Self-Preferencing and Competitive Damages: A Focus on Exploitative Abuses

Patrice Bougette (1) , Oliver Budzinski , Frédéric Marty (1, 2)

1 GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
2 UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

Conceived as a theory of competitive harm, self-preferencing has been at the core of recent European landmark cases (e.g., Google Android, Google Shopping). In the context of EU competition law, beyond the anticompetitive leveraging effect, self-preferencing may lead to vertical and horizontal exclusionary abuses, encourage exploitation abuses, and generate economic dependence abuses. In this paper, we aim at characterizing the various forms of self-preferencing, investigating platforms’ capacity and incentives to do so through their dual role, by shedding light on the economic assessment of these practices in an effects-based approach. We analyze the different options for remedies in this context, by insisting on their necessity, adequacy, and proportionality.

Mots clés: Self-preferencing; antitrust; regulation; European Union competition law; exploitative abuse; Digital Markets Act

Domaines: Economies et finances

Patrice Bougette, Oliver Budzinski, Frédéric Marty. Self-Preferencing and Competitive Damages: A Focus on Exploitative Abuses. Antitrust Bulletin, inPress, pp.0003603X2210827. ⟨10.1177/0003603X221082757⟩. ⟨halshs-03620661⟩