-2.75)	(-3.21)
ref cat: Other white collar					
Self-employed	1.036	1.037	1.044*	1.038	1.044*
	(1.83)	(1.86)	(2.17)	(1.88)	(2.16)
Manager	1.351***	1.350***	1.355***	1.345***	1.354***
	(16.10)	(16.05)	(16.19)	(15.83)	(16.14)
Manual worker	0.775***	0.774***	0.774***	0.773***	0.774***
	(-16.05)	(-16.09)	(-15.98)	(-16.15)	(-16.00)
House person	0.811***	0.811***	0.804***	0.808***	0.804***
	(-10.68)	(-10.66)	(-11.00)	(-10.82)	(-11.01)
Unemployed	0.577***	0.577***	0.619***	0.586***	0.618***
	(-27.41)	(-27.39)	(-23.64)	(-26.50)	(-23.68)
Retired	0.869***	0.869***	0.880***	0.872***	0.880***
	(-7.68)	(-7.67)	(-6.94)	(-7.50)	(-6.95)
Student	1.376***	1.375***	1.395***	1.370***	1.392***
	(12.72)	(12.67)	(13.14)	(12.49)	(13.07)
survey	0.994***	0.994***	0.996***	0.994***	0.996***
	(-85.75)	(-84.99)	(-47.78)	(-86.96)	(-46.95)
Troika		0.798***			
		(-8.25)			
Unemployment rate			0.649***		0.665***
			(-56.48)		(-45.83)
Long term interest rates				0.823***	0.966***
				(-32.96)	(-5.23)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	243456	243456	243456	243456	243456
pseudo R-sq	0.046	0.046	0.056	0.049	0.056
Log likelihood	-161036.3	-161002.0	-159349.7	-160443.0	-159335.9
chi2	15354.3	15423.0	18727.5	16541.0	18755.1
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses					
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001					

	Pre crisis		Post crisis		2010-2012	
	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
ref cat: male						
female	0.952***	0.951***	0.930***	0.929***	0.921***	0.921***
	(-3.74)	(-3.81)	(-6.00)	(-6.09)	(-5.27)	(-5.28)
ref cat: 25-39						
15-24	1.169***	1.166***	1.211***	1.216***	1.185***	1.186***
	(5.41)	(5.32)	(6.91)	(7.04)	(4.87)	(4.89)
40-54	0.875***	0.874***	0.886***	0.889***	0.920***	0.923***
	(-7.66)	(-7.77)	(-7.21)	(-6.99)	(-3.91)	(-3.76)
Above 55	0.969	0.964	0.942**	0.943**	0.973	0.973
	(-1.50)	(-1.72)	(-3.02)	(-2.95)	(-1.09)	(-1.06)
ref cat: Other white collar						
Self-employed	1.018	1.020	1.067*	1.063*	1.045	1.044
	(0.60)	(0.67)	(2.40)	(2.27)	(1.28)	(1.25)
Manager	1.321***	1.326***	1.388***	1.388***	1.370***	1.373***
	(10.13)	(10.25)	(12.72)	(12.70)	(9.48)	(9.56)
Manual worker	0.776***	0.776***	0.762***	0.764***	0.760***	0.762***
	(-10.98)	(-10.97)	(-12.17)	(-12.02)	(-9.70)	(-9.59)
House person	0.829***	0.829***	0.772***	0.776***	0.775***	0.776***
	(-6.75)	(-6.75)	(-9.02)	(-8.83)	(-7.06)	(-7.01)
Unemployed	0.601***	0.614***	0.608***	0.619***	0.612***	0.621***
	(-16.22)	(-15.50)	(-18.55)	(-17.82)	(-14.16)	(-13.74)
Retired	0.860***	0.864***	0.888***	0.892***	0.887***	0.892***
	(-5.52)	(-5.38)	(-4.74)	(-4.56)	(-3.72)	(-3.53)
Student	1.459***	1.467***	1.353***	1.356***	1.377***	1.384***
	(10.11)	(10.25)	(8.73)	(8.77)	(7.28)	(7.38)
survey	1.000	1.000	0.994***	0.996***	0.986***	0.989***
	(1.19)	(-1.32)	(-30.48)	(-16.31)	(-30.39)	(-20.90)
Long term interest rates		1.321***		0.951***		1.066**
		(6.54)		(-5.26)		(3.14)
Unemployment		0.777***		0.681***		0.624***
		(-12.06)		(-21.72)		(-10.18)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113416	113416	130040	130040	77743	77743
pseudo R-sq	0.027	0.028	0.038	0.042	0.036	0.038
Log likelihood	-74634.3	-74540.7	-84365.7	-84035.1	-51221.4	-51129.4
chi2	4136.3	4323.6	6694.3	7355.6	3831.5	4015.4

Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The second part of the analysis relies on biprobit estimates and focus on the post-crisis period[31]. Model 12 is the baseline model, including the microeconomic determinants and country dummies. The regression indicates that the errors term are indeed correlated and estimating trust in the European Union and trust in national government jointly is relevant. Socioeconomic determinants included in the model such as age and occupation, but also some variables that could not be included, influence both opinions. Long-term interest rates are included in models 13 to 15 and bring interesting results. Except in model 14 (where Euro zone unemployment rates are included) the impact of interest rates on trust changes sign. It even becomes insignificant for trust in national governments in model 15. In the end, interest rates have robust negative impact on trust in the European Union while the impact on national government trust is ambiguous. Monitored interest rates are an essential requirement for member states to adopt the single currency[32]. The European Commission disapproves of high interest rates and threatens sanctions against the countries which fail to meet their commitments. It is therefore not surprising that interest rates reduce trust in the European Union in each model. Long term interest rates illustrate that certain macroeconomic variables might have a different impact on trust in the European Union compared to trust in national governments. At the individual level one can see that age also plays differently. Trust in the EU is most stronger among young people compared to other age categories. It can be observed that retired people are also significantly distrustful towards the EU but not towards their government.

The impact of unemployment is a lot more uniform. Unemployment rates have a strong and robust negative impact on trust in institutions (national government or the EU) whether one considers national unemployment rates and European unemployment rates. However we do not expect the relationship to be linear but rather U-shape. Individuals in countries where unemployment is falling behind the EU level but also individuals in countries where unemployment is low and do not want to be dragged down by bad economic performances in the area, are likely to distrust the EU. Thus a variable measuring the gap between the unemployment level in the country the individual lives in and the mean level of unemployment in the euro area is included in model 15. The gap is positive when national unemployment is inferior to the Euro zone average; it is negative when national

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[31] Pooled estimates are available upon request

[32] Convergence criteria state that long term interest rates shall not be no more than 2.0% higher, than the unweighted arithmetic average of the similar 10-year government bond yields in the 3 EU member states with the lowest HICP inflation

unemployment is superior to the Euro zone average. The gap in unemployment has a positive impact which means that overall individuals in countries with below average rates of unemployment are more likely to trust both their government and the European Union.

Interpretation of regression tables can be very challenging in nonlinear models such as probit regression. Predictive margins allow interpreting effects on outcomes such as probabilities. Predictive margins are calculated from predictions of the model 13 for unemployment, model 14 for Euro zone unemployment, and model 15 for the gap between national and euro zone average unemployment rates[33]. Predictive margins are conditional expectations of responses. They display the averages of predictions over the estimation sample for fixed values of one covariate. Following Armingeon and Ceka (2014) we define four types of Europeans based on their level of institutional trust corresponding to 4 combinations of responses (figures 10 to 15):

- The trusting citizens: trust each level of government (Trust in the EU=1 Trust in national government=1)

- The detached citizens distrust each level of government (Trust in the EU=0 Trust in national government=0)

- The escapists: trust the European Union but not their government (Trust in the EU=1 Trust in national government=0

- The nationalists: trust only their government (Trust in the EU=0 Trust in national government=1)

We estimate the probability of one of these combinations to occur, for a given level of unemployment rate (fixed values) and integrating over the remaining covariate (average marginal effect).

We want to emphasize the interplay between the national and European level and the fact that a significant part of citizens now have a documented opinion on European politics. As appears from the descriptive statistics (table 3), 27% of the sample expresses different opinions on trust in the EU and trust in national government and we want to know if macroeconomic variables play a role. Predictive margins for trusting and detached citizens show a linear relationship: the better the employment situation (in your country, in the EU, in your country compared to the EU the more likely it is that your trust institutions (either national

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[33] We stop using standardized values for macroeconomic variables.

governments or the EU)[34]. Such results is intuitive (institutions are trusted because things go well and distrusted when things go wrong). We focus on the escapists and the nationalists to test if more sophisticated preferences emerge. Figures 10 to 15 illustrate the results. Figure 10 and 11 consider unemployment in the country the respondent lives in. As can be seen in figure 11, when unemployment goes up, the combination of high trust in national government and low trust in the EU is unlikely to happen. The relationship is less linear for escapists. When unemployment is around the average euro zone, citizens are the most likely to trust the European Union more than their own government. The difference is not marked and the confidence intervals are bigger than for nationalist citizens but it provides insights on the interplay between the national context and trust in both level of government. The next figures (12 to 13) involve euro zone average unemployment. When European unemployment is high, nationalist preferences are more likely to emerge. And the opposite is true, which suggests that determinants of trust in the European Union might be the gap between national economic performances and the situation in the whole Euro area. Indeed, if one's country is falling behind, it becomes less likely that European solidarity prevails. The last two figures (14 and 15) illustrate that view. National preferences are more likely to emerge when national unemployment is inferior to the European average (figure 15). Figure 14 displays the most interesting result: citizens living in countries with a close to European average unemployment rate are the most likely to trust the EU more than their own government (i.e. to fall into the category of escapist citizens). Once again the confidence intervals are large so the graphs must be interpreted with cautious. However those results are a good illustration of the current situation in the euro zone where macroeconomic heterogeneity makes it difficult to reach a consensus. Thus it is reasonable to think that citizens who support the European project are more likely to emerge in countries with economic performances close to the European average.

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[34] Predictive margins for trusting and detached citizens are available upon request

	Model 12		Model 13	
	Trust national	TrustEU	Trust national	TrustEU
ref cat: male				
female	-0.053***	-0.047***	-0.054***	-0.048***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
ref cat: 25-39				
15-24	0.057***	0.113***	0.059***	0.116***
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
40-54	-0.009	-0.074***	-0.006	-0.072***
	(0.414)	(0.000)	(0.575)	(0.000)
Above 55	0.087***	-0.034***	0.089***	-0.034***
	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.006)
ref cat: Other white collar				
Self-employed	0.006	0.040**	0.006	0.038**
	(0.718)	(0.018)	(0.746)	(0.023)
Manager	0.154***	0.202***	0.156***	0.203***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Manual worker	-0.159***	-0.169***	-0.156***	-0.167***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
House person	-0.075***	-0.160***	-0.071***	-0.156***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Unemployed	-0.333***	-0.305***	-0.321***	-0.293***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	-0.025	-0.075***	-0.021	-0.071***
	(0.132)	(0.000)	(0.205)	(0.000)
Student	0.063***	0.185***	0.064***	0.186***
	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)
survey	-0.002***	-0.004***	0.000	-0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.119)	(0.000)
Long term interest rates			0.005*	-0.014***
			(0.055)	(0.000)
National unemployment rate			-0.057***	-0.047***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.276***	2.929***	0.142	2.260***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.272)	(0.000)
Estimated covariance of error terms	0.862***		0.858***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	127570	127570	127570	127570

* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

	Model 14		Model 15	
	Trust national	TrustEU	Trust national	TrustEU
ref cat: male				
female	-0.053***	-0.047***	-0.054***	-0.047***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
ref cat: 25-39				
15-24	0.057***	0.116***	0.058***	0.114***
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
40-54	-0.009	-0.076***	-0.006	-0.073***
	(0.397)	(0.000)	(0.581)	(0.000)
Above 55	0.086***	-0.037***	0.089***	-0.034***
	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.006)
ref cat: Other white collar				
Self-employed	0.006	0.043**	0.005	0.038**
	(0.724)	(0.012)	(0.786)	(0.024)
Manager	0.154***	0.202***	0.156***	0.202***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Manual worker	-0.159***	-0.167***	-0.157***	-0.168***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
House person	-0.074***	-0.157***	-0.072***	-0.157***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Unemployed	-0.331***	-0.301***	-0.322***	-0.295***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Retired	-0.024	-0.074***	-0.020	-0.071***
	(0.142)	(0.000)	(0.216)	(0.000)
Student	0.062***	0.184***	0.065***	0.185***
	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)
survey	-0.001***	0.001***	-0.002***	-0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Long term interest rates	-0.013***	-0.021***	0.004	-0.018***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.156)	(0.000)
Euro zone unemployment rate	-0.021**	-0.170***		
	(0.013)	(0.000)		
Distance from Eurozone mean unemployment			0.058***	0.036***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.239***	0.872***	1.025***	3.102***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Estimated covariance of error terms	0.864***		0.860***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	127570	127570	127570	127570

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 10. Predictive margins: national unemployment (escapist)

Figure 11. Predictive margins: national unemployment (nationalist)

Figure 12. Predictive margins: average euro zone unemployment (escapist)

Figure 13. Predictive margins: average euro zone unemployment (nationalist)

Figure 14. Predictive margins: gap between national and euro zone average unemployment (escapist)

Predictive Margins with 95% CIs

Figure 15. Predictive margins: gap between national and euro zone average unemployment (nationalist)

Predictive Margins with 95% CIs

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Alternative specifications are presented in the appendix to make sure the previous results are robust. First of all, we include survey dummies to control for any factors common to one survey that might bias the coefficients (for example, a major event related to the EU that might have taken place around the date of the interviews). Column 1 is the baseline model, column 2 includes the macroeconomic variable and column 3 focuses on the post-crisis period (2010-2014). This specification indeed has an impact on the significance of the macroeconomic variables. Long term interest rates in the post-crisis period no longer impact on trust in the EU. Coefficients for unemployment rates remain unaltered. This is not surprising because in the previous sections coefficients for long term interest rates were sensitive to changes in specification. Additionally fixed effects reduce the variation that can be exploited, consequently significance is harder to achieve.

Subsequently, trust in national government is included as an explanatory variable. The inclusion of the variable does not challenge our results. However when the period considered is 2007-2011 as in Armingeon and Ceka (2014), the significance of the unemployment rate is highly reduced which might explain the fact that unemployment rate is not significant in their study. Indeed, when survey dummies are included (as in the case of their study), the coefficient for unemployment rate is no longer significant.

Finally, ordinary least square regressions are estimated for the baseline model, and seemingly unrelated equations are carried out. The estimation procedure does not alter the sign and significance of all the previously mentioned results.

CONCLUSION

The empirical evidence provided in the paper suggests that the interconnection between the economies of the Euro zone became tangible for EU citizens. As economic policies go beyond national institutions, citizens blame the EU institutions for the poor macroeconomic performances in the area. First we test the impact of IMF supervision, long term interest rates, and unemployment rates on EU trust. IMF supervision is found to have a strong negative effect on trust and so does high unemployment rates. The role played by long term interest rates is more ambiguous because it changes sign from one period to another. Before the crisis, interest rates increase support. One line of explanation is that high interest rates countries are those who benefited the most from the adoption of the single currency. During the crisis several countries with high interest rates have received bailouts. However they did not recover[35] and as their economic performances move away from other countries in the EU, solidarity becomes less likely which might explain that high interest rates are associated with lower trust in the post-crisis period. As a second step we document the idea that support for the EU is derived from evaluations of national politics and policy. We hypothesize that a considerable proportion of EU citizens are now able to make an informed opinion on EU politics. Bivariate probit estimates show that macroeconomic conditions might have a different impact on trust in the European Union compared to trust in national governments (although they are mostly predicted by the same determinants). Predictive margins derived from the bivariate probit model suggest that citizens living in countries with economic performances close to the Euro zone average are more likely to trust the European Union. The interpretation of the results might remain cautious. However they illustrate the current situation in the euro zone where macroeconomic heterogeneity makes it difficult to set a common strategy and undermines the desire to further integration.

