Security partnerships in France

Thierry Delpuech and Jacqueline E. Ross

INTRODUCTION

In France as elsewhere, management of security problems mobilizes a growing number of stakeholders with diverse institutional affiliations professional backgrounds. They are called upon to work together within the framework of inter-organizational and inter-professional mechanisms known as "security partnerships" (Crawford, 1999). These devices are intended to initiate, orchestrate and support the "co-production" of responses to insecurity. (Delpuech and Ross, 2016) They now play a very important role in the implementation of security policies at both the national and local level, particularly with regard to crime prevention. It is now generally accepted that all agents who have the capacity to do something to address a security concern must take part in a collective effort to solve the problem, an effort that most often takes the form of "networking" within a more or less organized and more or less formalized collective action system.

In France, all areas of internal security now include partnership mechanisms: international cooperation, crime prevention, community policing, criminal investigation, national security (political extremism, religious radicalisation, terrorism, etc.), peacekeeping, order maintenance, risk management, threat abatement, and the like. These mechanisms can provide governance functions for networked collaboration, such as the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalisation (*Comité interministérielle de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation*, CIPDR) or the Local Security and Crime Prevention Councils (*Conseils locaux de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance*, CLSPD). They may advise public authorities and develop standards on a specific issue, working closely with institutions such as the Inter-ministerial Mission to Combat Drugs and Addictive Behaviours (*Mission interministérielle de lutte contre les drogues et les conduites addictives*, MILDECA) or the Inter-ministerial Mission for the Protection of Women (*Mission interministérielle pour la protection des femmes*, MIPROF). Finally, they can carry out operational missions, as is the case with the Regional Intervention Groups (RIGs) responsible for combating crime by combining criminal, customs, fiscal and administrative resources.

This chapter deals more particularly with local partnerships between public entities (administrations, local authorities, public services, etc.) and semi-public ones (associations), mainly at the local level. These cooperative ventures correspond to the English-speaking countries' concepts of crime prevention partnerships and the multi-agency approach. Public-private collaborations – i.e. partnerships labelled plural policing or third party policing by the international criminology literature – are not being discussed here, as they are much less developed in France than in English-speaking communities and are rarely studied by French police specialists (Bonnet, 2008); the partnerships analysed here take the form mainly of consultation and co-management forums in which territorial actors have the opportunity to share information and set up joint initiatives.

As for France, the development of security partnerships has been promoted and supported since the mid-1990s by the establishment of a legislative and regulatory framework, as well as by the construction of a "devices and instruments directory" designed to structure and facilitate horizontal collaboration at local level (Part 1). Despite the elaboration of national schemes meant to support local partnership institutions, local security partnerships are

struggling, due to a series of obstacles and impediments that hinder cooperation and coordination within current frameworks for putting what they decide into action. (Part 2). Nevertheless, there are some French localities—particular in large urban areas—in which local security partnerships are becoming stronger, more deeply rooted, and more diverse, even though significant local variation persists, and even though significant obstacles to cooperation still remain. (Part 3).

1- THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN FRANCE

The expansion of local security partnerships in France results from a historical dynamic that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s: the transformation of public policies through the adoption of English and American models for managing security problems involving a plurality of actors. The stabilization of an institutional framework for the co-production of security took place at the beginning of the 2000s, after two decades of trial and error, during which the country experimented with a succession of partnership mechanisms.

1.1- The institutional framework of local security policies

Since 1983, and the submission of the report by the *commission des maires pour la sécurité dans la ville* (Commission of Mayors for Security in the City) chaired by Gilbert Bonnemaïson, local security partnerships have been gradually institutionalized. The main stages of that process included: the creation of the Municipal Crime Prevention Councils (*Conseils communaux de prévention de la délinquance*, CCPDs) in 1983; the establishment of the Local Security Contracts (*Contrats locaux de sécurité*, CLS) in 1997, and the launch of the Local Security and Crime Prevention Councils (*Conseil locaux de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance*, CLSPD) in 2002. These institutions have been integrated into an overarching contractual scheme for urban policy making at the local level. This is the national framework for the social and economic development of disadvantaged neighbourhoods and for urban renewal (Epstein, 2013).

This institutionalization is part of a whole series of transformations in the dynamics of governance: decentralisation of administrative powers from state to local authorities; recognition that quality of life issues need to be addressed at the level level (known as “territorialisation” in French); efforts to develop new venues for democratic participation and consultation in the elaboration of public policy; de-sectorisation and contractualisation of public activity (De Maillard, 2000) and the state’s gradual relinquishment of its erstwhile monopoly on sovereign functions (Roché, 2004).

The principles of local security co-production were defined when, at the end of the 1990s, the first mechanism was set up to enable local actors to formalize a partnership strategy for deliberation about security concerns. This mechanism was called the Local Security Contract (*Contrat local de sécurité*, CLS). This was an innovative framework for policy-making: it forced stakeholders to adopt a structured and streamlined approach, such as “project management”, for deliberation and decision-making. Indeed, when developing a CLS, participants in this partnership must collaborate on a diagnostic study of local security problems. The resulting inventory must take account of crime, petty nuisances, public safety, quality of life concerns, and fear of crime. It must assess the adequacy and effectiveness of current approaches as well as the problems with the way such issues are being addressed. And it must specify residents’ security needs and expectations. On the basis of this diagnostic

report, partners must define objectives and priorities. They must also set up an action plan informed by the targeted problems; and the action plan must include target dates for the attainment of interim benchmarks and describe how the plan should be implemented. The plan must also provide for a mechanism that allows the partners to monitor results, using performance indicators that are agreed on in advance. (Gautron, 2010). Subsequent frameworks for collaboration took the same basic form.

