A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks

Luca Colombo (1) , Paola Labrecciosa (2) , Agnieszka Rusinowska (3, 4, 5)

1 ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business
2 ESSCA - School of Management
3 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
4 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
5 PSE - Paris School of Economics

We take a novel approach based on differential games to the study of criminal networks. We extend the static crime network game (Ballester et al., 2006, 2010) to a dynamic setting where criminal activities negatively impact the accumulation of total wealth in the economy. We derive a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), which is unique within the class of strategies considered, and show that, unlike in the static crime network game, the vector of equilibrium crime efforts is not necessarily proportional to the vector of Bonacich centralities. Next, we conduct a comparative dynamic analysis with respect to the network size, the network density, and the marginal expected punishment, finding results in contrast with those arising in the static crime network game. We also shed light on a novel issue in the network theory literature, i.e., the existence of a voracity effect. Finaly, we study the problem of identifying the optimal target in the population of criminals when the planner's objective is to minimize aggregate crime at each point in time. Our analysis shows that the key player in the dynamic and the static setting may differ, and that the key player in the dynamic setting may change over time.

Mots clés: differential games; Markov Perfect Equilibrium; Criminal networks; Bonacich centrality; Key player

Domaines: Economies et finances

Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa, Agnieszka Rusinowska. A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks. 2023. ⟨halshs-03601580v2⟩