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[35] Except for Ireland

APPENDICES

Macro variables, source EUROSTAT

Long-term interest rates
EMU convergence criterion bond yields (10yr government bonds)

Unemployment rate
Unemployed persons are persons aged 15-74 who were without work during the reference week, but who are currently available for work and were either actively seeking work in the past four weeks or had already found a job to start within the next three months.

Micro variables, source Eurobarometer

Eurobarometers (EB) Included in the Analysis:

Code	Date		
EB 62.0	November 2004	EB 74.2	Nov-Dec 2010
EB 63.4	May-June 2005	EB 75.3	May 2011
EB 66.1	October 2006	EB 76.3	November 2011
EB 67.2	April-May 2007	EB 77.3	May 2012
EB 68.1	Sept–Oct 2007	EB 78.1	November 2012
EB 69.2	March–May 2008	EB 79.3	2013
EB 70.1	Oct–Nov 2008	EB 80.1	November 2013
EB 71.3	June–July 2009	EB 81.2	March 2014
EB 72.4	Oct–Nov 2009	EB 82.3	November 2014
EB 73.4	May 2010		

Likelihood functions

The likelihood function for logit is:

$$\ln L = \sum_{j \in S} \ln F\left(x_j b\right) + \sum_{j \notin S} \ln\left\{1 - F(x_j b)\right\}$$

S stands for all the observations j, such that $y_j \neq 0$ and $F(z) = e^z/(1 + e^z)$.

The likelihood-ratio chi2 test is defined as $2(L_1 - L_0)$ where L_1 is the log likelihood of the full model, and L_0 the log likelihood of the model including only the constant term.

The pseudo R-square (McFadden 1974) is defined as $1 - L_1/L_0$

For bivariate probit regression, the log likelihood, is given by

$$\xi_j^\beta = x_j \beta + offset_j^\beta$$

$$\xi_j^\gamma = x_j \gamma + offset_j^\gamma$$

$$q_{1j} = \begin{cases} 1 \ if \ y_{1j} \neq 0 \\ -1 \ otherwise \end{cases}$$

$$q_{2j} = \begin{cases} 1 \ if \ y_{2j} \neq 0 \\ -1 \ otherwise \end{cases}$$

$$\rho_j^* = q_{1j} q_{2j} \rho$$

$$\ln L = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \ln \Phi_2 \left(q_{1j} \xi_j^\beta, q_{2j} \xi_j^\gamma, \rho_j^*\right)$$

Φ_2 is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution

In the maximum likelihood estimation of bivariate probit models atanh ρ is estimated. From the likelihood function, if $\rho = 0$ then the log likelihood is equal to the sum of the log likelihood of the two univariate probit models. A likelihood-ratio test can thus be performed.

$$atanh \ \rho = \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{(1 + \rho)}{(1 - \rho)}$$

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Summary statistics

	Frequency	Percentage	Total
Survey number			
620	27,928	10.36	269465
661	14,107	5.24	269465
672	14,142	5.25	269465
681	14,183	5.26	269465
692	14,19	5.27	269465
701	14,173	5.26	269465
713	14,17	5.26	269465
724	14,192	5.27	269465
734	14,157	5.25	269465
742	14,259	5.29	269465
753	14,246	5.29	269465
763	14,176	5.26	269465
773	14,179	5.26	269465
781	14,19	5.27	269465
793	14,111	5.24	269465
801	14,346	5.32	269465
812	14,403	5.35	269465
823	14,313	5.31	269465
Occupation			
Self employed	21587	8.01	269465
managers	25170	9.34	269465
other white colla	28905	10.73	269465
manual workers	51970	19.29	269465
House person	27342	10.15	269465
Unemployed	21111	7.83	269465
Retired	72326	26.84	269465
Student	21054	7.81	269465
Age categories			
15-24	30605	11.36	269465
25-39	62967	23.37	269465
40-54	70392	26.12	269465
Above 55	105501	39.15	269465
Gender			
Male	123986	46.01	269465
Female	145479	53.99	269465

	Frequency	Percentage	Total
Trust in the EU			
tend not to trust	123861	45.97	269465
tend to trust	119595	44.38	269465
don't know	26009	9.65	269465
Trust in the EU (binary)			
Tend not to trust	123,861	50.88	243456
Tend to trust	119,595	49.12	243456
Trust in national government			
Tend to trust	97,605	37.54	259983
Tend not to trust	157,777	60.69	259983
don't know	4,601	1.77	259983
Trust in national government (binary)			
tend not to trust	167,259	63.15	264864
tend to trust	97,605	36.85	264864
Country			
Austria	19143	7.10	269465
Belgium	19241	7.14	269465
Cyprus	9560	3.55	269465
Finland	19153	7.11	269465
France	19471	7.23	269465
Germany	29242	10.85	269465
Greece	19012	7.06	269465
Ireland	19077	7.08	269465
Italy	19441	7.21	269465
Luxembourg	9597	3.56	269465
Malta	9502	3.53	269465
Netherlands	19292	7.16	269465
Portugal	19120	7.10	269465
Slovenia	19439	7.21	269465
Spain	19175	7.12	269465
Year			
2004	13773	5.23	269465
2005	14155	5.25	269465
2006	14107	5.23	269465
2007	28325	10.50	269465
2008	28363	10.51	269465
2009	28362	10.51	269465
2010	28416	10.53	269465
2011	28422	10.53	269465
2012	28369	10.51	269465
2013	28457	10.55	269465
2014	28716	10.64	269465

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
U	269465	9.105307	4.902011	3.7	27.5
Ustd	269465	1.89e-09	1	-1.102671	3.752479
LTr	269465	4.245855	2.502474	1.16	22.5
LTrstd	269465	2.27e-10	1	-1.233121	7.294439
U_EU	269465	9.105307	1.874386	6.592958	11.89887
gap_U	269465	-8.48e-09	4.529502	-15.63197	6.698866

Descriptive statistics

Table 1

Country	tend not to trust	tend to trust	Total
Austria	55.56	44.44	100.00
Belgium	42.05	57.95	100.00
Cyprus	50.22	49.78	100.00
Finland	50.76	49.24	100.00
France	56.56	43.44	100.00
Germany	58.71	41.29	100.00
Greece	57.41	42.59	100.00
Ireland	48.06	51.94	100.00
Italy	52.27	47.73	100.00
Luxembourg	43.79	56.21	100.00
Malta	35.26	64.74	100.00
The Netherlands	47.31	52.69	100.00
Portugal	49.32	50.68	100.00
Slovenia	46.97	53.03	100.00
Spain	52.74	47.26	100.00
Total	50.88	49.12	100.00

Table 2

Occupation	tend not to trust	tend to trust	Total
Self employed	49.17	50.83	100.00
managers	42.18	57.82	100.00
other white collars	48.86	51.14	100.00
manual workers	54.68	45.32	100.00
House person	51.84	48.16	100.00
Unemployed	63.76	36.24	100.00
Retired	52.79	47.21	100.00
Student	36.17	63.83	100.00
Total	50.88	49.12	100.00

Table 3

Trust in national government	Tend not to trust	Tend to trust	Total
Tend not to trust	102822	46850	149672
	68.70 %	31.30 %	
Tend to trust	19726	71588	91314
	21.60 %	78.40 %	
Total	122548	118438	240986

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

	[1]	[2]	[3]
ref cat: male			
female	0.940***	0.938***	0.928***
	(-6.92)	(-7.15)	(-6.16)
ref cat: 25-39			
15-24	1.198***	1.198***	1.226***
	(9.08)	(9.01)	(7.29)
40-54	0.876***	0.880***	0.887***
	(-10.97)	(-10.60)	(-7.12)
Above 55	0.964*	0.953***	0.940**
	(-2.54)	(-3.31)	(-3.13)
ref cat: Other white collar			
Self-employed	1.043*	1.047*	1.066*
	(2.15)	(2.33)	(2.37)
Manager	1.355***	1.355***	1.384***
	(16.14)	(16.10)	(12.56)
Manual worker	0.770***	0.770***	0.763***
	(-16.30)	(-16.23)	(-12.08)
House person	0.812***	0.806***	0.778***
	(-10.53)	(-10.84)	(-8.73)
Unemployed	0.583***	0.614***	0.615***
	(-26.67)	(-23.92)	(-17.99)
Retired	0.866***	0.875***	0.886***
	(-7.83)	(-7.20)	(-4.79)
Student	1.391***	1.398***	1.353***
	(13.04)	(13.19)	(8.69)
Standardized values of long term interest rate		0.939***	1.011
		(-7.59)	(1.00)
Standardized values of unemployment rate		0.728***	0.705***
		(-31.12)	(-18.97)
Observations	243456	243456	130040
pseudo R-sq	0.055	0.061	0.046
Log likelihood	-159513.2	-158410.3	-83651.9
chi2	18400.4	20606.3	8122.0
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
Trust in national governme	9.447***	9.113***	9.626***	9.327***	9.383***
	(205.14)	(201.32)	(147.09)	(146.52)	(146.26)
ref cat: male					
female	0.967***	0.965***	0.949***	0.947***	0.948***
	(-3.35)	(-3.60)	(-3.81)	(-3.99)	(-3.92)
ref cat: 25-39					
15-24	1.205***	1.202***	1.204***	1.169***	1.167***
	(8.47)	(8.34)	(5.95)	(5.23)	(5.15)
40-54	0.860***	0.863***	0.873***	0.880***	0.879***
	(-11.22)	(-10.95)	(-7.16)	(-6.98)	(-7.01)
Above 55	0.866***	0.860***	0.869***	0.858***	0.858***
	(-8.88)	(-9.31)	(-6.22)	(-6.92)	(-6.90)
ref cat: Other white collar					
Self-employed	1.054*	1.058*	1.070*	1.020	1.019
	(2.39)	(2.54)	(2.22)	(0.65)	(0.63)
Manager	1.291***	1.292***	1.314***	1.314***	1.319***
	(12.10)	(12.13)	(9.29)	(9.38)	(9.52)
Manual worker	0.812***	0.811***	0.815***	0.775***	0.776***
	(-11.64)	(-11.66)	(-8.07)	(-10.48)	(-10.40)
House person	0.786***	0.783***	0.770***	0.741***	0.742***
	(-10.86)	(-11.02)	(-8.04)	(-9.96)	(-9.92)
Unemployed	0.675***	0.705***	0.711***	0.648***	0.647***
	(-17.51)	(-15.49)	(-11.33)	(-13.79)	(-13.83)
Retired	0.855***	0.863***	0.876***	0.837***	0.838***
	(-7.54)	(-7.11)	(-4.63)	(-6.28)	(-6.22)
Student	1.374***	1.381***	1.366***	1.395***	1.406***
	(11.36)	(11.48)	(7.99)	(8.65)	(8.84)
survey	0.994***	0.996***	0.994***	0.993***	
	(-68.78)	(-43.63)	(-20.13)	(-26.51)	
Standardized values of long term interest rate		0.960***	0.925***	0.830***	0.882***
		(-5.64)	(-7.57)	(-13.61)	(-8.05)
Standardized values of unemployment rate		0.781***	0.780***	1.044*	0.972
		(-25.37)	(-12.85)	(1.97)	(-1.15)
Observations	240986	240986	127570	127400	127400
Survey dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE

	[1]	[2]
ref cat: male		
female	0.986***	0.983***
	(-7.02)	(-6.09)
ref cat: 25-39		
15-24	1.042***	1.045***
	(8.86)	(6.92)
40-54	0.972***	0.974***
	(-10.28)	(-6.92)
Above 55	0.989**	0.987**
	(-3.20)	(-2.94)
Standardized values of long term interest rate	0.992***	0.987***
	(-5.80)	(-6.70)
Standardized values of unemployment rate	0.915***	0.927***
	(-46.75)	(-20.19)
ref cat: Other white collar		
Self-employed	1.009*	1.013*
	(2.02)	(2.15)
Manager	1.074***	1.083***
	(16.42)	(13.21)
Manual worker	0.941***	0.940***
	(-16.17)	(-12.07)
House person	0.951***	0.945***
	(-10.94)	(-8.80)
Unemployed	0.896***	0.901***
	(-23.76)	(-17.53)
Retired	0.970***	0.974***
	(-7.09)	(-4.62)
Student	1.078***	1.078***
	(12.94)	(9.36)
survey	0.999***	0.999***
	(-49.15)	(-17.75)
Observations	243456	130040
Country dummy	Yes	Yes

SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION

	[1]		[2]	
	Trust national	EU trust	Trust national	EU trust
ref cat: male				
female	0.984***	0.983***	0.984***	0.983***
	(-6.20)	(-6.20)	(-6.30)	(-6.28)
ref cat: 25-39				
15-24	1.016**	1.043***	1.017**	1.043***
	(2.71)	(6.46)	(2.81)	(6.56)
40-54	0.995	0.973***	0.996	0.974***
	(-1.44)	(-7.09)	(-1.21)	(-6.90)
Above 55	1.026***	0.988**	1.026***	0.988**
	(6.13)	(-2.74)	(6.21)	(-2.72)
ref cat: Other white collar				
Self-employed	1.003	1.014*	1.002	1.013*
	(0.52)	(2.23)	(0.38)	(2.11)
Manager	1.057***	1.082***	1.057***	1.082***
	(9.85)	(12.98)	(9.88)	(13.02)
Manual worker	0.950***	0.939***	0.951***	0.939***
	(-10.77)	(-12.23)	(-10.67)	(-12.10)
House person	0.978***	0.943***	0.979***	0.944***
	(-3.64)	(-8.98)	(-3.48)	(-8.79)
Unemployed	0.912***	0.897***	0.915***	0.901***
	(-16.78)	(-18.14)	(-16.15)	(-17.38)
Retired	0.994	0.972***	0.994	0.973***
	(-1.20)	(-4.94)	(-1.06)	(-4.74)
Student	1.026***	1.077***	1.026***	1.077***
	(3.41)	(9.11)	(3.41)	(9.13)
survey	1.000***	0.999***	1.000	0.999***
	(-9.42)	(-31.13)	(1.59)	(-18.22)
Long term interest rates			1.001	0.995***
			(1.17)	(-6.98)
Domestic unemployment rate			0.986***	0.985***
			(-19.95)	(-20.12)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	127570	127570	127570	127570
Log likelihood	-148029.5	-148029.5	-147667.8	-147667.8
chi2	17416.9	17416.9	17892.2	17892.2

	[3]		[4]	
	Trust national	EU trust	Trust national	EU trust
ref cat: male				
female	0.984***	0.983***	0.984***	0.983***
	(-6.19)	(-6.25)	(-6.29)	(-6.24)
ref cat: 25-39				
15-24	1.016**	1.044***	1.017**	1.043***
	(2.73)	(6.63)	(2.77)	(6.51)
40-54	0.995	0.973***	0.996	0.974***
	(-1.46)	(-7.19)	(-1.20)	(-6.95)
Above 55	1.026***	0.987**	1.026***	0.988**
	(6.09)	(-2.92)	(6.24)	(-2.73)
ref cat: Other white collar				
Self-employed	1.003	1.015*	1.002	1.013*
	(0.53)	(2.38)	(0.35)	(2.12)
Manager	1.057***	1.082***	1.057***	1.082***
	(9.85)	(12.99)	(9.89)	(13.02)
Manual worker	0.950***	0.939***	0.950***	0.939***
	(-10.74)	(-12.11)	(-10.69)	(-12.13)
House person	0.979***	0.944***	0.979***	0.944***
	(-3.61)	(-8.83)	(-3.51)	(-8.84)
Unemployed	0.912***	0.898***	0.915***	0.900***
	(-16.69)	(-17.85)	(-16.16)	(-17.52)
Retired	0.994	0.972***	0.994	0.973***
	(-1.17)	(-4.92)	(-1.04)	(-4.74)
Student	1.026***	1.076***	1.026***	1.077***
	(3.40)	(9.07)	(3.43)	(9.13)
survey	1.000**	1.000***	1.000***	0.998***
	(-2.93)	(3.45)	(-8.21)	(-31.95)
Long term interest rates	0.997***	0.993***	1.000	0.993***
	(-4.12)	(-9.53)	(0.48)	(-8.95)
Euro zone unemployment rate	0.995*	0.940***		
	(-1.98)	(-20.96)		
Distance from Eurozone mean unemployment			1.014***	1.012***
			(19.91)	(15.07)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	127570	127570	127570	127570
Log likelihood	-147689.2	-147689.2	-147722.8	-147722.8
chi2	17444.2	17444.2	17890.5	17890.5

CHAPTER III

MAPPING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR FURTHER EUROPEAN UNIFICATION: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS

RESUME

Le dernier chapitre de la thèse explore le soutien à l'approfondissement de l'UE. A l'aide des données de l'European Social Survey (ESS), nous effectuons une analyse multi-niveaux incluant 21 pays afin d'identifier comment le contexte influence la formation des préférences. Nous utilisons la question suivante: *Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?*

Les réponses se présentent sous forme d'une échelle de 0 à 10 (0= l'unification est déjà allée trop loin/10= l'unification devrait aller plus loin) et il est bien précisé aux personnes interrogées que unification ne veut pas dire élargissement. Dans le cadre de cette analyse, la poursuite de l'unification est considérée comme une intégration plus poussée et/ou un approfondissement de l'Union européenne.