The partnership approach aims to inaugurate a dialogue between the various local actors, with a view to creating mutual understanding and improving trust. knowledge and a climate of trust. The aim of these discussions and exchanges is to identify and analyse problems of mutual concern and to bring the actors' vision of the problems more closely into alignment, culminating, ideally, in agreement on what actions to take and how to divide up the labor between the stakeholders. This requires the partners to share information and expertise, pool resources, and assess the impact of joint actions. Champions of such partnerships advocate a global approach to security; strategic management (inspired by the SARA approach); networked collaboration; decentralized management of local security concerns; and efforts to obtain buy-in from local residents.

In 2002, the local governance of partnership action was entrusted to local security and crime prevention councils, including municipal councils, called CLSPD's, and regional councils, called CISPD's, that bring together multiple municipalities under one administrative umbrella. (CISPD) Coordinated by the mayor or a regional administrator, these councils bring together representatives of the prefect, the prosecutor, mayor's offices, and security forces (National Police, National Gendarmerie, municipal police). They also include public housing officials, representatives of common carriers, school officials, social services, victims' aid societies, and non-profit urban development specialists, along with tenants' associations. These CLSPDs have now replaced the local security contracts (CLS), though that older system has not been entirely scrapped.

CLSPD's encourage the formation of breakout groups (*cellules de veille*) that deal with security issues in critical districts. These bring together ground-level actors to monitor the security situation and formulate an immediate response to events that mobilize public outrage and that might otherwise trigger a riot.

Another important security partnership is the local crime treatment group (*Groupe local de traitement de la délinquance*, GLTD), which, unlike the other ones, is organized and headed by a prosecutor. It brings together police and municipal security officials, along with a subgroup of the officials who take part in the CLSPD, depending on the nature of the crime problem at issue. This collaborative venture focuses specifically on criminal offenses, not quality of life issues loosely construed. The point of this venture is to fine-tune criminal investigations, charges, and sanctions to the nature of a crime problem that is confined to a particular location and involves a very small range of targets—sometimes only a single individual. The idea is to assemble everyone with expertise on one particular crime problem, to deal with it collaboratively. GLTDs are created for a limited period of time, as the imposition of sanctions on a particular individual or group of individuals usually ends its reason for being. (Wyvekens, 1999, 2000).

Thanks to these different mechanisms, the municipality has become the main platform for public action in local security policies. Nevertheless, some coordination mechanisms remain at the level of the county (*département*). In particular, a new partnership entity was set up in

2002: the County Council for Crime Prevention (*Conseil départemental de prévention de la délinquance*, CDPD). This structure brings together, under the prefect's chairmanship, the same range of operators as the CLSPDs. Its mission is to undertake annual review of a comprehensive report on the security situation of the county; to suggest solutions to actors in the field; and to support their initiatives and to draw up county-level crime-fighting and crime-prevention in various domains: victim assistance, road safety, drug interdiction, reduction and management of addictions, violence against women, hooliganism, sects and radicalisation.

In addition to these numerous committees, various conventional instruments have been created to encourage and organize bilateral cooperation between a state entity (police, gendarmerie, justice) and another security actor – municipal police, a low-income housing organization (known as HLM, *habitation à loyer modéré*), public transportation, etc. Examples include coordination agreements between national and municipal police forces; citizen participation protocols to facilitate self-monitoring of the neighbourhood by residents (in conjunction with the city-hall and the police); agreements spelling out the terms of information sharing between professionals who must protect the confidentiality of clients; and agreements between landlords and the police to allow access to stairways and carry out searches of common areas.

All these partnership mechanisms and tools are special in that they do not constitute mandatory frameworks for public security action in the territories. Participants have considerable margins of autonomy, which allow them to choose not to use these mechanisms, to limit their involvement to purely formal participation, or to withdraw from them if they so wish. These instruments function much more like resources that participants wishing to promote partnership policies can mobilize. They are then used in a flexible way, as frameworks to facilitate networking and coordinating action plans, in the service of collaboration whose form, scope and objectives vary significantly from one place to another and wax and wane over time, reflecting changes in the participants' level of trust and their willingness to engage each other as partners.

1.2- Main characteristics of French partnerships

In France, there is therefore a profusion of mechanisms that can serve as institutional support for local security partnerships. Despite this diversity, however, these mechanisms share a number of features.

First, they focus their energies on a limited number of infra-municipal sites, most of which are relatively small. As a general rule, they encompass an area that ranges from a city block to a neighbourhood. Their selection is often a contentious issue, as these areas benefit from site-specific subsidies and additional police resources. The selection criteria are somewhat vague and vary with the place and time when the choice is made and with the institutions involved in the process. Relevant criteria include crime rates, indicators of social dysfunction or vulnerability based partly on incident reports compiled by social workers, housing officials, common carriers, and other institutional actors; and demographic data indicating a sizeable presence of at-risk groups. (Bonelli, 2008)

Secondly, partnership mechanisms are mainly oriented towards dealing with petty crime and minor disorders that affect residents' quality of life and generate a climate of fear or a sense of public disorder. Many of these "incivilities" are linked to juvenile misconduct:

occupying or damaging public spaces, violence in schools or on public transport, noise pollution, motorcycle rodeos, etc. Partnerships aim to contain these phenomena by doing something about so-called “no-go” areas in which public actors are unwilling to intervene to maintain the public peace (Roché, 2002). Preferred tools for this are video surveillance, situational crime prevention and conflict mediation. In recent years, the partnership approach has been extended to new security concerns centering on economic crime, with county operational committees in charge of developing policy and action plans in this area. Newer crime-specific committees include the county-wide operational anti-fraud committees (*comités opérationnels départementaux anti-fraude*, CODAF), created in 2008, and a new committee tasked with fighting terrorism and radicalization (*comités départementaux de prévention de la radicalisation*, CDPR), which was set up in 2016.

