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Autre Publication Scientifique Année : 2021

Decision under normative uncertainty

Résumé

While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the ‘original position’, where one’s future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty – normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle – maximizing expected value (‘Expectationalism’) – has different formulations, namely Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.
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Dates et versions

halshs-03282198 , version 1 (14-07-2021)

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Franz Dietrich, Brian Jabarian. Decision under normative uncertainty. 2021, ⟨10.1017/S0266267121000201⟩. ⟨halshs-03282198⟩
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