Nous contribuons à la littérature de trois manières. Tout d'abord nous utilisons des données nouvelles, la question d'une unification plus poussée est essentielle et n'est pas couverte par l'eurobaromètre qui constitue la source la plus utilisée dans ce type d'études. Deuxièmement, le papier contribue au débat sur l'opposition clivages territoriaux/clivages transnationaux. Enfin, très peu d'études sur le sujet incluent une dimension régionale à l'analyse.

Lipset et Rokkan (1967) identifient deux types de clivages politiques: les clivages nationaux (ou territoriaux) et les clivages transnationaux (ou socioéconomiques). Les clivages nationaux peuvent être considérés comme contextuels (contexte historique, culturel, économique) tandis que les clivages socioéconomiques font références à des données individuelles (principalement niveaux d'éducation et revenu). Les clivages socioéconomiques sont bien expliqués par la théorie utilitariste du soutien à l'intégration européenne (Gabel, 1998) et nous avons prouvé dans nos précédents chapitres la robustesse de ce type d'explications. Les clivages territoriaux ont été en partie étudiés dans le deuxième chapitre de la thèse à l'aide de deux variables macroéconomiques afin de prendre en compte le contexte de crise. Dans ce dernier chapitre nous tenterons de faire le lien entre ces deux types de déterminants. Brinegar et Jolly (2005) étudient comment certaines variables contextuelles peuvent renforcer ou atténuer l'impact des déterminants socioéconomiques. Nous reprenons cette approche et en testant plusieurs interactions (entre les niveaux macroéconomiques et microéconomiques)

issues de la littérature. Nous nous demandons également si le niveau régional est pertinent pour expliquer le soutien à l'approfondissement de l'UE. Nous pensons en effet qu'il existe de fortes disparités régionales dans l'opinion publique vis-à-vis de l'Union et qu'il est intéressant de tenter de les expliquer. Enfin, nous nous demanderons si la question d'un approfondissement de l'Union diffère de la traditionnelle question du soutien à l'adhésion (question posée par l'eurobaromètre et le plus souvent utilisée dans la littérature). Hobolt (2014) propose une analyse multi-niveaux sur un échantillon comprenant 27 pays membres de l'UE. Cet article traite des déterminants du soutien à l'approfondissement de l'UE mais pas à son élargissement. L'auteur montre que les variables affectives ont un pouvoir explicatif limité tandis que les variables économiques ont elles un impact significatif. En effet, les traditionnels gagnants de l'intégration (les plus hautement qualifiés) ont tendance à soutenir l'approfondissement mais pas l'élargissement. C'est d'autant plus le cas dans les pays contributeurs nets qui craignent de devoir supporter le coût financier de nouvelles adhésions. Notre étude porte sur le soutien à l'approfondissement, nous pouvons donc nous attendre à ce que les variables économiques aient un fort pouvoir explicatif. Dans le même temps, dans des pays du cœur de l'Union traditionnellement très pro-européen, un nombre significatif d'Européens ont pu être déçu par les orientations prises par l'UE et sa gestion de la crise de la dette. Nous pensons donc que même chez les traditionnels soutiens de l'UE, la perspective d'une unification plus étroite peut ne pas être souhaitable.

L'analyse de décomposition de la variance montre que l'essentiel de la variance se situe au niveau individuel, les dimensions régionales et nationales représentent respectivement 3% et 6% de la variance. Bien que la variable dépendante soit très différente, les déterminants individuels confortent les résultats des chapitres précédents. En effet, les individus les plus qualifiés et ayant les plus hauts revenus soutiennent plus fortement l'approfondissement de l'intégration européenne que les autres catégories sociales. A l'aide d'un coefficient aléatoire pour la variable éducation selon la région et le pays, nous montrons que le coefficient des variables individuelles varie significativement d'un pays à l'autre et d'une région à l'autre. Nous incluons des variables explicatives au niveau régional puis au niveau national pour tenter d'expliquer ces différences. Plusieurs déterminants ressortent: le pourcentage d'élèves de l'enseignement supérieur, et le pourcentage de migration nette pour les régions, et l'indice de corruption, le taux de chômage des jeunes et les dépenses sociales pour les pays. Enfin, nous estimons des interactions entre les niveaux individuel et national. Celles-ci révèlent que

la coordination des négociations salariales renforcent l'impact positif de l'éducation. A l'inverse, plus le pourcentage d'élève dans l'enseignement supérieur est élevé, plus faible sera l'effet de l'éducation sur le soutien à l'intégration européenne. Nos résultats se démarquent de la littérature, notamment des analyses de Scheve (2000) et Brinegar et Jolly (2005). La principale explication se situe dans le choix de l'échantillon. En effet, nous avons inclus de nombreux pays d'Europe de l'Est et Centrale (Bulgarie, République Tchèque, Hongrie, Estonie, Lituanie, Pologne, Slovénie et Slovaquie). Dans les pays de l'Union à quinze, de fortes inégalités ont tendance à entrainer de la méfiance envers l'UE, particulièrement chez les moins qualifiés (Kuhn, 2014). De même les études de Scheve (2000) et Brinegar et Jolly (2005) portaient sur des pays de l'Union à quinze. Les pays d'Europe de l'Est et Centrale se caractérisent par une coordination salariale plus faible et des inégalités en moyenne plus élevées que dans le reste de l'Union européenne. Le niveau d'éducation est également plutôt élevé par rapport au reste de l'échantillon. Or, dans ces pays les professions intellectuelles sont certes les plus favorables à l'intégration européennes, mais les différences avec les travailleurs les moins qualifiés sont bien moins fortes que dans l'Union à quinze (Jacquier, 2012). On peut conclure de cette étude que pour analyser les préférences des nouveaux pays membres de l'Union européenne des cadres théoriques nouveaux sont nécessaires.

INTRODUCTION

Most empirical studies on public support focus on membership support[36]. We argue that levels of membership support alone do not give an accurate picture of where public opinion stands on the EU. This chapter proposes to document support for further European integration[37]. In the context of economic crisis in the EU, some individuals might consider unification of Europe as a positive step but are dissatisfied with the European agenda. To do so, we use a survey question from the European Social Survey (ESS) asking European citizens whether or not European unification should go further using a 0 to 10 scale.

The contribution to the literature is threefold. First a new dataset is exploited; the question of further unification is essential and is not covered by the Eurobarometer survey question traditionally used in the literature. Secondly, the paper contributes to the debate on territorial VS transnational cleavage. Finally, very few empirical studies include a regional dimension to its analysis of public support for the European Union.

A multilevel analysis involving 21 countries was conducted to identify contextual preference formation. Variance components analysis reveals that a multilevel structure is sound although the variance at the region and country levels is negligible compared to the individual level. Individual level predictors confirm that wide divides among social groups exist regarding the EU. Focusing on further integration rather than EU membership support does not lead to a different conclusion in this respect. Highly skilled occupations and high incomes support further European integration a lot more than any other groups. Using random slope we see that individual factors such as education vary from one region to another or one country to another. In the next sections, explanatory variables are included at both levels to see if country and region divides can be explained[38]. Several predictors stand out: the percentage of tertiary education, the GDP and the percentage of net migration for regions, corruption, young

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[36] The survey question usually used in the literature is found in the Eurobarometer (surveys carried by the European Union): *Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the European Community (Common Market) is a bad thing (1), neither good nor bad (2), or a good thing (3)?*

[37] In the present text, the terms "integration" and "unification" shall be used indiscriminately. They are regarded as similar concepts.

[38] The variables are obtained from multilevel data ESS6, eurostat and Visser (2015)

unemployment and social expenditures for countries. As a final step, cross-level interactions are estimated. We find that wage coordination enhances the positive impact of education. Conversely the higher the percentage of tertiary education, the smaller the education gap in public support for the EU.

LITERATURE

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) describe two types of political cleavage: National/territorial and transnational/socioeconomic. National cleavages result from the historical, cultural and economic context people live in. Socioeconomic cleavages correspond to social classes (income and education levels mainly) as well as differences based on values (post materialism and cognitive mobilization). The present chapter investigates the economic determinants of public support for European Union and the interaction between national and transnational drivers.

We rely on utilitarian explanations to account for socioeconomic cleavages. This utilitarian theory is based on the assumption that individuals calculate their expected gains from European integration, and the likelihood of positive evaluations is positively related to one's relative human capital (Gabel, 1998b). Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Anderson and Reichert (1995) provide evidence supporting the utilitarian model. They showed that the higher the income, the higher the support for EU membership. Kaltenthaler *et al* (2004) demonstrate that the most educated have the necessary skills to maximize their earnings in the global economy. Citizens with higher levels of education tend to be greater supporters of pro-market policies because they identify themselves as potential winners of market competition.

As for national cleavages, the study will focus on the economic context. We assume that the EU tends to be evaluated according to the potential added value it might bring to the national situation. Several studies indicate that citizens evaluate the EU based on macroeconomic performances (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel and Palmer, 1995). Indeed, the founders of the EU justified the integration in terms of welfare gains from trade. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of macro-economic predictors has largely decreased over time (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). Using Eurobarometer data, they emphasize that the higher the social expenses, the less citizens support EU action on health

and social security (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007:143 and 150). They make the case that many citizens want to preserve their national arrangements, notably social protection. Labor market or social protection policies are at the very root of socio-political compromises that funded post-war European economies. Eichenberg and Dalton also stress the influence of the EMU and its budgetary implications. Indeed, while European policies constrain national governments, there are no welfare state policies at the EU level. Citizens in the largest welfare states are likely to fear a decrease in social spendings as a consequence of European integration (Marks and Steenbergen, 2004). Kvist and Saari, (2007) investigate precisely this constraining effect of European integration on national welfare states (notably through the EMU).

Brinegar and Jolly (2005) make a bridge between national and transnational determinants. They intend to comprehend how national specificities (such as political-economic institutions and factor endowment) can reinforce or mitigate the impact of socioeconomic determinants on EU support[39]. Using Eurobarometer data, the skill level is taken into account through the frame of national factor endowments (skilled endowment is measured as the percentage of the population completing secondary education) and varieties of capitalism. They predict that in countries relatively well endowed with low-skilled workers, low-skilled workers should support integration, and the opposite would be true in countries with a scarcity of low-skilled labor. Additionally, workers in the most generous welfare states are more likely to perceive integration with a 'race-to-the-bottom' and be less supportive of the EU (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). They find that skill-based differences are not uniform across countries.

In the present study we also investigate how contextual factors mediate the influence of transnational variables that shape individual attitudes towards the EU such as occupational status. We further document the role of national determinants and extend it to test if regions are a relevant level of analysis to understand differences in public support for the EU. There are sound reasons to believe that regional contexts influence public support for the EU. First of all, the geographical location might affect the perception of citizens, for example in cross-border regions. EU support is expected to be stronger in regions hosting EU institutions such as Alsace, the Brussels-Capital region, Luxembourg and Hesse. On the other hand, according to their economic specific characteristics, regions are more or less affected by the EU. Its

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[39] The authors constructed a new dependent variables labeled Overall European Integration View (OEIV) combining several dimensions of EU perceptions

impact might appear damaging in certain regions. For example EU member-states are responsible for huge transit traffic in Tyrol which is viewed negatively by the Tyrolean people due to the pollution and noise caused by this transit traffic[40]. Some EU policies are controversial, opposition to the CAP and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is found in the most rural regions, hostility to the CFP is also present in some coastal regions (Landes). Strong dissatisfaction with the EU's reform of the wine sector was expressed in the region of Aquitaine. These differences exist and the literature has highlighted some of them. Perrineau (2005) showed differences of up to 30 percentage points between regions in terms of no votes in France in the 2005 referendum on the EU constitutional treaty. Kaiser (1995) analyzed the 1994 accession referenda in the Nordic countries and finds that inter-regional differences in levels of support reached a 20 percentage point difference. Trouvé (2005) found that French citizens voted markedly against the EU Constitutional Treaty in Aquitaine. Lubbers and Scheepers (2010) build a four-level model to emphasize how trends in political euroscepticism[41] vary both at the national and the regional levels. They find deviance from the country-level trend in four regions. In Greece, dytiki Macedonia shows a weaker decrease in Euroscepticism compared to the rest of Greece and the opposite is observed in Thessalia. The north of Luxembourg has become more eurosceptical over time than the rest of the country. Finally, the decrease in Euroscepticism is more pronounced in Castilla-La-Mancha than in Spain as a whole. Although Lubbers and Scheepers consider the variance at the regional level, they did not include any variable at the regional level that would help explain those differences.