Finally, municipal actors play a central role in the vast majority of local security partnerships. This predominant influence was recognised by the 2007 Crime Prevention Act, which makes the mayor the main driving force behind local security policies, but it above all results from the many assets cities have at their disposal to assert their leadership on public action in this field.

Indeed, mayors are the only elected authorities in partnership arrangements. They know their voters hold them responsible for the security situation in the borough. That is why they have a strong interest in ensuring security partnerships operate effectively from a problem-solving perspective (Le Goff, 2008). In addition, large municipalities have more budgetary flexibility than state administrations. Vested interests among their electorate have led many mayors to acquire their own resources to address security concerns. Mayors have set up a municipal service to deal with security, safety, and crime prevention issues. Mayors have also strengthened the municipal police; deployed urban video surveillance systems; recruited conflict mediators; fostered urban development to enhance the safety of public spaces; acquired geo-localisation equipment and hired specialists to aggregate and analyse incident reports (Bonelli, 2008). Cities therefore have more resources dedicated to developing partnership actions than other local governments. They are able to encourage the national police to participate in inter-institutional cooperation, as it is difficult for police officers to do without the help of municipalities to carry out some of their tasks (such as dealing with problem families and young troublemakers, launching roadside check operations, monitoring sports or cultural events, intervening to stop motorcycle rodeos, etc.).

Here is another advantage of municipalities: their in-depth knowledge of the security situation. This is linked to the organization of municipal services by city zones, to the connections that exist between city councils and neighbourhood associations, but also to the fact that residents constantly challenge local elected officials to address their problems and fears (Douillet & de Maillard, 2008). The mayor is the only generalist participant in local security policies, unlike the other partners whose action is limited to a more or less specialised problem areas. Mayors are therefore particularly capable of providing a global vision of security concerns in the community, and of linking neighbourhood specialists with city-wide actors to improve the flow of information among network participants (Le Goff, 2008).

2- - ROADBLOCKS AND CHALLENGES FACING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

Most research on security partnerships highlight the difficulties partners encounter on the ground in implementing national policies developing partnership institutions in the long-term.

The creation of a partnership structure in a territory does not automatically lead to the establishment of effective collaboration between participants. Indeed, several factors prevent actors concerned from truly making the available tools and mechanisms their own.

2.1- A heterogeneity of views

One obstacle lies in the divergence of perceptions, interests and agendas of heterogeneous stakeholders (Rhodes, 2006). Depending on their professional background and institutional affiliation, participants tend to uphold their own visions of what is problematic, what problems should be accorded priority, and what constitutes an acceptable and effective solution. Such disagreements can lead to mutual mistrust, conflict, reluctance or avoidance attitudes (Gautron, 2010; Douillet & De Maillard, 2008; Crawford, 1999). For example, social workers, teachers and health professionals are often reticent to be associated with the punitive interventions of the police, the judiciary and municipal actors faced with an increase in criminal behaviour (De Maillard, 2001). Prosecutors and judges, in turn, want to keep their distance from other institutional players, in the name of the judicial institution's duty of impartiality (Delpuech *et al.*, 2014).

2.2- The rejection of collective constraints

Another obstacle to partnerships is actors' reluctance to abide by constraints on joint initiatives that call for coordinated action. Indeed, taking part in a collective project requires that participants question their own way of seeing things, subordinate their freedom of action to common decisions even when that means changing how they do things, accept partners' right to have a say in what participants do, and shoulder their share of the financial burden for common projects. Some actors reject the interplay of reciprocal obligations, mutual interference and the additional costs associated with networking. They are willing to share information, engage in dialogue, accept a certain amount of coordination, but not to change their objectives and modes of action to fit into a joint strategy (Gorgeon, Estèbe, Léon, 2000). Such reluctance can be deduced from the behaviour of participants who may be willing to exchange views in formal meetings, but remain unwilling to take part in joint operations, or to contribute to them in some other way. It is also reflected in entrenchment behind professional secrecy, in requiring strict respect for each other's area of competence, and even in criticising other participants' inadequacies (Donzelot *et al.*, 2003).

Since the early 2000s, many partners have come to insist that their repertoire of interventions as institutional actors is bound by the rules and logic peculiar to their distinct organizations. This in turn fuels resistance to investment in common projects, as it encourages partnership participants to focus on their "core business" and prioritize their organizational interests at the expense of related partnership activities. State administrations are torn between their duty to implement government and ministerial policies and the need to respond to requests from their local partners, especially since they have only limited budgets to finance partnership actions.

2.3- A problematic management

Managing the dynamics of partnerships is challenging in a number of ways. The coexistence of multiple ways of performing certain tasks, of conflicting interests and different degrees of commitment to the partnership project makes partnerships difficult to govern. Power rivalries, struggles for precedence, competition for resources, ideological antagonisms

and partisan conflicts oppose the different actors within steering bodies, and especially those in a position to claim leadership, namely, prefects, prosecutors, and leaders of the different government entities at the township, inter-communal, and county levels (Mouhanna, 2005; Roché, 2004; Le Goff, 2002). In France, the combined authority of the prefect and mayor over CLSPDs has sometimes led to political deadlock, when the two leaders belong to opposing political parties.

