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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2022

Informed Information Design

Résumé

A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information-disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define interim-optimal mechanisms, a subset of incentive-compatible mechanisms that are optimal in the sense that the informed designer cannot credibly find an alternative mechanism that strictly improves his interim payoff. We prove that an interim-optimal mechanism exists and that every interim-optimal mechanism is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the informed-designer game. An ex-ante optimal mechanism may not be interim optimal, but it is when it is ex-post optimal. Likewise, the unraveling outcome in disclosure games is interim optimal. We provide a belief-based characterization of interim-optimal mechanisms and compare them with ex-ante optimal ones in common economic environments. In settings with strategic complements and binary actions, every ex-ante optimal mechanism is interim optimal. We compare interim optimality to other solutions of informed-principal problems.
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Dates et versions

halshs-03107866 , version 1 (12-01-2021)
halshs-03107866 , version 2 (14-02-2022)
halshs-03107866 , version 3 (22-12-2022)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-03107866 , version 3

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Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta. Informed Information Design. 2022. ⟨halshs-03107866v3⟩
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