Our study conveys another important contribution to the literature. Most empirical studies on public support use membership support as a proxy for European integration. We argue that support for membership is not enough to grasp preferences towards the EU. The issue of further integration is critical, especially in the context of economic crisis in the area. Hobolt (2014) investigate the support for deepening, or widening the European Union (further enlargement). The empirical analysis relies on Eurobarometer survey data over the period 2005-2012. Support for deepening is defined as strengthening the EU authority and is

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[40] No stops are necessary to transit freight through the Alps so the positive economic effects for the local alpine population is almost zero

[41] Political euroscepticism refers to citizens who reject the EU because they fear a loss of national sovereignty

measured through support for integration in common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and support for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The focus is on citizens who support deepening but not widening. Hobolt finds that citizens in core Eurozone countries, in net contributor states and in countries experiencing growth are more likely to support further integration, but not enlargement. High skilled workers also support deepening without widening. Their findings are consistent with the utilitarian theory: winners of the integration process want to deepen and reinforce the Union but they do not want to include new member states. Net contributor countries are especially concerned with the additional financial burden poorer member states might bring. These results suggest that economic variables are good predictors of support for further unification. Contrary to what is presented in Hobolt (2014), some individuals might consider unification of Europe as a positive step but are dissatisfied with the course of negative integration[42] (Scharpf, 1999). In countries where citizens strongly support membership, a significant number might be unsatisfied with the political agenda of the EU (attitude that would be referred as soft-euroscepticism here) and as a consequence oppose further integration. This is the case in Belgium (Abts et al, 2009). We assume that support for further unification also reflects support for the current political agenda of the Union. Consequently it is reasonable to think that among traditional supporters of the EU, some might find further unification undesirable.

THE DATA

The analysis is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) dataset. The program was launched by the European Science Foundation (ESF) and designed to compare social attitudes and values across European countries. The ESS provides a large data sample (at least 1,500 respondents per country) and employs the most rigorous methodologies. Kohler (2007) describes the ESS as the most reliable data for international comparisons. The analysis includes 21 EU member states: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Cyprus. The appendix provides descriptive statistics of the main national trends. We use the most recent wave including multilevel data: ESS6. The individual level data from ESS6 were collected in 2012.

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[42] Deregulation of national norms rather than new institutions or programs

Multilevel data are provided to document the context the ESS-respondents live in. Three levels are considered: individuals (the respondents), regions[43] and countries[44]. Data at the regional and national levels are from 2011. We assume that individuals base their preferences on past macroeconomic information. The variables from ESS included in the analysis at the region-level are the percentage of tertiary education, the regional GDP, young unemployment, long-term unemployment and the percentage of net migration by region. Variables at the country-level are also sourced from the ESS: Social expenditure in percentage of GDP 2011, Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income 2011, Unemployment rates by age 15-24 years in % 2011 and percentage of tertiary education. We use the following survey question: *"Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position? "*

There are two other sources of data. Eurostat provided two variables (GDP and GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)). We also use two variables from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts provided by Jelle Visser: Union density and coordination of wage-setting. See the appendix for details on the variables and their sources.

MULTILEVEL MODELING

Ignoring the multilevel data structure carries possibly incorrect standard errors and inflated Type 1 error rates (the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis although it is true). If the context is ignored, the individuals (N) are considered as independent. However, if individual-level factors are influenced by contextual factors then individuals sampled from the same context are not independent, but clustered. When those effects are not controlled for, the assumption that the errors are independent is violated. Including dummy variables for each subgroup captures the unique variation among the subgroups and standard errors are corrected. However, dummy variables do not explain why the different subgroups vary.

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[43] The regional variables are downloaded every second year. The variables from ESS 6 were downloaded in 2014

[44] The selection of variables provided by the ESS is based on the recommendations in the report of the ESS Upgrade and Planning Group on Contextual Data: 'Conceptual and Statistical Issues in Multilevel Analysis'

Including subgroup level predictors and interacting subgroups characteristics with predictors measured at a lower level of analysis provide information on the behavior of each subgroup. On the other hand, interactive models assume that the subgroup level predictors fully account for subgroup differences[45]. This is a very strong assumption which is usually not confirmed by the data. Multilevel modeling, as presented in this paper, exploits the theoretical opportunity to explain why subgroups differ and meet the statistical challenge that clustered data presents (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). We rely on a multilevel model to account for variance in a dependent variable measured at the individual level (support for further unification in the EU) using information from three levels of analysis: individuals, regions and countries. Variance components analysis is run using mixed-effects restricted maximum likelihood (REML) regression. Maximum likelihood parameters are those parameters estimates that maximize the probability of finding the sample data that was actually found.

The variance analysis enables to decompose the variance in EU support:

$$Support_{ijk} = \alpha_{0jk} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \tag{1}$$

Equation (1) is the individual level model. ε_{ijk} is individual-level variation around this mean. α_{0jk} is the mean level of EU support in region j in country k:

$$\alpha_{0jk} = \gamma_{000} + \upsilon_{00k} + \delta_{0jk}$$

γ_{000} is the overall mean of EU support (the mean across individuals, regions and countries) and υ_{00k} is cross-national variation around the mean. The national mean for EU support can be written as $\beta_{00k} = \gamma_{000} + \upsilon_{00k}$. Finally, δ_{0jk} is the region-level variation around this mean.

The variances components are given by ω_{00} (cross-national variation), τ_{00} (regional variation) and σ^2 (overall variation). If there is no variance at the regional and country levels, then responses from any EU countries and regions are expected to vary from the EU mean

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[45] A random error is only incorporated at the lowest level and error components are assumed to be zero at the highest levels of analysis

respondent in the same way. If there is cross-country and cross-region variance, individuals in different countries and regions will vary together from the EU mean respondent.

As a second step we estimate a linear model and include explanatory variables at the individual level (equation (2)). Although they most certainly play a role, no historical or cultural variables are included in the model; the focus is exclusively on economic factors. I is a vector of individual socio-demographic characteristics (age and gender), and the socioeconomic position of individuals (ISCO classification, employment status and employment relation).

$$Support_{ijk} = \alpha_{0jk} + \alpha_{1jk}I_{ijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \tag{2}$$

By modeling α_{0jk}, regional level predictors can be included:

$$\alpha_{0jk} = \beta_{00k} + \beta_{01k}R_{jk} + \delta_{0jk} \tag{3}$$

Thirdly, country-level drivers are included in the regional-level constant, β_{00k}:

$$\beta_{00k} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001}C_k + v_{00k} \tag{4}$$

R and C stand for predictors at the regional and country level respectively.

If we make the assumption that the effect of regional predictors is fixed (we write $\beta_{01k} = \gamma_{010}$) and the effect of the individual-level predictor is fixed as well ($\alpha_{1jk} = \gamma_{100}$) then substituting (3) and (4) into equation (2) yields:

$$Support_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001}C_k + \gamma_{010}R_{jk} + \gamma_{100}I_{ijk} + v_{00k} + \delta_{0jk} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \tag{5}$$

For both technical and theoretical however, the full model (including both regional and national predictors) presented in equation (5) is never implemented. Instead the predictors at the country and regional levels are included separately:

$$Support_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{100}I_{ijk} + v_{00k} + \delta_{0jk} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \tag{Model 1.1}$$

$$Support_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{100}I_{ijk} + \gamma_{010}R_{jk} + v_{00k} + \delta_{0jk} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \tag{Model 2}$$

$$Support_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{100}I_{ijk} + \gamma_{001}C_k + v_{00k} + \delta_{0jk} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \qquad \text{(Model 3.1)}$$

So far, we have made the assumption that the individual-level predictors have fixed effects. Only the intercept was allowed to vary across levels (see figure 1). However, our theoretical framework implies that individual variables have a different impact on public support according to the characteristics of the region and the country respondents live in. To model causal heterogeneity[46], we drop the assumption of fixed effects for education:

$$Support_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + v_{00k} + \delta_{0jk} + \gamma_{100}I1_{ijk} + \gamma_{2jk}EDUC_{ijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \qquad \text{(Model 1.2)}$$

With $I1$, a vector for each explanatory variable at the individual level except education

and $\gamma_{2jk} = \beta_{200} + \beta_{2j0} + \beta_{20k} + \delta_{2jk}$

Lastly, a model involving interaction terms between the individual level and the national level is estimated:

$$Support_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001}C_k + \gamma_{100}I2_{ijk} + \gamma_{201}C_{10k}*I3_{ijk} + v_{00k} + \delta_{0jk} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \qquad \text{(Model 3.2)}$$

$I2$ is a vector for each explanatory variable not interacted with country-level variables.

$I3$ is a vector for individual level variables interacted with the country level variables.

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[46] Following Western (1998), assuming that individual variables have a different impact according to the context people live in is referred to as "causal heterogeneity" by Steenbergen and Jones (2002)

VARIANCE COMPONENTS ANALYSIS

Table 1

Parameter	Estimates
Fixed Effects	
Constant	5.114
	(0.149)
Variance Components	
Country-level (ω_{00})	0.437
	(0.145)
Region-level (τ_{00})	0.215
	(0.028)
Individual-level (σ^2)	6.575
	(0.048)
-2 x Log Likelihood	176514,86

***=p >0.01

N= 37161

The intercept-only model (or variance component analysis) is estimated using mixed-effects restricted maximum likelihood (REML) regression on our large sample. Table 1 displays the REML estimates of the grand mean and the variance components. The intercept is 5.114 which is the average answer across all countries, regions and individuals.

As previously found in the literature (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002) the variance component at the individual level explains the largest part of the variance in EU support. The intra-cluster correlations (ICC) are equal to the proportion of the total variance that the variance components at each levels account for[47]. Individual level variation accounts for 91% of total variation here, countries and regions for 6% and 3% respectively.

In the literature section, we have detailed the main reason why regions matter and we have seen that regional disparities in public support for the EU are wide. Regional-level residuals (δ_{0jk}) and their standard errors were calculated. Figure 1 illustrates that marked differences between regions are present in our data.

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[47] The ICC formula is: $\frac{\sigma^2}{\omega_{00}+\tau_{00}+\sigma^2}$ at the individual level, $\frac{\tau_{00}}{\omega_{00}+\tau_{00}+\sigma^2}$ at the region-level, and $\frac{\omega_{00}}{\omega_{00}+\tau_{00}+\sigma^2}$ at the country-level

Figure 1

Table 2 presents the ranking of residuals among the 21 countries included in the present study. The United Kingdom has an estimated residual of -1.146. We estimate a mean score of 5.114-1.146=3.968.

In contrast, the mean score for Bulgaria is estimated as 5.114+1.34= 6.454. Those results illustrate that cross-country variation in public support for further integration is wide among the countries included in our sample. It is worth noticing that among the least supportive of further integration we now find structurally eurosceptical countries (The UK, Finland, Estonia and Sweden) but also countries that used to be strongly supportive of the EU and suffered from the debt crisis and austerity programs imposed by EU authorities: Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus.

Table 2

Country	residuals
United Kingdom	-1,146142
Finland	-0,8440557
Ireland	-0,621327
Estonia	-0,6098456
Portugal	-0,5701677
Sweden	-0,4202052
Czech republic	-0,3752307
Cyprus	-0,3005999
Slovakia	-0,276798
Hungary	-0,2556635
France	-0,1190227
Netherlands	-0,0092815
Belgium	0,1903609
Slovenia	0,2178813
Germany	0,3350276
Poland	0,5798509
Lithuania	0,5844846
Denmark	0,5995718
Italy	0,7949169
Spain	0,9059339
Bulgaria	1,340312

The fact that cross-country differences are significant is already acknowledged in the literature. Our aim is to test the main results in the literature on a different sample (including new member states and at a more recent period) and include new variables at the country-level to extend the state of knowledge in the field.

Standard likelihood ratio (LR) test procedures are applied to determine the significance of variance components[48]. Two models are compared. Model 1 (m1) is a null single level model. Model 2 (m2) is null but includes 3 levels: individuals, regions and countries. In both cases the multilevel model fits better the data.

Large sample	Reduced sample
m2-m1: LR = 2471.426	m2-m1: LR= 929.29147
Prob > chi2 = 0	Prob > chi2 = 1.61e-202

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[48] we consider the large sample including 21 countries

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND MAIN HYPOTHESIS

Socioeconomic determinants include income, occupation, trade union membership and the employment status.

Gabel and Palmer (1995) make the hypothesis that high income citizens are most capable to grasp the opportunities associated with capital market liberalization (investment opportunities and low inflation) and find empirical evidence supporting this assumption. Thus citizens belonging to high income families are expected to be more supportive of the EU than lower incomes. Gabel (2009) assumes that labor market liberalization benefits high-skilled workers because they are in a better position to compete on an international labor market. High-skilled positions such as managers and professionals are expected to be the most supportive occupational categories and low-skilled occupations (plant and machin operators, and elementary workers) to be more eurosceptical. Along with mainstream political parties, most European trade unions had adopted a pro-European position. However, the prospect of a "social Europe" has been challenged by the completion of the internal market, the enlargements and EU legislation such as the Posted Worker Directive (1996)[49] (Leconte, 2010). Thus the impact of trade union membership is not clear and might depend on union density. We do not have strong assumptions for every employment status, except for students. The fact that students are the most supportive of European integration is widely acknowledged. Students are expected to strongly support further integration. Unemployed people might also have distinct preferences from paid worker[50]. Iversen and Soskice (2001) assume that unemployed people need social transfers and are consequently opposed to policies that might weaken the welfare state. If the process of European integration is seen as encouraging liberalization, then unemployed Europeans would tend to oppose European integration. However, if the EU is able to pursue socioeconomic policies that could help them maximize their chances of finding a job, outsiders such as the unemployed might support the EU (Esping-Andersen, 1999).

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[49] The directive states that firms seconding workers in another member state have to abide by the host country's conditions in terms of the minimum legal wage and working time limits. It led to several controversial decisions from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Trade Unions accused the ECJ of prioritizing market integration over workers' rights.

[50] In chapter two we saw that unemployed people trusted the EU significantly less

Overall, our hypothesis regarding socioeconomic determinants is that the economic policies implemented by the European Union (notably budgetary orthodoxy or liberalization policies) are unlikely to favor low income, low-skilled or people dependent on state generosity.

We test four predictions found in the literature about the national context. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) showed that levels of national support for integration are higher in countries that suffer greater corruption. The author argues that the worse the opinion of the national political system, the lower the opportunity cost of transferring sovereignty to Europe. Thus we expect corruption to increase support for the EU. Kuhn et al (2014) show that growing inequalities are correlated with more euroscepticism especially among the low educated. The present study involves cross-sectional data which means that only the level of income inequality is considered. However, we expect the income inequality to decrease support, especially among the low educated. The study from Brinegar and Jolly (2005), presents two main hypothesis. They assume that the impact of education on public support for the EU will differ according to the skill endowments in the country and the welfare state type[51]. They predict that in countries relatively well endowed with low-skilled workers, low-skilled workers should support integration, and the opposite would be true in countries with a scarcity of low-skilled labor. They follow the logic of the Heckscher-Ohlin model and state that a country exports products that use their abundant factors of production. European integration (here associated with trade) would then favor the abundant factor and disadvantage the other. Additionally, they expect workers in the most generous welfare states to be less supportive of the EU. These hypotheses will be tested with our data. Social expenses are used as a proxy for welfare state type. We expect respondents with large social expenses to fear a 'race-to-the-bottom' between EU countries. Scheve (2000) proposed an interesting theory about the role of wage bargaining. He argues that centralized wage bargaining tends to reduce wage inequality, thus the distributive consequences of integration are mitigated and individuals are less threatened by European integration. The evidence presented in the paper by Scheve implies that the well known skill cleavage in opinion formation over European integration should be attenuated by

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[51] The variable for welfare state type is coded as continuous and takes the value 1 for social democratic, 2 for Christian democratic and 3 for residual welfare states.

a high degree of wage bargaining centralization. This hypothesis will be tested on a different sample[52].

We also test for the impact of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards, young unemployment, and union density because we expect them to be relevant in the present context . The expected sign is positive for GDP, and negative for young unemployment. In the context of economic crisis in the EU and a lack of solidarity in the euro zone, we expect poor economic performances to erode confidence in the European Union[53]. Union density is a proxy for the prevalence of trade unions. If unions are strong, they are expected to inform workers about the consequences of further European integration, should it be the opportunities or the risks. In the context of the debt crisis, it is reasonable to expect union density to decrease support for further integration. However, the impact of trade unions might be limited to trade union members.