On the other hand, there is no obligation for actors involved in a partnership mechanism to fulfil their joint commitments. Each partner retains a high degree of autonomy in deciding what resources to allocate to collective endeavors. Everyone retains the freedom to withdraw or defect if they consider it necessary to change their priorities, or consider themselves prey to unacceptable criticism from other actors, or disagree with the choices adopted by the steering body (Gautron, 2010; Gatto & Thoenig, 1993). As a result, few partnerships have implemented instruments designed to monitor their respective contributions to the joint policy.

The lack of management tools and the lack of training in how to manage the collective initiatives of heterogeneous partnerships also impedes the governance of partnership activities. Though political actors call on partners to develop strategic plans to the wealth of security issues they encounter, many partnership arrangements operate without a sound diagnosis of the environment in which they operate, without precise objectives and action plans, and without feedback or shared performance indicators. Partnerships also lack well-established procedures for how to work together and dispute resolution mechanisms. There are two main reasons for the amorphous organisation of partnerships, and their difficulty in developing strategic visions and approaches that go beyond modest tactical innovation to deal with individual security issues in a piecemeal fashion. First, partnership participants lack managerial know-how and, second, their willingness to work together often hinges on tacit agreement on the need to avoid tensions within the public policy network and to search for common ground. It is of course easier to agree on non-binding procedures and vague objectives. Due to such vagueness, some agents, such as law enforcement officers, are tempted to use the system to obtain commitments (from others) about things that the actors themselves care about (like actionable intelligence about serious crimes), while unloading on others those tasks they don't consider central to their own professional identity (like crime prevention). To cite another example, it is common for inner-city retailers to ask security partnerships to take action against homeless people who harass the retailers' customers, principally by removing them from the vicinity of the retailers' businesses. Similarly, some local elected officials use partnership forums as a platform to ask the state for additional police resources.

2.4- The fragility of action plans

One constraint under which many partnerships labour is that their dynamism depends on a few key managers' personal involvement and on those managers' ability to win the trust and cooperation of other network participants. (Such nodal figures are referred to as "*intégrateurs inter-administratifs*" (inter-administrative integrators) by Gatto & Thoenig, 1993). The departure of one or more of these central personalities can disrupt the functioning of the network or even cause it to disintegrate. The sustainability of partnership collaborations is therefore destabilized periodically by the departure and replacement of key figures. These include prefects, sub-prefects, Departmental Chiefs of the Public Security Police,

Gendarmerie commanders, prosecutors, mayors, and leaders of inter-municipal or departmental councils.

The organizational dynamics of law enforcement agencies also inhibit their liaisons' role in local security partnerships (Fleming, 2006). Police officials must bring their political, administrative and judicial authorities' demands to local partners' attention. Many of them view criminal investigation as the "core responsibility" of law enforcement. That is why they are reluctant to engage in local collaborations that most often emphasize order maintenance and prevention. Police officers and gendarmes have other good reasons to limit their involvement. Many of them lack professional training in partnership cooperation. As a result, they have trouble with finding solutions to the difficulties that arise from networking and see it as one more challenge rather as a vehicle for innovation. In addition, their performance indicators and internal promotion systems hardly take into account this type of [partnership] activity. They therefore have few material rewards and little in the way of symbolic benefit to expect from involvement in partnership ventures (Ocqueteau, 2006). Finally, they must at all times be able to respond to unpredictable order maintenance emergencies that may call on their operational resources. Consequently, they prefer to keep their available resources in reserve instead of committing them to partnership ventures, from which they find it difficult to disentangle themselves, for obvious reasons of inter-institutional diplomacy. (Gatto & Thoenig, 1993).

Due to these various uncertainties and centrifugal forces, some of the partnership mechanisms fail to generate much momentum, so that members rapidly lose interest, though other partnerships have thrived in spite of fractious relationships between political leaders. As we have noted elsewhere (Delpuech and Ross 2016, 2017), ground-level actors within the police, in particular, needed informal contacts with outside stakeholders when the abolition of community policing in 2003 reduced the flow of information to the police from neighbourhood contacts. Consultation is therefore formal and limited in nature, does not address conflicting issues and does not lead to any concrete decisions (Le Goff, 2004). The system is maintained for display purposes, to meet legal obligations and benefit from the resources attached to it (public funds from an inter-ministerial allocation for the prevention of crime¹ and urban policy, additional police staff, etc.). The proportion of such ineffective devices has been decreasing since the 1990s.

3- RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PARTNERSHIPS

Despite these various inhibiting factors, security partnerships have been developing for the past 30 years within three areas: they address an increasing variety of security issues; they involve increasingly sophisticated organizational methods; and they promote the production as well as the mobilization of a great deal of new expertise in the security field.

3.1- Diversification of objectives and participants

---

¹ The Inter-ministerial Fund for the Prevention of Delinquency (FIPD) is a national mechanism designed to finance actions carried out by local authorities or associations to address a variety of security problems, such as the development of urban video surveillance systems, the prevention of violence against women or of juvenile delinquency, the fight against recidivism, assistance to victims, etc. The CIPDR's mission is also to promote local partnership initiatives (Dieu, 2016, p. 84-85).

The purpose of partnership initiatives has diversified. At first, it focused on petty crime and quality of life issues, educational and preventive initiatives, and victim support. It now covers a wide range of phenomena: organised crime, economic crime, fraud, bullying in schools, violence against women, radicalisation, etc.

