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Is there a field for philosophy?

Anne-Françoise Schmid

Translation by Jeremy R. Smith and Luka Stojanovic

The Universe was 'in' the World, but the World did not see it.

Laruelle, "On the Black Universe within the Human Foundations of Colour"

There is no 'philosophy of the future', but a future-philosophy.

Laruelle, "The Philosophers and the Future"

Introduction

The question of a field for philosophy seems almost obvious. Indeed, we know multiple fields, and in particular, the disciplines where philosophy is exercised could be its fields. But this is not what we seek to answer the question: is there a field for philosophy. What concerns us is the investigation of a field entirely exterior or foreign to philosophy, a field where it would have no authority, but where it nevertheless will be necessary for the development of new forms of invention, and a field that it would ignore under its classical and authoritarian forms.

This investigation is in fact very difficult, and, I will add, very risky. We will see that it unsettles philosophy both in its unity and its multiplicity. On the other hand, modeled after the work that I wrote with Muriel Mambrini-Doudet, *Generic Epistemology: Manual for Future Sciences* (Paris: Kimé, 2019), the investigation proposes a more collective and more interdisciplinary practice of philosophy. We will substitute the solitary philosopher with the ordinary philosopher, who follows the order between the real and philosophy and seeks out

the original content of their practice. The ordinary philosopher is not an individual as common sense perceives them but an extended and collective individual. In its sufficient autonomy, we will come to seek a field for philosophy which not only puts it in relation with other practices but brings it into contact with “the concrete” that resists the philosophizing appetite. The philosopher will take part in an experience which puts them in relation with philosophy and gives philosophy new liberties and styles of writing.

The first epigraph manifests a change in scale: the Universe within the World, and the invisibility of this change in scale. In the world of philosophy, can we open something that philosophy itself does not recognize? This epigraph will be a focal point at each step in the development of this investigation for a field for philosophy.

The second epigraph suggests an inversion between philosophy and what it occupies itself with, another focal point.

By combining both epigraphs, perhaps we can glimpse into another field. This is the business of experimentation.

The point is to implement an experimental apparatus proposed by the two epigraphs susceptible to create or conceive a look at philosophy which will allow new possibilities of invention and writing for it, not its fixation. What are the elements of this apparatus and how do we prepare them to make them perform together?

1) Preparing the experimentation

Several factors are required to prepare for our experimentation. They are as follows:

- Philosophy as an object of experience: an integrative object where synthesis is no longer assured
- The transformation of principles into hypotheses: to philosophize from hypotheses
- The philosopher as the experimenter: experimenting on the limits of philosophy
 - A generic space for philosophies where their common = X can be introduced: this common =X can be new combinations
- The World and the simulation of Worlds: philosophies inhabit the world all by simulating other worlds (“the world is not enough”)

Ultimately, a vertical dimension will allow us to presume a Universe whose world does not have the means to be perceived. This dimension has often taken the form of the *linea serpentinata* in the work of François Laruelle. This figure comes to us from Michelangelo and Ravaisson. One aspect of verticality that gathers the two epigraphs, the change of scale and inversion, is the following: there is an ethics for philosophy, and not a philosophy of ethics.

However, this Universe does not belong to only one philosopher. The philosopher knows how to construct worlds, but it is in this gesture that the philosopher touches upon something that they cannot see while remaining a philosopher. This is one of the hypotheses of non-philosophy: the philosopher must become human and recognize their humanity without qualities to be able to perceive their gesture and objectivate it. But to do this, the philosopher needs help from another discipline. The auto-modeling of philosophy fails here. There is no theory of philosophy without the help of another discipline and of another practice.

Our experimentation will engage as much the difference in scale as the inversion of the word “of” into an operator which contributes towards unbinding

the philosopher from philosophical authority and philosophical sufficiency. Inverting “of” makes us see the philosopher’s act.

There are two personages in this experimentation: philosophy and the philosopher are not alike. The “I” of the philosopher is introduced to the experience of contingency within the multiplicity of philosophies. This experience and experiment are fundamental for the investigation into a field independent of philosophy but where philosophy, now transformed and treated, can take its place.