Additionally, structural factors are included in order to document the socio-economic profiles of a given region and proxy the perceived benefits and costs associated with European integration. We include the percentage of tertiary education, regional GPD and unemployment (long term unemployment and young unemployment). We make the same assumption we made at the country level. We also include the percentage of net migration and make the assumption that more cosmopolitan regions would be more supportive of further European integration.

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[52] The sample in Scheve (2000) includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden and Austria.

[53] This result was already found in the previous chapter

RESULTS

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL PREDICTORS

Fixed effects

First, individual level variables are included in the regression. Although the sample is reduced[54] compared to table 1 and thus the variance residual cannot be compared directly, one can see that the individual-level predictors explain very little of the individual level variance in EU support. Hooghe and Marks (2005) argue that identity explains a larger part of the variance than economic factors. However, taking into account identity consists in including survey questions that reflect the respondent's opinion[55], to explain public support for the EU which is also an opinion. Our focus on economic variables is an attempt to draw a causal relationship between the objective information available concerning the respondents (age, nationality, gender, income, and occupational status) and preference formation towards the EU. We are aware that including variables such as EU attachment or trust in the European parliament would increase the explained variance. However, these variables are too correlated. For people who do not have a sophisticated opinion on the EU, the three questions are the same but formulated differently. Consequently, we choose not to use such variables and accept that a large part of the variance remain unexplained.

Most variables are strongly significant and confirm that a wide divide among social groups exists when it comes to European integration. Model 1.1.1 tends to prove that social groups reluctant to further European integration are the same who traditionally fear liberalization, i.e. manual workers. Compared to the reference category (clerks), plants and machine operators support further integration less (by 0.29), so do elementary occupations (0.20). Conversely, working as a manager raise support by 0.31 and as a professional 0.45. Even though

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[54] This is mainly due to the inclusion of the income decile, this variable has a significant amount of missing variables. Including a proxy for income (the variable HINCFEL which is an income self positioning from "living comfortably on present income" to "very difficult on present income") with less missing values does not alter the results

[55] The survey question typically used is: "do you see yourself as...(NATIONALITY) only / (NATIONALITY) and European / European and (NATIONALITY) /European only"

occupational clusters are taken into account, the highest income categories remain significantly more in favor of the European process (+0.4) than medium or low income ones. Trade union membership is significant and unionized workers are less supportive of further integration than their non-unionized counterparts (-0.13) points (in the 0-10 scale). As predicted, respondents in education are heavily supportive of the European Union. Being a student raises support by 0.44.

Model 1.1.2 is similar to model 1.1.1, except that a continuous variable is included to account for the educational level of respondents instead of occupational categories. The impact is strongly significant and the impact of an additional year of education is 0.073. Since education ranges from 0 to 51, the predicted difference between the least educated and the most educated is 51*0.073=3.723 which is considerable. Model 1.1.3 proposes an alternative measure of education, using ES-ISCED classification. Compared to the reference category, lower education decreases support and higher education enhances it.

Overall, we do not find any difference with respect to the existing literature. We confirm the results from Hobolt (2014) that supporters of deepening are traditional winners of the integration process.

Table 3

Variables	1.1.1		1.1.2		1.1.3	
	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error
female	-0.151***	(0.0345)	-0.0886**	(0.0310)	-0.102***	(0.0310)
reference category: 25-39						
15-24	0.265**	(0.0826)	0.305***	(0.0757)	0.337***	(0.0757)
40-54	-0.210***	(0.0451)	-0.168***	(0.0443)	-0.153***	(0.0444)
above 55	-0.128*	(0.0520)	-0.0302	(0.0513)	-0.0558	(0.0512)
reference category: paid work						
Education	0.444***	(0.103)	0.364***	(0.0856)	0.411***	(0.0858)
Unemployed	-0.0303	(0.0685)	-0.0541	(0.0657)	-0.0467	(0.0655)
Retired	0.0985	(0.0526)	0.172***	(0.0516)	0.143**	(0.0516)
Other	0.0370	(0.0574)	0.0425	(0.0540)	0.0414	(0.0539)
Member of a trade union	-0.127***	(0.0366)	-0.146***	(0.0358)	-0.147***	(0.0357)
reference category: 5th decile						
1st decile	-0.134	(0.0740)	-0.114	(0.0701)	-0.133	(0.0701)
2nd decile	-0.151*	(0.0696)	-0.127	(0.0667)	-0.135*	(0.0665)
3rd decile	-0.0237	(0.0685)	-0.00791	(0.0660)	-0.0182	(0.0658)
4th decile	0.0175	(0.0681)	0.0179	(0.0657)	0.0172	(0.0655)
6th decile	0.122	(0.0689)	0.110	(0.0666)	0.0862	(0.0664)
7th decile	0.135*	(0.0691)	0.167*	(0.0668)	0.134*	(0.0667)
8th decile	0.235***	(0.0711)	0.270***	(0.0687)	0.221**	(0.0686)
9th decile	0.197**	(0.0739)	0.229**	(0.0714)	0.153*	(0.0715)
10th decile	0.413***	(0.0751)	0.435***	(0.0720)	0.316***	(0.0726)
reference category: clerks						
Armed forces	0.237	(0.258)				
Managers	0.312***	(0.0803)				
Professionals	0.454***	(0.0664)				
Associate professionals	0.0419	(0.0675)				
Serv and sales	-0.0878	(0.0653)				
Agri, forestry and fishery	-0.367**	(0.120)				
Trade workers	-0.265***	(0.0724)				
Plant and machin operators	-0.285***	(0.0765)				
Elementary occupations	-0.206**	(0.0726)				
ref cat: ES-ISCED III upper tier						
ES-ISCED I					-0.300***	(0.0653)
ES-ISCED II					-0.274***	(0.0514)
ES-ISCED III lower tier					-0.270***	(0.0539)
ES-ISCED IV					-0.00849	(0.0543)
ES-ISCED V lower terciary					0.345***	(0.0599)
ES-ISCED V higher terciary					0.741***	(0.0567)
Years of education			0.0729***	(0.00457)		

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Constant	5.209	(0.173)	4.153	(0.175)	5.126	(0.161)
Variance components						
Country-level	0.436	(0.150)	0.435	(0.149)	0.402	(0.139)
Region-level	0.226	(0.0328)	0.223	(0.0319)	0.217	(0.0311)
Individual level	6.449	(0.0566)	6.409	(0.0544)	6.384	(0.0541)
N	26286		28059		28125	

Random effects

To model the different impact of individual variables on public support according to the characteristics of the region and the country respondents live in, we drop the assumption of fixed effects. The coefficient of the number of years of education completed is allowed to vary across levels.

In this model the variable "years of education" consists of two parts, a fixed and a random part. The fixed part is the expected value across all countries and regions (+0.069). The random part is a random coefficient following a normal distribution. We calculate its standard error to estimate a confidence interval which indicates how the coefficient varies from one country to another or from one region to another.

At the country level, the variance of the variable education is estimated at 0.00083. Its standard deviation is 0.029. With normally distributed observations 95% of the observations lie between two standard deviations below and above the mean. Consequently, 95% of the regression coefficients are expected to lie between (0.069-0.057)=0.012 and (0.069+0.057)=0.126

At the region level, the variance is estimated at 0.0015, so the standard deviation is 0.0387. 95% of the regression coefficients are expected to lie between (0.069-0.0774)=-0.0084 and (0.069+0.0774)=0.1464

The predictive intervals express that 95% of the regression coefficients of the variable "years of education" are predicted to lie between 0.012 and 0.126 at the country level and -0.0084 and 0.1464 at the region level. We observe a large and significant variance of the regression coefficient of education across both countries and regions.

Although they are not presented here, other variables were found to vary across levels, notably income and trade union membership.

Table 4

Variables	1.2	
	Coef	Std-error
female	-0.0795*	(0.0310)
reference category: 25-39		
15-24	0.311***	(0.0757)
40-54	-0.169***	(0.0443)
above 55	-0.0315	(0.0513)
Years of education	0.0695***	(0.00866)
reference category: paid work		
Education	0.357***	(0.0856)
Unemployed	-0.0534	(0.0656)
Retired	0.166**	(0.0517)
Other	0.0389	(0.0540)
Member of a trade union	-0.143***	(0.0358)
reference category: 5th decile		
1st decile	-0.133	(0.0704)
2nd decile	-0.128	(0.0667)
3rd decile	-0.00797	(0.0660)
4th decile	0.0187	(0.0657)
6th decile	0.112	(0.0665)
7th decile	0.165*	(0.0668)
8th decile	0.269***	(0.0686)
9th decile	0.228**	(0.0714)
10th decile	0.434***	(0.0722)
Constant	4.185***	(0.204)

Variance components	Coef	Std-error
Country level		
Education	0.000830	(0.000456)
Constant	0.598	(0.235)
Constant, education	-0.604	(0.312)
Region level		
Education	0.00151	(0.000587)
Constant	0.603	(0.145)
Constant, education	-1,165	(0.201)
individual level	6.381	(0.0544)

REGIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

Due to data availability, a reduced sample including only 9 countries[56] (around 17 000 observations) is used to document regional differences in EU support.

Five fixed effect predictors are included in order to explain region-level variation: the percentage of tertiary education, the regional GDP, regional young unemployment and long term unemployment, as well as the percentage of net migration by region. A null model of the reduced sample (including 16229 observations) estimates the variance component at the regional level at 0.12[57]. Thus the variance components are largely reduced with the inclusion of regional predictors (0.0448 in model 7). As predicted, the percentage of net migration, tertiary education and GDP all have a positive impact of EU support (model 2, 3, 6 and 7). Conversely, regional unemployment does not seem to affect support in the EU, neither young unemployment or long term unemployment are significant in model 4 and 5.

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[56] Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, The UK, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden

[57] Tables are available upon request

Table 5

Variables	2.1.1		2.1.2		2.1.3	
	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error
female	-0.139**	(-2.69)	-0.131*	(-2.31)	-0.136**	(-2.63)
reference category: 25-39						
15-24	0.168	(1.42)	0.179	(1.36)	0.177	(1.49)
40-54	-0.205**	(-3.03)	-0.198**	(-2.69)	-0.202**	(-2.98)
above 55	-0.161*	(-2.10)	-0.111	(-1.31)	-0.155*	(-2.01)
reference category: clerks						
Armed forces	1.166**	(2.98)	1.159**	(2.81)	1.184**	(3.03)
Managers	0.461***	(4.07)	0.472***	(3.89)	0.465***	(4.12)
Professionals	0.699***	(7.50)	0.779***	(7.77)	0.698***	(7.48)
Associate professionals	0.167	(1.77)	0.172	(1.71)	0.167	(1.78)
Serv and sales	-0.0506	(-0.54)	-0.136	(-1.33)	-0.0454	(-0.48)
Agri, forestry and fishery	-0.0651	(-0.35)	-0.0101	(-0.05)	-0.0499	(-0.27)
Trade workers	-0.188	(-1.71)	-0.148	(-1.24)	-0.178	(-1.62)
Plant and machin operators	-0.367**	(-2.98)	-0.299*	(-2.23)	-0.362**	(-2.94)
Elementary occupations	-0.186	(-1.68)	-0.219	(-1.86)	-0.178	(-1.61)
reference category: paid work						
Education	0.628***	(4.54)	0.656***	(4.20)	0.628***	(4.54)
Unemployed	-0.00833	(-0.07)	-0.0872	(-0.72)	-0.00158	(-0.01)
Retired	0.278***	(3.49)	0.263**	(3.02)	0.279***	(3.51)
Other	0.00478	(0.06)	0.0452	(0.51)	0.00229	(0.03)
Member of a trade union	-0.0812	(-1.49)	-0.0245	(-0.42)	-0.0711	(-1.31)
reference category: 5th decile						
1st decile	-0.118	(-1.02)	-0.0724	(-0.58)	-0.108	(-0.93)
2nd decile	-0.103	(-0.98)	-0.111	(-0.98)	-0.0947	(-0.90)
3rd decile	0.0866	(0.81)	0.106	(0.91)	0.0963	(0.90)
4th decile	-0.0192	(-0.18)	0.00898	(0.08)	-0.0141	(-0.13)
6th decile	0.164	(1.58)	0.173	(1.55)	0.167	(1.62)
7th decile	0.198	(1.91)	0.229*	(2.06)	0.199	(1.93)
8th decile	0.149	(1.42)	0.213	(1.86)	0.147	(1.40)
9th decile	0.306**	(2.81)	0.402***	(3.33)	0.310**	(2.86)
10th decile	0.506***	(4.63)	0.550***	(4.59)	0.503***	(4.62)
% of tertiary education by region			0.102**	(3.04)		
log of regional GPD (current price)					0.720***	(4.83)
Constant	5.042***	(18.10)	4.680***	(14.57)	-2.420	(-1.54)
Variance components						
Country-level	0.493	(-1.29)	0.488	(-1.21)	0.537	(-1.14)
Region-level	0.0672	(-8.65)	0.0542	(-7.19)	0.0385	(-7.72)
Individual level	6.369	(139.79)	6.580	(132.40)	6.370	(139.81)
N	11540		10006		11540	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 6

Variables	2.1.4		2.1.5		2.1.6		2.1.7	
	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error
female	-0.137*	(-2.42)	-0.131*	(-2.32)	-0.136**	(-2.62)	-0.125*	(-2.20)
reference category: 25-39								
15-24	0.160	(1.21)	0.173	(1.32)	0.169	(1.43)	0.183	(1.39)
40-54	-0.203**	(-2.75)	-0.202**	(-2.74)	-0.204**	(-3.01)	-0.196**	(-2.66)
above 55	-0.123	(-1.45)	-0.116	(-1.38)	-0.166*	(-2.16)	-0.112	(-1.32)
reference category: clerks								
Armed forces	1.256**	(3.02)	1.158**	(2.81)	1.156**	(2.96)	1.172**	(2.85)
Managers	0.460***	(3.78)	0.472***	(3.89)	0.454***	(4.01)	0.468***	(3.85)
Professionals	0.774***	(7.70)	0.783***	(7.81)	0.692***	(7.41)	0.774***	(7.70)
Associate professionals	0.164	(1.62)	0.173	(1.72)	0.162	(1.72)	0.167	(1.65)
Serv and sales	-0.142	(-1.38)	-0.136	(-1.34)	-0.0480	(-0.51)	-0.130	(-1.27)
Agri, forestry and fishery	-0.0315	(-0.16)	-0.0245	(-0.12)	-0.0565	(-0.31)	0.00284	(0.01)
Trade workers	-0.161	(-1.35)	-0.153	(-1.29)	-0.189	(-1.71)	-0.146	(-1.23)
Plant and machin operators	-0.290*	(-2.16)	-0.302*	(-2.25)	-0.362**	(-2.94)	-0.291*	(-2.17)
Elementary occupations	-0.233*	(-1.97)	-0.219	(-1.86)	-0.186	(-1.68)	-0.214	(-1.81)
reference category: paid work								
Education	0.662***	(4.21)	0.657***	(4.21)	0.613***	(4.42)	0.643***	(4.10)
Unemployed	-0.0980	(-0.81)	-0.0819	(-0.68)	-0.00728	(-0.06)	-0.0821	(-0.68)
Retired	0.261**	(2.98)	0.263**	(3.02)	0.286***	(3.58)	0.272**	(3.11)
Other	0.0547	(0.62)	0.0423	(0.48)	0.00249	(0.03)	0.0390	(0.44)
Member of a trade union	-0.0269	(-0.46)	-0.0226	(-0.39)	-0.0839	(-1.54)	-0.0213	(-0.36)
reference category: 5th decile								
1st decile	-0.0665	(-0.53)	-0.0705	(-0.57)	-0.105	(-0.90)	-0.0565	(-0.45)
2nd decile	-0.111	(-0.98)	-0.110	(-0.97)	-0.0966	(-0.91)	-0.0955	(-0.84)
3rd decile	0.119	(1.02)	0.108	(0.93)	0.0831	(0.77)	0.108	(0.93)
4th decile	0.0110	(0.10)	0.00986	(0.09)	-0.0239	(-0.23)	0.00635	(0.06)
6th decile	0.162	(1.44)	0.169	(1.51)	0.161	(1.55)	0.172	(1.53)
7th decile	0.224*	(2.01)	0.222*	(2.00)	0.186	(1.79)	0.213	(1.92)
8th decile	0.229*	(1.99)	0.206	(1.80)	0.139	(1.32)	0.197	(1.71)
9th decile	0.394**	(3.25)	0.391**	(3.23)	0.311**	(2.86)	0.403***	(3.33)
10th decile	0.560***	(4.65)	0.547***	(4.56)	0.501***	(4.59)	0.540***	(4.50)
% of tertiary education by region							0.0374	(0.93)
log of regional GPD (current price)							0.622**	(3.06)
Regional young unemployment (%)	-0.00283	(-0.34)						
Regional long term unemployment (%)			-0.0220	(-0.85)				
% of net migration by region					0.252*	(2.06)	-0.0553	(-0.40)
Constant	5.117***	(15.32)	5.124***	(16.50)	4.966***	(17.44)	-1.477	(-0.72)
Variance components								
Country-level	0.498	(-1.17)	0.504	(-1.15)	0.507	(-1.24)	0.515	(-1.12)
Region-level	0.0720	(-7.32)	0.0685	(-7.37)	0.0624	(-8.40)	0.0448	(-6.79)
Individual level	6.572	(131.83)	6.579	(132.38)	6.370	(139.52)	6.582	(132.12)
N	9936		10006		11493		9959	