At the same time, the range of operators willing to engage in security partnerships has broadened. Actors in the housing, public transport and private security sectors have gradually assumed the role of full participants in the collective elaboration of security policies. The reluctance of social workers and school staff to engage with law enforcement has waned over the years, although it has lingered in some places – which are generally those less affected by crime.

Partnership efforts to do something about violence in schools provide a good example of a cooperation between actors who previously did not plan to collaborate with each other, given that schools prefer to solve disciplinary problems internally. The integration of schools into partnership schemes dates back to the early 1990s (Dumoulin & Froment, 2003) and is reflected in recent efforts by school administrators to inform police and judicial actors of all serious criminal offenses committed on school premises. There has also been increased cooperation between junior-high schools, police (including youth leisure centres run by police personnel) and the gendarmerie (particularly their brigades for the prevention of juvenile delinquency) as part of a concerted effort to counteract truancy and to provide programming for students whom they schools have suspended for disciplinary infractions. Finally, each police station or gendarmerie brigade has a "*correspondant scolaire*" (school liaison), responsible for improving communications between schools and law enforcement officials. These officers play an important role as intermediaries and as situational crime prevention experts, since they advise schools on how to better secure their premises. They offer to teach educational modules about addictive behaviours, digital harassment, gender-based violence, and so forth. And they update the school on the progress of ongoing legal proceedings. This type of networking has become the norm in many other specialised areas of security policy, such as domestic violence, juvenile delinquency, hooliganism, road safety, crimes against the environment, economic fraud, and so forth.

French partnerships increasingly involve residents. For a long time, public security action did not go beyond the administrative sphere. Only institutional actors had a voice in the conduct of security policies (Donzelot *et al.*, 2003; Wyvekens, 2003). Associations were viewed with suspicion, except when they served as a conduit for administrative initiatives. The latter excluded direct citizens' involvement in their work, except as sources of information. Public authorities did not go beyond the occasional consultation of residents, which was designed to help police leadership to better understand residents' expectations and to improve techniques for quantifying changes in residents' fear of crime. Even then, public authorities only marginally integrated the points of view thus collected (LeGoff, 2004).

However, since the 2000s, partnership mechanisms have been evolving towards greater public participation. Inspired by American "neighborhood watches," the Gendarmerie has put in places similar measures since 2007, with particular emphasis on combating burglaries (through so-called "*voisins vigilants*", ie. vigilant neighbours). These watches were renamed "*participation citoyenne*" (citizen participation) in 2011). Some CLSPDs involve citizens' advisory committees in the design and evaluation of the actions carried out (for example, in Lyon, see Germain, 2012, or then again in Marseilles and Nantes). A number of French cities now invite representatives of tenants' associations to participate in such partnerships, and

some cities have begun to experiment with focus groups of “trusted citizens” (often nominated by the police or gendarmerie themselves) in partnership deliberations. Some cities have found it easier to include members of the public in discussion groups sponsored by the city itself rather than by the police. For example, some municipalities have organized citizen focus groups that fold security discussions into discussions about the beautification and redesign of public spaces (which must now take situational crime prevention into account.)

3.2- Formalization of cooperation

In addition, there has been greater formalization of partnership procedures. In the 1980s and 1990s, the most effective security collaborations took place outside formal mechanisms, in informal networks of personalized relationships. Institutional meetings had little influence on stakeholders' decisions and had even less impact on daily practices. Formal consultation and coordination procedures were subject to “ambivalent appropriation”, aiming at developing an interconnection of organizational and professional cultures, and at introducing clarity and predictability about the actions planned by one or another of the partners (Gatto & Thoenig, 1993).

Informal contacts between local actors allow them to share knowledge and information useful to each. Informal relationships with trusted interlocutors are now deemed the best way to obtain relevant and reliable information about how partners intend to handle situations of common interest. These informal relationships are the preferred channel for rapid exchanges of sensitive information, i.e. information relating to facts that may give rise to negative media comments (error or fault committed by an operator, increase in a criminal phenomenon, an initiative getting poor results, etc.).

In short, whatever its degree of formalisation, the partnership is first and foremost seen as a source of useful information. Stakeholders commit, not so much to initiate joint actions, but to increase their capacity to anticipate sensitive events falling within their own prerogatives. Collaboration is accepted insofar as each partner retains full autonomy with regard to others and can make use of the partnership as a means of “fully controlling and occupying its own legal and regulatory areas of intervention with regard to those of others” (*ibid.*, p. 73). For example, police organizations use their external partners to know whether their street staffs actually do their work. This form of indirect control of daily activity allows managers to assess the quality of the services provided by their subordinates while giving the impression of upholding field staff professional autonomy (*ibid.*, p.37).

Attitude towards formal arrangements changed during the 2000s. Stakeholders have learned to view them, beyond simply ways of sharing information, as places to initiate and implement operational collaborations. In a growing number of places, cooperation has been strengthened, although the extent of rapprochement between partners remains very uneven from one place to another. Three levels of coordination and integration of security partnerships continue to coexist across the country (Douillet & De Maillard, 2008).

At the most limited cooperation level, actors simply recognize and encourage each other, as well as exchange non-sensitive information. At an intermediate level, partners agree on a small number of common objectives and allow for limited coordination of the resources for reaching them. They agree to some extent to adjust their activities according to collective consultations and choices, but avoid intervening outside their usual sphere of action. They do not question their own definitions of problems and do not plan substantially to change the way they respond. Finally, at the highest level of integration, participants consent to the steering

exercised by the partnership official governance body. They are willing to engage in long-term joint actions involving pooling their resources and systematically sharing sensitive information. They settle for a distribution of roles and tasks that can lead them to adopt new forms and modalities of action. This can also involve a willingness to integrate incident reports from different sources (police, firefighters, hospitals), to consider new explanations for familiar phenomena that might call for a new approach (such as partnership with mental health experts as a way of conducting a triage of emergency situations), and to bring new forms of expertise (and new stake-holders) into partnership deliberations. (In Grenoble, this involved non-profit organizations with expertise in survey research and mediation.)