What about the negation that intervenes in both epigraphs? Negation in non-philosophy is to put at a distance, whereas negation in non-standard philosophy is an extension of the field. We can compare this use of negation with the notion of non-music. In music, negation adjoins its timbre and noise (cf. Brazilian composers included Jean-Pierre Caron who is inspired by Yacinto Scelsi). Extension, as a non-classical negation, allows one to articulate logics that are often seen as contradictory, for example Russell’s principle of external relations and the use of relations in Deleuze.

These epigraphs have the function to deprive philosophy of its sufficiency, to limit philosophy, but by leaving it with a greater freedom of invention, a greater freedom than what sufficiency constantly uses and abuses: critique. With the help of intermediary axioms, namely, the obscure cogito and the open secret, we will bind invention to the exercise of the *de jure* multiplicity of philosophies.

The *Kampplatz* and fields within philosophy that depend on it

Philosophers have spoken of “matter” in philosophy, such as Husserl in his *Logical Investigations*. There, matter allows one to better distinguish the scope and the contents within complex intentional acts by making the part of what is lived intentional. Further, it allows one to distinguish the object of a description, which is what of this lived experience is expressed. However, this matter is within

philosophy, even if it is but one material condition of possibility. Philosophy requires a degree of matter, but philosophy does everything to ensure that it does not go beyond its sphere of influence.

The idea of a sphere for philosophy, distinct from the famous Kantian *Kampflatz* which would be a space proper to philosophy, has no special significance in the philosophical gesture. The field of philosophy is within philosophy itself. The field is held between two edges, two contraries, as is custom in philosophy: the a priori and the empirical. From the point of view of the a priori, the philosophers who see some other disciplines as their own field or those who, like Wittgenstein, think it would be nonsense to attribute a field to philosophy if it is not language. According to Wittgenstein, the Logos is but one outgrowth devoid of meaning. As for the empirical, determined by the a priori of philosophies, it is one sort of internal field whose limits are drawn in advance by principles and concepts. The empirical objects of each philosophy do not completely overlap. There is a nearly infinite possibility of development of the empirical, giving to the empirical a certain mystery: what is its “theoretical” place if it is not to distinguish philosophies otherwise than through principles.

Philosophy had the ability to distribute fields to other disciplines as one of its functions. But disciplines are often rebellious and seek out their own autonomy. Anthropology or ethnology no longer wanted to be guided by philosophy. Sometimes we want to forge new bonds with philosophy but without submitting these bonds to its hierarchies.

We can suppose that to forge these new bonds assumes the creation of new fields for philosophy in the sense where the field will no longer be the point of application of philosophy. The field will be a semi-rebel that proposes a part of the unknown to philosophy, and not only a part of classical astonishment. To realise this change, we will see that we must comprehend the principles of philosophy like

hypotheses and begin to philosophize from hypotheses. We know that Leibniz and Russell knew to give importance to hypotheses within philosophy while it was customarily relegated to the sciences.

Let us begin with a variation of the first epigraph:

The Field is “within” philosophy, but philosophy did not notice it.

There is a mode of exteriority to philosophy which is “within” philosophy, without which philosophy does not notice and which, despite everything, it could not do without. Without this mode of exteriority, philosophy would not be “philosophy.”

How do we demonstrate this and how can such an assertion change the practice of philosophy? Can we imagine a field that does not depend on philosophy from philosophy? There are some fields that philosophy delegates, but the very gesture of delegation subsists.

I propose a series of propositions to make a place for an exteriority outside of the philosophical field. In a certain way, it is to add intermediary axioms to non-philosophy and non-standard philosophy. These axioms are necessary because non-philosophy is interested in philosophy as a unity more than as a diversity.

Concerning one preposition...