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

COUNTRY LEVEL PREDICTORS

As previously mentioned, variables at the region level were systematically available only for 9 countries. Additionally, we choose not to include regional explanatory variables in the same regression because regional and national variables might blend (National GDP for example is a linear combination of regional GDP). Thus, in the next sections, region level predictors are not included and the larger sample (including 21 countries) is used.

Fixed effects

As a first step, national predictors are included as fixed effects. Indeed, a coefficient is calculated for the whole sample and the impact of variables are not allowed to vary from one country to another. We tested for the impact of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards, the percentage of tertiary education, the corruption index, young unemployment, Gini coefficients, the degree of wage coordination and union density. However, only three variables have a significant impact on EU support. They are presented in table 7. Higher scores stand for lower corruption in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, thus, a negative sign is interpreted as high corruption increases support for further European integration. When the index increase by 1 point (corruption decreases) support for further integration drops by 0.268. Young unemployment is only significant at 10% and as expected higher young unemployment decreases EU support. Since the percentage of young unemployment ranges from 7.6% to 46.4% the highest unemployment rate might decrease support by 1.38 point on the 0-10 EU support scale. Finally, the higher social expenditures, the more citizens support further integration which challenges our hypothesis.

Table 7

Variables	3.1	
	Coef	Std-error
female	-0.130***	(-3.53)
reference category: 25-39		
15-24	0.221*	(2.55)
40-54	-0.222***	(-4.65)
above 55	-0.153**	(-2.77)
Member of a trade union	-0.153***	(-3.92)
reference category: clerks		
Armed forces	0.433	(1.54)
Managers	0.345***	(4.08)
Professionals	0.506***	(7.22)
Associate professionals	0.0623	(0.88)
Serv and sales	-0.0718	(-1.04)
Agri, forestry and fishery	-0.317*	(-2.50)
Trade workers	-0.251**	(-3.26)
Plant and machin operators	-0.299***	(-3.65)
Elementary occupations	-0.197*	(-2.52)
reference category: paid work		
Education	0.469***	(4.48)
Unemployed	0.0130	(0.18)
Retired	0.120*	(2.13)
Other	-0.00919	(-0.15)
reference category: 5th decile		
1st decile	-0.140	(-1.74)
2nd decile	-0.154*	(-2.09)
3rd decile	-0.0492	(-0.68)
4th decile	0.00660	(0.09)
6th decile	0.137	(1.90)
7th decile	0.147*	(2.02)
8th decile	0.225**	(3.00)
9th decile	0.222**	(2.84)
10th decile	0.436***	(5.43)
Corruption	-0.268**	(-3.11)
Young unemployment	-0.0356	(-1.85)
Social expenditures	0.0767*	(2.32)
Constant	5.760***	(6.11)

Variance components		
Country-level	0.188***	(-4.45)
Region-level	0.136***	(-11.29)
Individual level	6.365***	(196.54)
N	22795	

Cross-level interactions

Model 3.2 in table 8 presents comprehensive models including 3 levels of analysis and interaction terms between individual and national predictors. Our aim is to document how national institutions affect the perception of the costs and benefits of European integration.

In the presence of a significant interaction the effect of the interaction variable and the direct effects of the explanatory variables that make up that interaction must be interpreted together as a system. Thus both direct effects are included in the regression, even though they are not systematically significant. The regression slope of one of the direct variables is the expected value of the regression coefficient for the case that the other variable is equal to zero, and vice versa. If the observed values of one variable do not include zero, then the regression coefficient for the other variable has no substantive interpretation. We present average marginal effects for each interaction terms.

Table 8

Variables	3.2.1		3.2.2	
	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error
female	-0.153***	(-4.19)	-0.0865**	(-2.79)
reference category: 25-39				
15-24	0.201*	(2.32)	0.309***	(4.08)
40-54	-0.228***	(-4.82)	-0.173***	(-3.89)
above 55	-0.162**	(-2.97)	-0.0328	(-0.64)
Member of a trade union	-0.0264	(-0.41)	-0.145***	(-4.06)
reference category: clerks				
Armed forces	0.320	(1.12)		
Managers	0.310***	(3.71)		
Professionals	0.472***	(6.83)		
Associate professionals	0.0568	(0.81)		
Serv and sales	-0.0688	(-1.01)		
Agri, forestry and fishery	-0.290*	(-2.31)		
Trade workers	-0.267***	(-3.51)		
Plant and machin operators	-0.314***	(-3.88)		
Elementary occupations	-0.202**	(-2.64)		
reference category: paid work				
Education	0.468***	(4.42)	0.361***	(4.21)
Unemployed	-0.0117	(-0.16)	-0.0553	(-0.84)
Retired	0.130*	(2.33)	0.170**	(3.29)
Other	0.0195	(0.32)	0.0423	(0.78)
reference category: 5th decile				
1st decile	-0.186*	(-2.33)	-0.129	(-1.84)
2nd decile	-0.174*	(-2.41)	-0.134*	(-2.02)
3rd decile	-0.0487	(-0.68)	-0.0114	(-0.17)
4th decile	-0.0188	(-0.26)	0.0159	(0.24)
6th decile	0.118	(1.65)	0.109	(1.64)
7th decile	0.131	(1.81)	0.165*	(2.47)
8th decile	0.203**	(2.71)	0.264***	(3.85)
9th decile	0.204**	(2.63)	0.227**	(3.17)
10th decile	0.415***	(5.27)	0.435***	(6.04)
Union density	-0.00157	(-0.23)		
UnionmembershipXUniondensity	**-0.00445***	(-2.54)		
Years of education			0.0421***	(4.65)
Coordination of wage setting			-0.127	(-1.11)
EducationXCoordination			**0.0110***	(3.95)
Constant	5.245***	(20.22)	4.513***	(13.40)

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Variance components	3.2.1		3.2.2	
Country-level	0.326	(-3.16)	0.407	(-2.68)
Region-level	0.126	(-12.36)	0.222	(-10.52)
Individual level	6.443	(202.05)	6.401	(218.71)
N	23723		28059	

Table 9

	3.2.3		3.2.4	
Variables	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error
female	-0.0840**	(-2.71)	-0.0879**	(-2.83)
reference category: 25-39				
15-24	0.301***	(3.97)	0.308***	(4.07)
40-54	-0.171***	(-3.86)	-0.169***	(-3.81)
above 55	-0.0319	(-0.62)	-0.0312	(-0.61)
Member of a trade union	-0.146***	(-4.09)	-0.144***	(-4.03)
reference category: paid work				
Education	0.357***	(4.17)	0.364***	(4.25)
Unemployed	-0.0574	(-0.87)	-0.0524	(-0.80)
Retired	0.164**	(3.18)	0.172***	(3.33)
Other	0.0431	(0.80)	0.0427	(0.79)
reference category: 5th decile				
1st decile	-0.107	(-1.53)	-0.124	(-1.76)
2nd decile	-0.123	(-1.85)	-0.130	(-1.95)
3rd decile	-0.00647	(-0.10)	-0.0108	(-0.16)
4th decile	0.0182	(0.28)	0.0174	(0.26)
6th decile	0.110	(1.65)	0.110	(1.65)
7th decile	0.168*	(2.51)	0.165*	(2.47)
8th decile	0.271***	(3.96)	0.267***	(3.89)
9th decile	0.234**	(3.28)	0.227**	(3.18)
10th decile	0.441***	(6.12)	0.434***	(6.03)
Years of education	0.155***	(6.94)	0.153***	(4.02)
Percentage of tertiary education	0.157	(0.81)		
EducationXtertiaryeducation	**-0.0188***	(-3.75)		
Gini coefficient			0.103*	(2.34)
EducationXGinicoefficient			**-0.00275*	(-2.12)
Constant	3.475***	(4.00)	1.176	(0.92)

t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Variance components	3.2.4		3.2.5	
Country-level	0.406	(-2.69)	0.354	(-3.04)
Region-level	0.220	(-10.56)	0.223	(-10.49)
Individual level	6.402	(218.72)	6.404	(218.76)
N	28059		28059	

The differentiated impact of education is investigated according to the degree of wage coordination in a country[58] and the percentage of tertiary education. The results concerning wage setting coordination do not confirm the assumption of Scheve (2000). Once interacted with years of education, one can see that the more coordinated wage bargaining is the more education enhances support for further European integration (figure 3). Education is also interacted with the percentage of tertiary education. Following Brinegar and Jolly (2005), in countries with a high share of highly educated workers, the low skilled are expected to display a lower support for European integration than countries less endowed with skills. A higher percentage of tertiary education should reinforce the positive impact of education on support. However the regression coefficient is negative and figure 5 shows that education has a positive and significant impact but this impact is mitigated by the percentage of tertiary education. In sum, a high percentage of tertiary education mitigates the positive impact of education on support in our sample.

As stated before, belonging to a trade union has a negative impact on support for further European unification. Now we see that this negative impact increases with union density[59](figure 2). The fact that the coefficient for membership alone is not significant has no straightforward interpretation. The coefficient for union membership in regression 3.2.1 refers to a country where union density is zero which is an extreme value, not observed in the data. However, one can infer that the negative impact of union membership is driven by countries where trade unions are strong and play a part in the debate over European integration.

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[58] The degree of coordination is measured from 0 to 5, 5 being the highest level of coordination
[59] To facilitate the interpretation, union density was standardized

Figure 2

Average Marginal Effects of trade union membership with 95% CIs

Figure 3

Average Marginal Effects of education with 95% CIs

Figure 4

Average Marginal Effects of education with 95% CIs

Figure 5

Average Marginal Effects of education (indiv) with 95% CIs

Finally, the impact of inequalities is considered. In the previous section we find no significant impact of the level of income inequalities (gini index[60]) on support for further unification. Now we consider the impact of inequalities according to the education level. Inequalities are expected to decrease support for further European integration for the low skilled (Kuhn et al, 2014). However, we find the opposite effect. The coefficient in model 3.2.4 indicates that higher inequalities mitigate the positive impact of education on public support for the EU. If education equals to zero, inequalities increase support (0.103). This should not be interpreted as positive impact of inequalities on EU feelings. Figure 6 in the appendix show that income inequalities do not have a significant impact on support for further unification except under 10 years of education. However figure 4 reveals that income inequalities reduces the positive impact of education on support for further unification. Empirical evidence prove that the educational divide is weaker in countries where inequalities are higher.

Overall, our results challenge previous results in the literature. In our sample high social expenditures are associated with support for further unification, wage coordination enhances the educational gap while income inequalities and tertiary education both reduce it. The main explanation is the composition of the sample. Our sample is much larger than previous studies and includes central and eastern member states. The preferences of new member states are likely to be distinct because of their communist past and their emerging economies. The impact of social expenditures is weakly significant and its impact is modest in size. Nonetheless, its positive sign might be explained by country with residual welfare states where citizens support a European single market and thus consider that unification has already gone too far. As for wage setting coordination, Scheve (2000) assumed that its impact on income distribution would mitigate the educational divide. It appears from the statistics shown in the appendix that more coordinated countries indeed display lower disposable income inequalities which confirms his first assumption. However contrary to Scheve (2000) income inequalities in our sample attenuates the skill divide (figure 4). This can be due to the fact that our sample includes central and eastern member states where inequalities are higher but the skill divide is much weaker than former member states (Jacquier, 2012). Similarly, tertiary education is rather high in central and eastern member states (see figures in the appendix), which might explain why tertiary education reduces the educational divide in our sample (figure 5).

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[60] The higher the Gini coefficient, the less egalitarian is the distribution of income

Additionally we can offer several secondary explanations for the unexpected results presented in the chapter. The time period is different from most of the literature we refer to. Data were collected in 2012 and the crisis might have affected public opinion temporarily or even permanently. The fact that our dependent variable focuses on support for further European integration might also influence the results. Finally there might be a technical reason for some counter-intuitive results. As one can see in the appendix, variables at the country-level do not vary strongly from one country to another. For example, the Gini coefficient or the percentage of tertiary education, are concentrated around the same values which might reflect a convergence within the EU. The former economic gaps are narrowing and fail to explain political attitudes towards the EU.

ROBUSTESS CHECKS

So far, our dependent variable was treated as linear. To make sure that our results are not sensitive to the choice of a linear specification, an ordered logit regression is estimated. The eleven original categories (from 0 to 10) were re-coded to five[61]. The estimated equation can be defined as:

$$y_i^* = \emptyset_1 D_i + \emptyset_2 E_i + \emptyset_3 C_i + \emptyset_4 R_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

$\gamma, \beta, \emptyset, \delta$ and are parameters to be estimated and is the latent variable, i.e. the intensity of the support for the European integration. D is a vector of individual socio-demographic characteristics (age and gender). E measures the socioeconomic position of individuals (ISCO classification, employment status and employment relation). C and R are a country and region dummies which accounts for any omitted country-specific and region-specific influences. ε is the error term.

We do not observe y_i^*, but a variable y_i that goes from 1 to 5 and rises when public support for the European Union rises:

$y_i = j$ if $\alpha_{j-1} \leq y_i^* < \alpha_j$

---

[61] (0/1=1, 2/4=2, 5=3, 6/8=4 and 9/10=5)

For $j = 1,2,3,4,5$. Where α_j are thresholds, with $\alpha_1 = -\infty$ and $\alpha_5 = +\infty$

To facilitate the interpretation of the results, odd ratios are provided instead of coefficients. The odd ratio represents the odds that an event will occur given a particular exposure, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure. Odd ratios allow to compare dummy variables in a meaningful way (within the same regression, the magnitude of coefficients is comparable). For example, an odd ratio of 0.5 for the dummy variable "female" means that, holding all other variables constant, the odds of having more negative attitudes toward European integration are half as large for women as for men.
The results on individual predictors are unchanged. Tables are presented in the appendix.