3.3- How partnerships deepen

Only a fraction of local collaborations have a dynamic that leads to a significant degree of integration. In other cases, cooperation is not so strong, remains at a standstill or falters. In France, no national study has been conducted to evaluate and rank security partnerships by their degree of cohesiveness and integration. Nevertheless, various studies, as well as our own empirical research (Delpeuch & Ross, 2016, 2017), make it possible to reconstruct the process of developing a highly integrated partnership. Such a process involves a series of steps.

Initially, cooperation is limited to sharing information. It promotes dialogue between participants, who learn to talk and to listen to each other. In doing so, actors get to know and understand each other better. They will no longer blame each other for the persistence or aggravation of security problems. As their exchanges increase, they become more aware of their interdependence and embrace a norm of reciprocity. As trust grows, they accept giving others a say in what they do, which encourages them to invest themselves more in their own field of expertise (Fleming, 2006; Donzelot *et al.*, 2003).

Secondly, actors find it less and less difficult to agree on how to interpret and address problems. They begin to see the potential benefits of breaking down the barriers between their initiatives. The more everyone knows about each other's resources and constraints, the more they appreciate what it is realistic to ask and to expect of the others, and the more obvious the benefits and opportunities of cooperation become. For example, schools realize that law enforcement can help them better protect their students and staff; the national police understand that quick and easy access to video surveillance tapes managed by the municipal police is an asset for clarifying facts; the prosecutor realises she needs regular updates with the town hall CLSPD coordinator to adjust or explain her enforcement policy with regard to sensitive matters. (Bonelli, 2008)

Bringing participants' perspectives more closely into alignment, and making them aware of shared interests, can facilitate a more active form of cooperation. The first close collaborations to emerge are usually bilateral, for example between the national and municipal police, between schools and the police, etc. Under suitable conditions (accumulation of positive experiences, heavy pressure due to the gravity of the underlying crime problems, the presence of partnership entrepreneurs, etc.), broader collaborations can be achieved, typically in the form of site-specific working groups. Most often, these *ad hoc* partnerships bring together a limited number of participants, who are more familiar with local problems, trust each other and already have common working habits. Such collaborations have limited objectives, such as following up a targeted audience, monitoring a priority area, working to solve a specific problem or engaging in a particular project (Douillet & de Maillard, 2008). The partners attempt to transcend the individual institutional interests of the participants; to

divide tasks among the partners; to pool resources; and to enlarge the repertoire of interventions. These efforts are often accompanied by a willingness to experiment with new approaches, to create synergies, and to lend reciprocal support in ways that enhance the legitimacy of each partner's approach to a problem.

Often there is no pre-established protocol for how to deal with certain problems, since cross-cutting problems that can be viewed through multiple interpretive lenses can call forth a wide range of responses from diverse sets of actors. In some cases, however, a coherent and coordinated system of action involving most local stakeholders manages to crystallize. All professionals concerned then collaborate on a daily basis and succeed in setting up collective strategies. The development of such generalised cooperation does not exclude keeping up bilateral or restricted cooperation. It is important to stress that these effective partnerships are, to a large extent, decoupled from the partnership arrangements that national policies have put in place. Operational coalitions built from the bottom up at local level, as well as institutional arenas established by central authorities do not follow the same logic and do not apply the same rationale towards the same issues, even though the functioning of one may affect that of the other (De Maillard, 2005).

3.4- The effects of partnerships on police organizations

Few local police departments or gendarmerie brigades today are not engaged in partnership cooperation in one form or another. One can rightly question the impact that the generalization of the partnership model has on police organizations. This can be described as limited organizational learning.

*CONTINUE HERE Participation in networking leads to changes in the way police liaisons think about security concerns, as a result of their integration into "*communautés de pratique*" (practice communities) that intersect several professional worlds. However, changing mindsets and the acquisition of new knowledge do not always inspire significant changes in approaches and modes of intervention of other actors within the police.

The most common and perhaps the most effective way of involving police in a partnership arrangement is to create a unit dedicated to the implementation of related activities. At best, this unit is well integrated into the overall organisation, has adequately trained staff and is equipped with appropriate means of action and management instruments. In the worst cases, it is decoupled or marginalized from the rest of the organization. Its members must learn all the tricks of partnership on the job and have to develop their own management tools. There is of course a diversity of intermediate situations between these two extremes, but in all cases, learning and changes are mainly located in the specialized unit and have little impact on the other components of the police organization. In short, the institutionalization of security partnerships causes increasing segmentation within the participating institutions, rather than bringing about generalized change in practices.

The effects of networked work on those who participate are well known: convergence of views; emergence of a sense of belonging and loyalty to the collective; clarification of roles and division of tasks; exchange of resources; and agreement on rules of the game, coordination mechanisms, and the like (Rhodes, 2006). Security partnerships are no exception, but these dynamics are most often confined to the units and staff directly involved, so that the development of collaborations is not incompatible with enduring institutional

identities together with entrenched administrative cultures and professional corporatism (all of which weaken partnership ventures).