First, let us reprise some philosophical habits. Its relation to other disciplines nearly each time makes use of the word “of” (in French “de”): such as in philosophy of sciences, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, philosophy of technics. It is in this position that philosophy nearly always appears in the singular. There are sciences in the plural, but *one* philosophy of the sciences or *one* philosophy of science. There is a trajectory already made for philosophy. It chooses historical cases and texts that it projects some of its characteristic

properties such as opposition or complementarity among the conceptual and the experimental. In philosophy of art, it creates commentaries which project a philosophical signification over painting, sculpture, installations, and even music. It knows how to transform technics, which respond each time to finite problems, into an infinite technology which ends by being represented as autonomous. Obviously, all these traits are caricatures because these operations are made with technical means and subtle, varied stylistics which make up the bonds between philosophies. Within these technical means, there is a beginning of formalization that some will bring to the side from mathematics or physics – rarely from chemistry, biology, or the human sciences.

The use of the word “of” manifests the voracity of philosophy: if philosophy is found with another discipline, then it seeks to interiorize some traits from it, perhaps even those which most often allow to put it in relation with other further disciplines, for example through mathematization and even now digitization.

There exists an inverse use of the word “of”: the science of philosophy, the technics of philosophy, and the religion of philosophy has another signification or another use. It is philosophy as a science, philosophy in its technical aspect, and philosophy as a religion. It is then philosophy that is characterized, rather than its voracious relation with other disciplines. They are what we can call its disguises.

In whatever way we turn, it is very difficult to speak of philosophy without making any allusion to other disciplines. Its autonomy is paradoxically guaranteed by its relation to other disciplines. I draw the following idea: philosophies among themselves have relations which are indirectly bound to the relations that they give to other disciplines, in particular the sciences.

From the word “of” to the concept of “operator”

We replace the word “of” through an inversion: there is no philosophy “of” the future, but, rather, a future-philosophy, as Laruelle proposed in a colloquium on philosophers and the future. The inversion of the “of” leads to the invention of operators on philosophy; any discipline can be an operator on philosophy.

Science-philosophy will manifest the interventions of philosophy in the fragments of science so heterogeneously that the connections and adjustments cannot depend on the disciplines concerned. Art-philosophy demonstrates the inchoative series and the dynamic movements, process, consumption, and inscription, within philosophy.

2) The hypothesis of a Real preceding philosophy

The hypothesis that I propose is that the autonomy of philosophy only makes sense if we consider at the same time and identically the philosophies which make up its tradition, and I posit the primacy of the *de jure* multiplicity of philosophies over philosophy. Is this multiplicity just the material of philosophy (or philosophies)? A philosophy which would be in total isolation could not be recognized as philosophy, perhaps as intention, process, and inscription rather than philosophy.

But this multiplicity is equivocal: it allows us to treat the relation of philosophies to the real in the form of compatibilities which themselves are part of this multiplicity. Being isolated, one philosophy makes a representation of the real created through its own arrangements and techniques without being able to be recognized as philosophy. This philosophical horizon allows any philosophy to preserve a kind of authority to think that the more one advances in their philosophical thought, the more they have chances to “encounter” the real. The authentic real is at the end of philosophy, and not vice versa. It is what grounds the

authority or the sufficiency of philosophy. The *de jure* multiplicity manifests the desire of sufficiency of each untreated multiplicity not in a chronological succession of type: for example, a caricatural response where my philosophy is better than the previous one, but in a systematics which can support diverse interpretations of time and chronology. Each philosophy thus manifests an “active indifference” to the other philosophies, to take up an expression from Laruelle’s early Nietzschean writings.

Non-Philosophy has changed this problematic radically with the following hypothesis: the Real precedes philosophy and is indifferent to it. There is something Real which cannot be philosophized, there is philosophy which can develop as it desires and consume itself (like the desiring-machine in Deleuze, or philosophy is a “skin disease” as Laruelle said in the “vomit scene”).

In his thesis *General Economy of the Effects of Being* (to be published by Temple University, Tokyo, edited by Jordančo Sekulovski) Laruelle undoes the identities of phenomenology in a system, such as intention, process, inscription on a Topos, all of which already bring out something of the dynamics of his subsequent works. It was necessary to separate phenomenology from its identities to find the One or the Real. And each philosophical and/or non-philosophical wave will be in a constant motion, each work being something of a “freeze frame” of a moment in this dynamic.