CONCLUSION

Using a new dataset this chapter contributes to the debate on territorial versus transnational cleavage thanks to a multilevel structure and the inclusion of explanatory variables at three levels. Our focus on a new dependent variable (support for further integration) does not challenge what is usually found in the literature; highly skilled occupations and high incomes support further European integration a lot more than any other groups. Although its influence is modest, the regional dimension exists and influences public support for further European integration. We find three relevant predictors: the percentage of tertiary education, the regional GDP and the percentage of net migration. The role played by countries is well-documented in the literature and confirmed in the present study. Several macroeconomic variables are found to influence support within member states (corruption, young unemployment and social expenditures) and our results confirm that individual-level predictors work differently in different institutional contexts. Education has a positive and significant impact and this impact is increased by wage setting coordination but mitigated by income inequalities. Additionally in our sample, the higher the percentage of tertiary education, the smaller the education gap in public support for the EU. Our results challenge previous findings in the literature. They are most likely driven by the preferences of new

member states. We may conclude from this chapter that new theoretical frameworks must be designed to properly grasp the preferences of new EU member states.

APPENDICES

SUMMARY STATISTICS

Larger sample

Variable	Frequency	Percentage	Total
European unification go further or gone too far			
Unification already gone too far	2,424	6.50	37289
1	1,659	4.45	37289
2	2,701	7.24	37289
3	3,63	9.73	37289
4	3,415	9.16	37289
5	8,325	22.33	37289
6	3,73	10.00	37289
7	3,959	10.62	37289
8	3,582	9.61	37289
9	1,362	3.65	37289
Unification go further	2,502	6.71	37289
Gender			
Male	18884	45.92	41121
Female	22237	54.08	41121
Age categories			
15-24	4717	11.47	41138
25-39	8963	21.79	41138
40-54	10568	25.69	41138
55 and above	16890	41.06	41138
Employment status			
Paid work	19319	47.50	40671
Education	3398	8.35	40671
Unemployed	3113	7.65	40671
Retired	10072	24.76	40671
Other	4769	11.73	40671
Occupation			
Armed Forces occupations	145	0.39	36889
Managers	2589	7.02	36889
Professionals	5804	15.73	36889
Technicians and Associate Professionals	5112	13.86	36889
Clerical Support Workers	3263	8.85	36889
Services and Sales Workers	6628	17.97	36889
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fish	993	2.69	36889
Craft and Related Trades Workers	4474	12.13	36889
Plants and Machine Operators and Assemb	3392	9.20	36889
Elementary Occupations	4489	12.17	36889
Member of a trade union			
No	22358	57.31	39012
Yes	16654	42.69	39012

Education level (ES-ISCED)			
ES-ISCED I , less than lower secondary	5083	12.44	40850
ES-ISCED II, lower secondary	7565	18.52	40850
ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary	5819	14.24	40850
ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary	9240	22.62	40850
ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational	4814	11.78	40850
ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education	3744	9.17	40850
ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education	4585	11.22	40850
Household's total net income, all sources			
1st decile	3715	11.37	32667
2nd decile	3868	11.84	32667
3rd decile	3607	11.04	32667
4th decile	3516	10.76	32667
5th decile	3339	10.22	32667
6th decile	3242	9.92	32667
7th decile	3158	9.67	32667
8th decile	2928	8.96	32667
9th decile	2626	8.04	32667
10th decile	2668	8.17	32667
Countries			
Belgium	1869	4.54	41138
Bulgaria	2260	5.49	41138
Cyprus	1116	2.71	41138
Czech Republic	2009	4.88	41138
Germany	2958	7.19	41138
Denmark	1650	4.01	41138
Estonia	2380	5.79	41138
Spain	1889	4.59	41138
Finland	2197	5.34	41138
France	1968	4.78	41138
United Kingdom	2286	5.56	41138
Hungary	2014	4.90	41138
Ireland	2628	6.39	41138
Italy	960	2.33	41138
Lithuania	2109	5.13	41138
The Netherlands	1845	4.48	41138
Poland	1898	4.61	41138
Portugal	2151	5.23	41138
Sweden	1847	4.49	41138
Slovenia	1257	3.06	41138
Slovakia	1847	4.49	41138
Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**Total**
Years of full-time education completed	12.5715	4.10578	40658

Reduced sample

Variable	Frequency	Percentage	Total
European unification go further or gone too far			
Unification already gone too far	982	6.05	16229
1	583	3.59	16229
2	1144	7.05	16229
3	1516	9.34	16229
4	1444	8.90	16229
5	3605	22.21	16229
6	1628	10.03	16229
7	1867	11.50	16229
8	1813	11.17	16229
9	620	3.82	16229
Unification go further	1027	6.33	16229
Gender			
Male	8183	47.77	17129
Female	8946	52.23	17129
Age categories			
15-24	2041	11.91	17142
25-39	3561	20.77	17142
40-54	4590	26.78	17142
55 and above	6950	40.54	17142
Employment status			
Paid work	8290	49.31	16813
Education	1507	8.96	16813
Unemployed	1134	6.74	16813
Retired	3777	22.46	16813
Other	2105	12.52	16813
Occupation			
Armed Forces occupations	48	0.31	15499
Managers	1208	7.79	15499
Professionals	2799	18.06	15499
Technicians and Associate Professionals	2563	16.54	15499
Clerical Support Workers	1547	9.98	15499
Services and Sales Workers	2844	18.35	15499
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fish	355	2.29	15499
Craft and Related Trades Workers	1582	10.21	15499
Plants and Machine Operators and Assemb	941	6.07	15499
Elementary Occupations	1612	10.40	15499
Member of a trade union			
No	8388	55.20	15196
Yes	6808	44.80	15196

Education level (ES-ISCED)			
ES-ISCED I , less than lower secondary	2439	14.28	17078
ES-ISCED II, lower secondary	3151	18.45	17078
ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary	3283	19.22	17078
ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary	2188	12.81	17078
ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational	2212	12.95	17078
ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education	1752	10.26	17078
ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education	2053	12.02	17078
Household's total net income, all sources			
1st decile	1411	9.70	14550
2nd decile	1769	12.16	14550
3rd decile	1426	9.80	14550
4th decile	1471	10.11	14550
5th decile	1389	9.55	14550
6th decile	1523	10.47	14550
7th decile	1501	10.32	14550
8th decile	1397	9.60	14550
9th decile	1315	9.04	14550
10th decile	1348	9.26	14550
Countries			
Belgium	1858	10.84	17142
Germany	2933	17.11	17142
Denmark	1650	9.63	17142
Spain	1888	11.01	17142
France	1967	11.47	17142
United Kingdom	2213	12.91	17142
Italy	953	5.56	17142
The Netherlands	1842	10.75	17142
Sweden	1838	10.72	17142
Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**Total**
Years of full-time education completed	13,06745	4.308991	17020

Regions included in the regional analysis (9 countries)

GERMANY	BELGIUM	FRANCE	NETHERLANDS
Baden-Württemberg	Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest	Ile de France	Groningen
Bayern	Prov. Antwerpen	Champagne-Ardenne	Friesland (NL)
Berlin	Prov. Limburg	Picardie	Drenthe
Brandenburg	Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen	Haute-Normandie	Overijssel
Bremen	Prov. Vlaams-Brabant	Centre	Gelderland
Hamburg	Prov. West-Vlaanderen	Basse-Normandie	Flevoland
Hessen	Prov. Brabant Wallon	Bourgogne	Utrecht
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	Prov. Hainaut	Nord-Pas-de-Calais	Noord-Holland
Niedersachsen	Prov. Liège	Lorraine	Zuid-Holland
Nordrhein-Westfalen	Prov. Luxembourg	Alsace	Zeeland
Rheinland-Pfalz	Prov. Namur	Franche-Comté	Noord-Brabant
Saarland		Pays de la Loire	Limburg (NL)
Sachsen	**SPAIN**	Bretagne	
Sachsen-Anhalt	Galicia	Poitou-Charentes	**SWEDEN**
Schleswig-Holstein	Principado de Asturias	Aquitaine	Stockholms län
Thüringen	Cantabria	Midi-Pyrénées	Uppsala län
	País Vasco	Limousin	Södermanlands län
ITALY	Comunidad Foral de Navarra	Rhône-Alpes	Östergötlands län
Piemonte	La Rioja	Auvergne	Örebro län
Valle d'Aosta	Aragón	Languedoc-Roussillon	Västmanlands län
Liguria	Comunidad de Madrid	Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	Jönköpings län
Lombardia	Castilla y León		Kronobergs län
Provincia autonoma di Bolzano	Castilla-La Mancha	**ENGLAND**	Kalmar län
Provincia autonoma di Trento	Extremadura	South East	Gotlands län
Veneto	Cataluña	South West	Blekinge län
Friulia Venezia Giulia	Comunidad Valencia	North East (England)	Skåne län
Emilia Romagna	Illes Balears	North West (England)	Hallands län
Toscana	Andalucía	East Midlands (England)	Västra Götalands län
Umbria	Región de Murcia	West Midlands (England)	Värmlands län
Marche	Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta	East of England (England)	Dalarnas län
Lazio	Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla	London (England)	Gävleborgs län
Abruzzo	Canarias	Yorkshire & the Humber	Västernorrlands län
Molise		Wales	Jämtlands län
Campania	**DENMARK**	Scotland	Västerbottens län
Puglia	Hovedstaden	Northern Ireland	Norrbottens län
Basilicata	Sjælland		
Calabria	Syddanmark		
Sicilia	Midjylland		
Sardegna	Nordjylland		

Explanatory variables at the region-level

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
GDP current price 2011	17142	31714,7	9633,1	15700	62000
Population size 2011	17142	4019849,0	3849014,0	57269	1.78e+07
Terciary education (isced5_6) 2011	15304	158410,6	142678,2	2720	606628
Long-term unemployment 2011 (%)	15304	3,7	2,7	.8	14.19
Young unemployment 2011 (%)	15201	20,0	12,7	5.4	65.8
Net migration 2010	17060	9665,5	15491,4	-48102	83923

Using population size, tertiary education and net migration were transformed as percentages. To facilitate interpretation, the log of GDP is considered.

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Tertiary education by region (%)	15304	3,72	1,19	0,56	8,50
Net migration by region (%)	17060	0,31	0,35	-0,44	1,79
Log of national GDP at current prices	17142	10,32	0,29	9,66	11.03489

Explanatory variables at the country-level

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2011)

The CPI is the most widely used indicator of corruption worldwide. Countries are rank on how corrupt their public sectors are seen to be. It is a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption, collected by a variety of reputable institutions. A country score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and a 100 means that a country is perceived as very clean. A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries/territories included in the index.
Source: European Social Survey

Country	Index
Bulgaria	41
Italy	42
Slovakia	46
Czech Republic	49
Lithuania	54
Hungary	55
Poland	58
Slovenia	61
Portugal	63
Estonia	64
Spain	65
Cyprus	66
Ireland	69
France	71
Great Britain	74
Belgium	75
Germany	79
Netherlands	84
Sweden	88
Denmark	90
Finland	90

Social expenditure in percentage of GDP 2011, Union density, Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income 2011, Unemployment rates by age 15-24 years in % 2011, volume index of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) and percentage of tertiary education

Gross domestic product (GDP) is defined as the value of all goods and services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their creation. The volume index of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) is expressed in relation to the European Union (EU28) average set to equal 100. If the index of a country is higher than 100, this country's level of GDP per head is higher than the EU average and vice versa. PPS eliminates the differences in price levels between countries allowing meaningful volume comparisons of GDP between countries.
Source: EUROSTAT

Union Density rate is defined as net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment
Source: Visser

Country	Social exp	UD	Gini	Young U	GDP PPS	tertiary educ (%)
Belgium	29,7	55.1	26,3	18,7	120	4,20
Czech Republic	20,8	15.8	25,2	18	83	4,25
Denmark	30,6	66.4	27,8	14,2	126	4,66
Estonia	18,2	6.9	31,9	22,3	68	5,20
Finland	29,2	69.6	25,8	20,1	117	5,74
France	32,0	7.7	30,8	23	108	3,48
Germany	25,9	18	29	8,6	122	3,13
Ireland	23,3	34.4	29,8	29,1	130	4,30
Italy	27,5	36.3	31,9	29,1	103	3,31
Netherlands	23,4	19.1	25,8	7,6	135	4,06
Poland	20,5	13.6	31,1	25,8	64	5,40
Portugal	25,0	18.3	34,2	30,1	78	3,75
Slovakia	18,1	14.1	25,7	33,2	73	4,20
Slovenia	23,7	23.1	23,8	15,7	83	5,23
Spain	26,4	16.9	34,5	46,4	95	4,18
Sweden	27,6	67.8	24,4	22,8	127	4,92
United Kingdom	23,6	26.5	33	21,1	106	3,95
Cyprus	.	49	29,2	22,4	96	3,82
Hungary	21,9	.	26,8	26,1	65	3,82
Bulgaria	.	.	35	25	44	3,87
Lithuania	.	9.6	33	32,2	65	6,13

The Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income 2011 is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the population arranged according to the level of equivalised disposable income, to the cumulative share of the equivalised total disposable income received by them.

Source: European Social Survey (Original source: SILC)

Social expenditures, the rate of young unemployment and the percentage of tertiary education are extracted from the multilevel database of the European Social Survey (Original source: Eurostat). Tertiary education correspond to the category ISCED 5_6. It is considered as a proxy for human capital endowments.