3.5- Better knowledge of the security environment through partnership

Effective governance of partnerships requires procedures for collective consultation and decision-making by consensus. This in turn requires each participant to produce arguments designed to persuade the others. Among professionals, the most convincing arguments are evidence-based claims supported by expertise and systematic analysis (Fischer, 2000). Viewed as systematic, rigorous and objective, expert discourse is a language partners can identify with, beyond the diversity of their institutional, organizational and professional cultures (Callon, Lascoumes & Barthes, 2001). It can provide a focal point for analysis of a problem and agreement on how to address it (Fleming & Wood, 2006). In France, increasing integration into security partnerships motivates the police participants to develop their own expertise in matters like situational crime prevention. Indeed, this capacity is one of the main determinants as to the political weight and negotiating power of the police in the partnership processes for the production of local security policies.

In some French cities, public authorities have initiated new forms of intervention in consultation with experts, for example by working closely with child psychiatrists to put together a multi-disciplinary crisis intervention team to treat children exposed to domestic violence, child abuse, or suicide. Other cities have used the partnership framework to set up a local observatory and to cross-reference incident reports of hospitals and fire departments, as a check on police crime statistics; yet other cities have drawn on the expertise of urban design experts, sociologists, and consulting firms to assess security risks and identify gaps in public action. Studies that link crime to demographic data and truancy statistics contribute to better understanding of the security environment (Gautron, 2010). These studies draw on the methods and tools of the social sciences – survey questionnaires, statistical analysis, fact mapping... – to provide support for strategic or operational decision-making. Some municipalities (such as Nantes) have hired former members of French intelligence agencies to conduct their own security analysis on behalf of the city, in order to better triage complaints about “loitering juveniles.” The aim to fine-tune the city’s response, depending on whether the problem involves truancy, drug-dealing, or juveniles who lack recreational outlets.

Until now, the institutional response to the need for more specialized expertise within the police has been to set up national structures such as the National Institute for Advanced Security and Justice Studies (*Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice*, INHESJ), heir to the *Institut des hautes études de sécurité intérieure* (Institute for Advanced Studies on Internal Security) created in 1989, or the Central Service for Territorial Intelligence (*Service central du renseignement territorial*, SCRT). These centralized responses are out of step with the expertise needs of county-level police and gendarmerie services. These structures do not have the means to conduct sophisticated diagnostics of the local security environment at the request of local law enforcement officials, who tinker with their own instruments for measuring local phenomena, and their own performance indicators. Accordingly, many departments draw on external partners’ expertise or on a knowledge-poor decision-making environment.

CONCLUSION - WHERE DO WE STAND TODAY IN FRANCE? THE LIMITS OF HIGHLY INTEGRATED PARTNERSHIPS

In various parts of France, the partnerships that emerged in the 2000s and 2010s were characterized by a high degree of inter-organizational integration, joint governance and collective management. Although these partnerships represent "the very best France has to offer" in terms of partnership, they nevertheless have a number of weaknesses.

Despite progress in opening up partnership governance (to a wider range of institutions and citizens), three sets of authorities still carry predominant weight in the management of security partnerships: the mayors (along with the head of the inter-municipal structure, the deputy in charge of security matters, the CLSPD coordinator, the head of the municipal police...); the administrative authority (prefect, sub-prefect, head of the municipal police or gendarmerie...) and prosecutors). The dynamism of cooperation depends on agreement between these three groups of stakeholders, and on their skills as inter-administrative integrators.

Non-sovereign partners and residents are consulted but they have little say in the repressive dimension of local security policies. This still is the preserve of the police, prosecutors, and political authorities. For other forms of intervention, consultation has widened at multiple geographic levels, from the infra-urban to the inter-communal and regional realms. Each level has its own participatory bodies and partnership mechanisms.

In larger geographic units, partnership committees are generally said to be engaged in strategic management, while infra-municipal committees are said to only have an operational role implementing policy. But in practice, concrete responses to security problems are often defined by the actors closest to the field, i.e. by participants in neighbourhood watch cells or other groups working at the neighbourhood level or even below. The pitfalls and risks attached to multi-level security governance include tensions or decoupling between the different decision-making levels, fragmented and inconsistent actions carried out by the various devices, lack of transparency, and dilution of responsibilities. The participation of associations (and, through them, of citizens) has become the norm, but the complexity of the layered system makes it difficult to assess the impact of the public partners' daily work.

Today in France, the main partnership issues are no longer reluctance to cooperate and the "democratic deficit" – two pitfalls that have yet to disappear – but the difficulty in coordinating and controlling the multi-layered partnership mechanisms that have emerged over the past twenty years. In response to this problem, the multiple authorities have sometimes set up additional coordination bodies, which have been superimposed on the old ones without replacing them.

Here is a second current weakness: insufficient progress has been made to develop techniques and instruments for piloting security partnerships and managing their work. It is now widely accepted that partnership action requires investment in territorial expertise and decision-making tools. While local actors have, on the whole, been able to modernize their information systems to meet their partnership needs, this may not be said of their analytical capacities: these remain rudimentary in France compared with what exists in English-speaking countries. There, many police forces employ professional "strategic analysts" (i.e. specialists in local security policy design) and conduct problem-oriented policing or evidence-based policing schemes in collaboration with the local academic community.

French partnerships have gotten used to setting local goals and priorities and to evaluating the results of their interventions, but their expertise in doing this remains very limited. Some partnership bodies are certainly capable of producing accurate, insightful, and relevant analyses, but the driving forces behind such a high quality diagnosis are primarily the participants' ability to share information and engage in collective deliberation than expertise in the management of partnerships. Security engineering capabilities are not evenly distributed throughout the country, but concentrated in a few large cities that have chosen to engage in the security field. A large proportion of local authorities lack such capacities, particularly in outlying areas (rural regions, as well as small and medium-sized towns far from large cities, etc.). Most of the means of diagnosing and analysing security problems are located outside the police, gendarmerie and prefectures – i.e. outside institutions covering the whole of France: this is a major factor in the unequal distribution of effective partnerships across the national territory.