[There is a form of materiality of philosophy that philosophy cannot notice](#)

If philosophy does not co-construct the Real, it becomes contingent.

Does this contingency lead to a critique of philosophy? This is not the right term. Contingency softens the *Kampfplatz* and the misunderstandings between contemporary philosophers. It gives philosophy new liberties. It admits a *de jure* multiplicity of philosophies as a condition for philosophical writing. How do we

write without considering the fact that other philosophers write under other hypotheses and anchor themselves to other disciplines or practices? There emerges a first materiality that philosophy, in its classical systematicity, cannot recognize.

A philosophy without foundation

A philosophy which is written by considering the *de jure* multiplicity of philosophies loses its own foundations. These foundations are replaced by the relations that it builds with other disciplines, as the work of Jovenne Neo has shown.

I have translated this into two intermediate axioms:

1. The obscure cogito: there is at least one philosophy that I do not understand. Multiplicity does not give itself.
2. The open secret: philosophies do not hide themselves and yet they are not manifest.

These intermediate axioms question the overlap between philosophy and philosophies.

The Cogito is out in the open but the open does not notice it.

3) On the contingency of philosophy and the philosopher

An experience of philosophy is then lived that its contingency liberates. In a practice without foundation, the philosopher herself appears contingent. But her experience eclipses the object, philosophy, for a moment, or in any case eclipses it as isolated and auto-productive.

That philosophy would be without foundations can give rise to several conceptions of its possible field. For example, think of the philosopher Robert Frodeman (North Texas University, Denton) who sent his students to the field directly in a social group and would give a very interdisciplinary philosophical

teaching at the same time. Or think of William Gonzales in Cali (Universidad del Valle) who sent his doctoral students into the country towns to start up masters' programs in philosophy almost everywhere in the hopes to be a pledge for peace in a country coming out of war.

The research of intermediaries

But one can also see philosophy as a function that the philosopher bears. Thus: to be a philosopher among the scientists, philosophers among the artists, etc. Think of the philosopher Fernando Zalamea (UNAL, Bogota) who admirably read Poincaré and currently works on a publication by Grothendieck all while writing on Proust. Is this the same gesture as Hegel's? I do not believe so. This does not concern the *Aufhebung*, but rather the research of intermediaries and intermediary fields which no longer directly depend on philosophy. According to Zalamea, we can no longer practice contemporary mathematics by making them exclusively repose on set theory, however complex and difficult it may be. To comprehend contemporary mathematics, we must create theories of an intermediary scope to take account of the current wealth of mathematics. The same terms – theories of the intermediary rank – have also been utilized by the philosopher Jean Gayon to manifest the diversity of the disciplines of biology, biology being one spectrum of heterogeneous theories. All these works change the idea of unity and its dream which have been directors within the epistemology of physics.

There is heterogeneity within the sciences, and the sciences can perceive it if they get rid of the dream of unity, like the epistemology of physics has done, relying on the reduction of heterogeneity that its functional use of mathematics allows. They then must invent a new epistemology to take account of these heterogeneities and recognize them as sciences. No former paradigm suffices here in the wealth of current works. The works of epistemology all repose on past

examples. To project these examples, even recent ones, onto works that come about are not enough to make them visible. In this way, it is what I, side by side with Muriel Mambrini-Doudet, worked on together in our work *Generic Epistemology: Manual for Future Sciences* to give the tools to comprehend what is happening in the sciences. Muriel was then the president of a great center of interdisciplinary research, and I was a part of the governance of this center (INRA, Jouy-en-Josas). We hesitated to call this work “Intermediary Fields.” Also, in the arts, the philosopher’s place will no longer be to comment but to eventually write texts to accompany and allow, along with the artist, to think the bonds between art and philosophy which could be common, perhaps ephemeral, in a new way. It is what we have done in different ways with Ivan Liovik Ebel, Alice Lucy Rekab, and in another way, for an exhibition in Hanover, with Gallien Déjean.