Coordination of wage-setting

Based on Kenworthy (2001a; 2001b). Note that this is an indicator of the "degree, rather than the type, of coordination"

Source: Visser

1	Estonia	United Kingdom	Hungary	Ireland	Lithuania	Poland
2	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Czech Rep	Portugal	Slovakia	France
3	Spain	Italy	Slovenia	Sweden		
4	Germany	Denmark	Netherlands			
5	Belgium	Finland				

5 = maximum or minimum wage rates/increases based on

a) Centralized bargaining by peak association(s), with or without government involvement, and/or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze, with peace obligation

b) Informal centralisation of industry-level bargaining by a powerful and monopolistic union confederation

c) Extensive, regularized pattern setting and highly synchronized bargaining coupled with coordination of bargaining by influential large firms

4 = wage norms or guidelines (recommendations) based on

a) Centralized bargaining by peak associations with or without government involvement

b) Informal centralisation of industry-level bargaining by a powerful and monopolistic union confederation

c) Extensive, regularized pattern setting coupled with high degree of union concentration

3 = negotiation guidelines based on

a) Centralized bargaining by peak associations with or without government involvement

b) Informal centralisation of industry-level bargaining

c) Government arbitration or intervention

2 = mixed industry and firm-level bargaining, with no or little pattern bargaining and relatively weak elements of government coordination through the setting of minimum wage or wage indexation

**1** = fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants

ORDERED LOGIT REGRESSION

| Variables	1.1.1		1.1.2		1.1.3	
	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error	Coef	Std-error
female	0.893***	(-4.62)	0.932**	(-3.19)	0.922***	(-3.68)
reference category: 25-39						
15-24	1.205**	(3.22)	1.238***	(4.00)	1.263***	(4.37)
40-54	0.857***	(-4.84)	0.883***	(-3.97)	0.891***	(-3.67)
above 55	0.898**	(-2.92)	0.960	(-1.12)	0.942	(-1.62)
reference category: paid work						
Education	1.337***	(4.05)	1.282***	(4.12)	1.324***	(4.64)
Unemployed	0.972	(-0.58)	0.956	(-0.96)	0.961	(-0.85)
Retired	1.077*	(1.96)	1.131***	(3.33)	1.108**	(2.77)
Other	1.009	(0.22)	1.012	(0.32)	1.013	(0.34)
Member of a trade union	0.928**	(-2.86)	0.912***	(-3.59)	0.914***	(-3.52)
reference category: 5th decile	0.910	(-1.77)	0.916	(-1.73)	0.905*	(-1.97)
1st decile	0.895*	(-2.22)	0.905*	(-2.09)	0.900*	(-2.19)
2nd decile	0.987	(-0.27)	0.994	(-0.12)	0.989	(-0.24)
3rd decile	1.016	(0.32)	1.017	(0.37)	1.016	(0.34)
4th decile						
6th decile	1.092	(1.80)	1.086	(1.75)	1.068	(1.40)
7th decile	1.096	(1.88)	1.117*	(2.34)	1.096	(1.94)
8th decile	1.166**	(3.07)	1.190***	(3.59)	1.153**	(2.94)
9th decile	1.148**	(2.64)	1.175**	(3.19)	1.120*	(2.23)
10th decile	1.343***	(5.52)	1.367***	(6.09)	1.261***	(4.47)
reference category: clerks						
Armed forces	1.159	(0.77)				
Managers	1.236***	(3.69)				
Professionals	1.345***	(6.34)				
Associate professionals	1.011	(0.23)				
Serv and sales	0.927	(-1.65)				
Agri, forestry and fishery	0.739***	(-3.48)				
Trade workers	0.824***	(-3.76)				
Plant and machin operators	0.815***	(-3.76)				
Elementary occupations	0.860**	(-2.93)				
ref cat: ES-ISCED III upper tier						
ES-ISCED I					0.830***	(-3.98)
ES-ISCED II					0.838***	(-4.80)
ES-ISCED III lower tier					0.836***	(-4.64)
ES-ISCED IV					0.990	(-0.26)
ES-ISCED V lower terciary					1.276***	(5.74)
ES-ISCED V higher terciary					1.656***	(12.37)
Years of education			1.050***	(14.89)		
Region fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
N	26286		28059		28125	

Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 6

Average Marginal Effects of gini 2011 with 95% CIs

Years of full-time education completed

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Frequency answers: larger sample

European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Frequency answers: reduced sample

European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Average support by country

Country	Support
United Kingdom	
Finland	
Ireland	
Estonia	
Portugal	
Sweden	
Czech Republic	
Cyprus	
Slovakia	
Hungary	
France	
The Netherlands	
Belgium	
Slovenia	
Germany	
Poland	
Lithuania	
Denmark	
Italy	
Spain	
Bulgaria	

Average support by occupation: larger sample

Occupation	Support
Plants and Machine Operators and	
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry a	
Craft and Related Trades Workers	
Elementary Occupations	
Services and Sales Workers	
Clerical Support Workers	
Technicians and Associate Profes	
Managers	
Professionals	
Armed Forces occupations	

Average support by education: larger sample

Education level	
ES-ISCED I , less than lower sec	
ES-ISCED II, lower secondary	
ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper	
ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper	
ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational	
ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary educ	
ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary edu	

0   2   4   6

Average support by income: larger sample

Income decile	
2nd decile	
3rd decile	
1st decile	
4th decile	
5th decile	
6th decile	
7th decile	
8th decile	
9th decile	
10th decile	

0   2   4   6

CONCLUSION GENERALE

Dans cette étude, nous avons analysé dans quelle mesure le soutien à l'intégration européenne est déterminé par des facteurs économiques. Pour cela nous avons effectué trois analyses empiriques sur données de sondage, insistant dans chaque chapitre sur une dimension différente du soutien à l'intégration européenne. Nous étudions d'abord la question de la sortie de l'Union européenne en coupe transversale sur l'année 2013 dans cinq pays (France, Finlande, Danemark, Irlande et Royaume-Uni). Ensuite nous évaluons la confiance accordée à l'Union européenne sur la période 2004-2014 dans les quinze pays ayant adopté l'euro au moment de la crise (Autriche, Allemagne, Belgique, Espagne, Finlande, France, Irlande, Italie, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Grèce, Slovénie, Chypre et Malte). Dans le dernier chapitre, vingt-et-un pays sont inclus dans l'analyse (dont neuf pays d'Europe de l'Est et Centrale), afin d'étudier le soutien à une unification plus poussée de l'Union européenne. Cette dernière analyse porte sur des données de 2012. Ainsi, chacune des périodes étudiées est affectée par la crise que traverse actuellement l'Union. Nous utilisons des méthodes empiriques différentes dans chacun des chapitres pour prendre en compte la spécificité de la dimension étudiée (logit multinomial, probit bivarié, modèle linéaire multi-niveaux).

Notre étude montre que quelle que soit la variable dépendante choisie et la méthode utilisée, il existe une masse d'individus favorables à l'Union européenne, et les autres, qui semblent plutôt indécis. Ce clivage entre deux populations s'explique très largement par les déterminants socioéconomiques. Les individus les plus aisés et les plus qualifiés se montrent nettement plus favorables à l'intégration européenne pour chacune des dimensions étudiées. En dehors de ce résultat bien connu de la littérature, de nombreuses limites aux explications fondées sur des variables économiques sont mises en lumière dans cette thèse.

Dans le premier chapitre de la thèse nous mettons en évidence ce clivage se trouve entre les classes les plus aisées, qui ont des raisons plus ou moins objectives de croire en des bénéfices économiques de l'Union et les autres qui sont en difficultés et qui blâment plus ou moins ouvertement l'UE. Nous parlons d'euroscepticisme "soft" ou "hard". En effet, une part de la population peut se retrouver dans une position ambiguë vis-à-vis de l'Union européenne car celle-ci représente l'unification de l'Europe mais également des politiques contraignantes pour les pays membres dont on ne voit pas toujours les fruits. De plus, si nous prenons l'exemple

des politiques de restrictions budgétaires, ce sont des politiques qui affectent certaines populations plus que d'autres. Il s'agit des populations qui connaissent les risques sociaux les plus forts et les variables socioéconomiques incluses dans l'analyse empirique permettent effectivement de les distinguer des classes aisées, qui elles, affichent un fort soutien. Pourtant seule une fraction de ces populations, susceptibles de pâtir des contraintes européennes, se positionnent contre le maintien dans l'Union européenne. Nous ne trouvons qu'un déterminant robuste pour ce type d'opinion, le vote pour un parti d'extrême droite. Pour expliquer cela nous développons l'idée selon laquelle l'agenda politique national joue un rôle majeur dans la polarisation des opinions vis-à-vis de l'Union européenne. Ainsi dans ce premier chapitre nous montrons que les déterminants économiques sont essentiels mais nous pointons aussi une limite de ce type d'explications. Prendre en compte l'offre politique nationale est également essentiel pour comprendre pourquoi les individus soutiennent ou non l'UE.

Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous insistons sur le fait que la confiance en l'UE n'est pas un simple reflet de la confiance dans les institutions nationales. Nos résultats montrent que plus le taux de chômage dans le pays est proche de la moyenne européenne, plus les individus auront tendance à avoir davantage confiance en l'UE qu'en leur gouvernement. Ce qui laisse penser que plus les performances économiques dans la zone seront homogènes, plus les citoyens seront enclins à déléguer des compétences aux institutions européennes. Il apparait que les variables macroéconomiques (principalement le chômage) jouent un rôle dans la formation du soutien spécifique (Easton, 1975). Nous pouvons en effet conclure de notre étude que les citoyens considèrent l'Union au moins en partie responsable de la situation macroéconomique dans la zone euro. Tous ces éléments tendent à prouver que les variables économiques expliquent correctement le soutien à l'UE. Le cadre d'analyse que nous avons choisi énonce que les individus forment leurs préférences en fonction des coûts et bénéfices des politiques proposées. Dans le contexte de la crise, les populations les plus exposées devraient donc percevoir un risque plus élevé et donc afficher une baisse de confiance plus forte. Or lorsqu'on observe la tendance pour chacune des catégories sociales sur la période 2004-2014 (graphique présenté en introduction) la baisse de la confiance apparait au contraire assez uniforme. On observe aucune recomposition des suites de la crise et les catégories les plus favorables à l'intégration demeurent les mêmes. Bien que les jeunes soient fortement touchés par le chômage, la population étudiante reste fortement pro-européenne. Dans ce chapitre nous rencontrons donc une autre limite des explications fondées sur l'économie

politique. Les variables économiques n'expliquent que faiblement le soutien affectif (Easton, 1975).

Le dernier chapitre de la thèse s'appuie sur le plus vaste échantillon et porte sur la question essentielle de l'approfondissement de l'Union européenne. A l'aide d'un modèle multi-niveaux nous cherchons à établir un lien entre les dimensions nationales (clivages territoriaux) et transnationales (clivages socioéconomiques). Nos résultats montrent que les trois niveaux d'analyse (individuel, régional et national) sont pertinents dans la formation des préférences européennes. Nous trouvons des déterminants économiques significatifs à tous les niveaux. De plus, bien que la variance expliquée au niveau national semble de prime abord modeste en comparaison de la dimension individuelle (9% contre 91%) ont observe que l'impact des variables individuelles varie fortement selon le contexte économique et institutionnel. Il faut néanmoins une fois de plus nuancer le pouvoir explicatif des variables économiques. Si les individus semblent en mesure d'évaluer les gains générés par l'intégration européenne, ils restent ancrés dans un contexte national qui n'est que très partiellement expliqué par des variables macroéconomiques. La majeure partie de la variance reste inexpliquée dans notre étude. Les résultats obtenus à l'aide d'interactions entre les niveaux individuels et nationaux obligent également à considérer les limites du cadre d'analyse choisi. Ces trois effets portent sur l'impact de l'éducation selon le contexte institutionnel et économique. Dans notre échantillon la coordination des négociations salariales renforcent l'impact positif de l'éducation. A l'inverse, plus le pourcentage d'élève dans l'enseignement supérieur est élevé, plus faible sera l'effet de l'éducation sur le soutien à l'intégration européenne. Ce qui contraste avec les analyses de Scheve (2000) et Brinegar et Jolly (2005). De fortes inégalités ont tendance à entrainer de la méfiance envers l'UE, particulièrement chez les moins qualifiés (Kuhn, 2014). Or, l'effet inverse apparait dans nos données. Nous expliquons cela par le choix de l'échantillon car celui-ci inclut de nombreux pays d'Europe de l'Est et Centrale ce qui n'est pas le cas des études précitées qui portaient sur les pays de l'Union à quinze. Les pays d'Europe de l'Est et Centrale se caractérisent par une coordination salariale plus faible et des inégalités en moyenne plus élevées que dans le reste de l'Union européenne. Le niveau d'éducation est également plutôt élevé par rapport au reste de l'échantillon. Or, dans ces pays les professions intellectuelles sont certes les plus favorables à l'intégration européennes, mais les différences avec les travailleurs les moins qualifiés sont bien moins fortes que dans l'Union à quinze (Jacquier, 2012). Cela explique sans doute pourquoi nos résultats

contredisent la littérature mais nous ne pouvons pas pour autant établir une relation théorique à cette corrélation. Ainsi pour analyser les préférences des nouveaux pays membres de l'Union européenne des cadres théoriques nouveaux sont nécessaires.

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LES DETERMINANTS ECONOMIQUES DU SOUTIEN A L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE: UNE ANALYSE EMPIRIQUE SUR DONNEES DE SONDAGE

La thèse présentée s'inscrit dans une période de crise économique, qui affecte tout particulièrement les institutions européennes. A l'aide de données récentes, nous tentons de cerner des continuités ou ruptures dans la perception que les citoyens ont de l'intégration européenne. Nous proposons de répondre à la question suivante : Dans quelle mesure le soutien à l'intégration européenne est déterminé par des facteurs économiques ?

Notre étude comprend plusieurs apports empiriques. Nous utilisons de nouvelles sources pour effectuer nos travaux, notamment les sondages ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) et ESS (European Social Survey). Nous travaillons sur la variable dépendante afin de cibler un aspect précis du soutien à l'intégration dans chaque chapitre, tout en adaptant les méthodes économétriques (logit multinomial, logit simple et régression linéaire). Sur le plan théorique, nos travaux confirment que quelle que soit la variable dépendante choisie et la méthode utilisée, il existe une masse d'individus favorables à l'Union européenne, et les autres, qui semblent plutôt indécis. Ce clivage entre deux populations s'explique très largement par les déterminants socioéconomiques. Les individus les plus aisés et les plus qualifiés se montrent nettement plus favorables à l'intégration européenne pour chacune des dimensions étudiées. En dehors de ce résultat bien connu de la littérature, de nombreuses limites aux explications fondées sur des variables économiques sont mises en lumière dans cette thèse. Dans le premier chapitre nous montrons que, pour distinguer les individus hostiles à l'intégration des individus indécis, il est indispensable de prendre en compte l'offre politique nationale. Le deuxième chapitre met en évidence le fait que les variables économiques n'expliquent que faiblement ce qu'Easton (1975) appelle le soutien "affectif" c'est-à-dire le soutien diffus et stable dans le temps que les Européens adressent à l'Union européenne et dont celle-ci a besoin pour exister et avancer. Enfin, dans le dernier chapitre, nous constatons que les cadres théoriques appliqués aux anciens états membres (l'Union à quinze) ne peuvent pas être étendus aux nouveaux pays membres et ne peuvent donc pas expliquer les préférences des européens qui constituent l'Union européenne d'aujourd'hui. Il nous apparait donc nécessaire de construire de nouveaux cadres théoriques pour penser l'Union en prenant en compte sa diversité.

THE ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON SURVEY DATA

European institutions have been particularly affected by the recent economic crisis. The present dissertation uses recent data to identify continuities and ruptures in the perception of the European Union held by European citizens. We especially question the extent to which economic drivers shape public support for the European Union.

New data sources are used to carry out the empirical analysis in our study, notably the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the European Social Survey (ESS). The dependant variables in each chapters are designed to identify precise aspects of public support. To that end, we also use several estimation procedures (multinomial logit, binary logit and linear regression). From a theoretical perspective, our findings confirm that regardless of the dependent variable and the method used, a sizeable majority of EU citizens are supportive of the EU, while the other half of the European population appears as uncertain. This broad cleavage is explained to a large extend by socioeconomic determinants. Highly skilled respondents with high incomes display more pro-EU attitudes in each of the dimensions of public support considered in the empirical analysis. Alongside this result, which is already well-known in the literature, the present dissertation emphasizes several limitations to the explanatory power of economic variables. In the first chapter, we show that, to distinguish between individuals hostile to the idea of European integration and those who are only uncertain (or ambivalent), the domestic political offer should be taken into account. Chapter two highlights the fact that economic variables do not explain what Easton (1975) calls affective support i.e. diffuse support, stable over time which is crucial to the legitimacy of European institutions and to ensure the continuity of the EU. Finally, in the last chapter, it appears that the theoretical frameworks applied to former member states cannot be applied to new member states. Consequently the theoretical frameworks that we have used so far fail to explain the preferences of the whole population living in today's European Union. It seems necessary to build new theoretical frameworks to study the EU and its diversity.

Keywords: European integration, survey analysis, political economy