Therefore, the philosopher’s role is no longer grounded in their work, their experience in the research of intermediaries opens her to new styles. There is a fusion of styles and techniques with style becoming an intermediary for the technique and inversely to a near displacement. Philosophy without foundation flies away like fictions or experimental texts where neither totality nor the result are given. It is in this experience and experiment that the philosopher makes use of hypotheses more than principles: the correlations among intermediaries result from hypotheses that are more local than the principles which remain impermeable to the experience of the philosopher.

4) The Point of Exteriority

With the intermediaries, it is now possible to pose a point of exteriority independent of philosophy and to ask ourselves what of philosophy manifests from this point of exteriority. At once a unity, philosophy, and a multiplicity: philosophies, at the same time separately and identically.

Let us think of Vernadsky when he imagines himself looking at the Earth from afar. He sees first a mineral, then a place of animals which modify the vegetal world, and human thought modifying the animal world. He concludes that human thought is found in the earth's crust. Despite the different scales, we still have the Earth. Thought was in the Earth and the Earth was not aware of it. The point of exteriority was there: Vernadsky, the geologist who could not be separated from Stalin, and the philosopher who tried to organize interdisciplinary platforms in Europe.

Would the philosopher be then the point of exteriority, which would make philosophy manifest itself at once as singular and multiple? They would be like the one who inhabits the world (=a philosophy), while simulating others. The philosopher never delivers only one philosophy, but rather simulates others at the same time. The philosopher thus has a responsibility before philosophy, to respond to philosophies in an unstable and each time singular equilibrium.

Genericity and the common = X

In front of the identity and the multiplicity of philosophy(s), we can suppose a genericity, a place, which is a common=x, always guarding a part of the unknown. It is not given, it is to be constructed as an unknown, and not as a simple uncertainty, which leaves the concepts unchanged.

Let us suppose that this unknown is an X. There are alternatives and knowledges that allow one to determine it, at least partially. But what knowledge? It is possible to use very heterogeneous ones because it is possible to echo them through the intermediaries. These allow a reorganization of knowledge.

How can these commons be developed? It is possible to do it by matrices as Laruelle suggested in Non-Standard Philosophy, with, on one coordinate, the conditions of experience and, on the other, the characteristics of philosophy. The

“spaces” of the matrix are places of invention for philosophy. And it is a method which allows us to work in commons, even with heterogeneous or contradictory hypotheses, if we consider the variety of uses of “non-”.

Decomposition of the logos and invention in philosophy

To decompose philosophy, the question is neither to destroy philosophy nor the “real world” or the “field”, but to undo the entanglements, both will have new dimensions, liberated by the bracketing of complementarity and the opposition of the two notions. There is the concept and the empirical, let us not make them opposites. This obliges us to consider the contingency of our concepts and our field.

Let us look for a philosophy that does not see present daily life in necessary darkness, but rather that is attentive to the lights and the shadows of contemporary objects. Let us look for a philosophy that is not supposed to be the creator of these objects and one that is not persuaded that it must be accountable for them. Let us present philosophy without its opposites, without its sufficiency. Let us present the field without its auto-position, but by seeking the tools to recognize it as such.

For this task, it is necessary to be able to recognize the limits to philosophy but not from above. It can go up as far as it wishes with the help of other disciplines according to Laruelle, such as the generic, the quantum and philosophy, by stages, where a philosophical thought and scientific and philosophical thought are linked. This is already a limit to omnipotence. But there is another, this time from below, that are not inhabitants of the Earth rather than the world, that have been internalized by philosophy as abstract beings. Katerina Kolozova has shown this beautifully. The animal, man, woman, pain, and sorrow are not abstractions that philosophy presents to us. We are no longer in the era of all-philosophy, as we speak of the all-powerful, but in an era where philosophy takes its place and its

field just where it stumbles towards the concrete. Not a particular concrete, in a worldly situation, but a rough concrete that makes us feel something of the human that philosophy, having forgotten it, has not been able to transmit to us.

The animal, the man, and the woman see philosophy which on the contrary does not see them. The living was in the philosophy, but philosophy did not consider it in its concreteness. Rather than a philosophy of the living, let us practice philosophy in another style, that of the fiction, passing from the real to another point of the real, or that of the experimental text, of which, in a certain way, this essay is a part.

Let's imagine operative fictions, such as a man-philosophy, a woman-philosophy, an animal-philosophy, which makes us relive the intentions, processes, inscription, and topoi closest to living matter without qualities.

What would then be the field for philosophy? One, rough and robust, where it could find its limits of omnipotence through something concrete – or through a "ject" according to Laruelle (a ject without jection or without an ob-ject), resisting all abstraction.

The concrete was not in philosophy, and philosophy did not realize it. This is its limit and its strength.

The force of invention of philosophy does not come from criticism, but from its transformation by the concrete which returns to it the reality of the de jure multiplicity of philosophy: to philosophize by hypotheses rather than by principles.

The bonds between hypotheses (to philosophize from hypotheses in multiplicities), unknown and uncertainty: fiction and the experimental text

What is a fiction?

A fiction touches the real in one point to pass onto another point. Its most simple formula is the following: $C \times K/K$

Where C stands for Concept and K stands for Knowledge

$C_x \times \rho(K)/K_i^n$ – formula from *Generic Epistemology*

$$\frac{C_x \times \mathfrak{P}(K)}{K_i^n}$$
 – this formula was written by Brynn McNab, adapted from *Generic Epistemology*

The concept of fiction then functions in an analogous way to what Laruelle calls, in *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy*, a first term. While engaged within knowledges under other knowledges, a first term engages the philosopher within fictions.

Fiction is the combination of a concept with knowledges under heterogeneous knowledges. Rather than working with the uncertain, fiction works with the unknown = X which reorganizes knowledges in an unexpected way within its realizations.

In philosophy, it is possible to choose a concept and recombine it with other philosophies under the guarantee of another discipline as an under-determination.

What is an experimental text?

An experimental text touches the concrete. The formula is the following:

$K/K' \supset \text{Hyp}$

An experimental text is a text that seeks to produce new hypotheses through heterogeneous knowledges to comprehend contemporary integrative and complex objects (To appear in: *Scripts Philosophiques 1: le silence du futur*, edited by

Jordančo Sekulovski, Temple University). The experimental text works on uncertainty rather than the unknown, and as Wittgenstein reminds us, “uncertainty extends to the roots.”

The bond of fiction and experimental text: non-synthesis?

In this new practice which admits a field that does not depend on philosophy, philosophy becomes an integrative object, an object without definitive synthesis, within an unstable equilibrium between fiction and the experimental text.

New work on contemporary objects then can be done, superseding complexity. Such contemporary objects are the following: climate change, nanotechnologies, GMOs, which are equally partially unknown Xs, and the work can practice an orchestration where all these disciplines have the same weight, with this work included. Therefore, it is no longer the organizing of this orchestration alone, but it makes a part of this orchestration as the possibility of the creations of bonds between propositions and other disciplines. This allows the generic to organize a hyper-compatibility between disciplines, but this does not make the whole of philosophy nor the whole of science.

In this generic space, philosophy encounters the real otherwise, where the colours and sounds can be reintroduced in philosophy. Philosophy then can construct spaces for its relations to other disciplines: discrete spaces, open spaces, where the fragments of disciplines act as variables, and not as differences in tension. It is in this generic space that the philosopher comes into play. For the philosopher, philosophy becomes a material where she can choose and freely combine concepts in accordance with the spaces created in relations with other practices and disciplines.

Concretizations in progress:

- With Muriel Mambrini-Doudet: The Laboratory of Discrete Philosophy – The creation of a space for collective invention of discrete philosophies
- With Ivan Liovik Ebel: *Topographie discrète. Scénario pour un texte sans dimensions*, Neuchâtel, le Griffon, to be published in September 2021. Then with music by Thomas Köner and video by Benoît Maire, in discussion.
- With Alice Lucy Rekab, “Art and Philosophy: New Solidarities,” in a work to be published, edited by Steven Shakespeare, Liverpool.

One of the realizations was the latest course at the New Centre of Research and Practice: “Inventing the Non-Given Common = X Between Philosophy, Art, and Science,” with Tony Yanik and Joevenn Neo.

I will end this experimental essay with the final fiction of this course with Tony and Joevenn. It reprises the interventions of the participants in its own way, all whose disciplinary domains were very varied:

[Discoherences of disciplines and new dimensions for a common = X](#)

Anne-Françoise Schmid, translation by Joevenn Neo

The long notes have the obligation to receive and take care of the short ones, which give the rhythm. Among those who invented long notes, we can play Bruckner, Wagner, Scelsi. Among the short ones we have percussion, anything that sounds from tactile pressure. Perhaps we could feel music by the differences in air pressure, what is called noise. Any piece could be immersed in the noise. If we were Leibnizians, we could accept silence as an infinitesimal form of noise. We would then touch something like a common = X, the inchoate beginning of music,

but not only of it, because in this way we break the accepted frameworks which make disciplines into separate islands while assuming that we can move from to each other directly. They remain separate but allow echoing through silence and noise and the generic make them drift on the horizon without losing anything.

In science, disciplines are talkative, but what about the silence of science in an interdisciplinary regime? We can accept that any woman in the most distant countries, "a whole distant world" (Dutilleux), who watches her plant grow does so with a scientific gaze. It has an intuition, an intention, an elementary, an ordinary, natural, a trajectory and mobile truths, all the primitives of science, those that we find in the most complex and the most contemporary, even in the experimental holes under the earth's surface. The theory-centered conception of classical epistemology cannot quite understand this. Primitives are like long notes in music - this music "decolonizes" science and makes it appear independent of mathematization. This does not disappear but loses its function of "universal language" for a more generic and modeling function.

The colors are not talkative, they vary between the cry and the silence, and touch us like pressure differences, if not air, at least intermediate spaces between the eye and what makes art, the painting, the gallery, the volcano, and all the landscapes of visageity. They can "drip" into our subjectivity. Closer to earth, clay, a sculpture, which escapes classical standards - it extends into installations and contexts - but also contemporary standards by taking up the object orientation just like an object-like in context, where the gestures of the observer to approach him are part of his characterization - or of his "aura". The words of poetry also take on color, we perceive them as sounds and images, and teleported into a universe of new dimensions.

Philosophies learn to see each other and to recognize their multiplicity, a multiplicity of rights, but also of functions with other disciplines. Let us remember the Poincaré conjecture: if we can on a sphere seen in two dimensions, consider a point as the reduction of a closed figure which would pass through several regions of this sphere. Suppose this sphere is three-dimensional. Can we make the same conjecture in philosophy? In mathematics, this was demonstrated by Gregori Perelman (1966), Russian mathematician, who refused the Field Prize and Medal, and just “balanced” his demonstration on the Net and not in a recognized journal... What would become of the multiplicity of philosophies in such a third dimension? Philosophy would at least be deprived of its foundations. It would take the collective experience of philosophers, with the help of musicians, painters, poets, physicists, if we recognize that philosophy forms a body. We would be helped by Jouve and Tony.

The geographer would help us keep the peace, limit hegemonies, invent new maps without hurting the territories too much. It could ally itself with geopoliticians, who seek to guarantee food and soil for humans who have become subjects of the arts and philosophies, as well as the sciences. Fred Moten and Edouard Glissant would inspire us for the decolonization of our prejudices on all disciplines. What would be left then? If we are lucky, a common = X, regenerated by the impossibility of representing it in two dimensions, and the games (Tony, Sub) and the abductions which will give us the means to reorganize our spaces of thought, our modes home and living. And for that, let's reverse the perspectographs of the classic perspectivists. Let us invent new solidarities, which are no longer just matters of perspective, but of faith without an object, of mysticism = X. Let us be attentive to the idea of metamorphosis (Michaël Levinas & Valère Novarina), even that of requiem and silent colors.

Thanks to everyone involved in this thought project.