A third limitation lies in the dynamics of professionalization that accompany the institutionalisation of security partnerships. To work well, studies show, participants in positions of responsibility must learn specific skills from their partners. Participants must acquire knowledge and know-how related to information sharing; to inter-institutional diplomacy; and to inter-professional dialogue. They must learn to translate discourses from beyond the disciplinary boundaries that separate professions from each other and must be able to persuade by marshalling expertise. While local authorities have largely relied on the development of new professionals to carry out the tasks linked to partnerships (municipal police officers, CLSPD coordinators or prevention and security officers, mediators, specialised consultants, etc.), national authorities have generally been content to provide (some) staff with supplemental training of limited scope. There is therefore a skills gap in partnership work that is sometimes considerable between highly professionalized municipal actors and other state actors (police, prosecutors and prefects) who are much less so. However, the police have been able to develop professional specialisations in a small number of specific areas, namely, in situational prevention; in cooperating with schools (through anti-drug speakers and school liaisons); in preventing juvenile delinquency (through the CLJ and BPDJ); in addressing domestic violence (through investigators from the family protection brigades and domestic violence liaisons).

REFERENCES

- Bonelli Laurent, *La France a peur*, Paris : La Découverte, 2008.
- Bonnet François, « Les effets pervers du partage de la sécurité. Polices publiques et privées dans une gare et un centre commercial », *Sociologie du Travail*, 50 (4), 2008, p.505-520.
- Callon Michel, Lascoumes Pierre, Barthes Yannick, *Agir dans un monde incertain. Essai sur la démocratie technique*, Paris : Seuil, 2001.
- Crawford Adam, *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Delpeuch Thierry, Dumoulin, De Galember Claire Laurence, *Sociologie du droit et de la justice*, Paris, :Armand Colin, 2014.
- Delpeuch Thierry, Ross Jacqueline E., “Crime-Fighting and Prevention as Competing Approaches to Collective Juvenile Violence – A Comparative Study of the United States and

France”, Sieber Ulrich, Mitsilegas Valsamis, Mylonopoulos Christos, Billis Emmanouil, Knust Nandor (eds.) *Alternative Systems of Crime Control National, Transnational, and International Dimensions*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2018.

Delpeuch Thierry, Ross Jacqueline E., “The Co-Production of Security in the United States and France”, *American Journal of Criminal Law*, vol.44, n°2, 2017, p.187-216.

Dieu François, *Réponses à la délinquance*, Paris : L’Harmattan, 2016.

Donzelot Jacques, Mével Catherine, Wyvekens Anne, *Faire société. La politique de la ville aux États-Unis et en France*, Paris : Le Seuil, 2003.

Douillet Anne-Cécile, de Maillard Jacques, « Le magistrat, le maire et la sécurité publique : action publique partenariale et dynamiques professionnelles », *Revue française de sociologie*, 49 (4), 2008, p. 793-818.

Dumoulin Laurence, Froment Jean-Charles, « Ecole et sécurité : les politiques de lutte contre la violence à l’école », in Jean-Charles Froment, Jean-Jacques Gleizal, Martine Kaluszynski (sous la dir.) *Les Etats à l’épreuve de la sécurité*, Grenoble : Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 2003, p.62-82.

Duran Patrice, *Penser l’action publique*, Paris : LDGJ, 1999.

Epstein Renaud, *La rénovation urbaine. Démolition-reconstruction de l’Etat*, Paris : Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2013.

Ferret Jérôme, « Evaluer la police dite de proximité ? Certitudes et incertitudes tirées des expériences françaises », *Les cahiers de la sécurité intérieure*, n°53, 2003, p. 83-110.

Fleming Jenny, Wood Jennifer, “Introduction: New Ways of Doing Business: Networks of Policing and Security”, in Jenny Fleming, Jennifer Wood (eds.) *Fighting Crime Together – The Challenges of Policing and Security Networks*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006. p.1-14.

Fleming Jenny, “Working through Networks: The Challenge of Partnership Policing”, in Jenny Fleming, Jennifer Wood (eds.) *Fighting Crime Together – The Challenges of Policing and Security Networks*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006, p.87-115.

Fischer Frank, *Citizens, Experts and the Environment: The Politics of Local Knowledge*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.

Gautron Virginie, « La coproduction locale de la sécurité en France : un partenariat interinstitutionnel déficient », *Champ pénal/ Penal field*, Vol. VII | 2010.

Germain Séverine, « Le retour des villes dans la gestion de la sécurité en France et en Italie, *Déviance et Société*, 36 (1), 2012, p.61-84.

Goldstein Herman, *Problem Oriented Policing*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990.

Gorgeon Catherine, Estebe Philippe, Leon Hervé, « De la prévention sociale à la tranquillité publique. Glissement sémantique et renouveau de l’action publique », *Les Cahiers de la sécurité intérieure*, n°39, 2000, p. 223-241.

Hassenteufel Patrick, *Sociologie politique: l’action publique*, 2^e édition, Paris : Armand Colin, 2011.

Le Goff Tanguy, *Les maires, nouveaux patrons de la sécurité ?*, Rennes : Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2008.

Le Goff Tanguy, « L'insécurité 'saisie' par les maires. Un enjeu de politiques municipales », *Revue française de science politique*, 55(3), 2005, p. 415-444.

Le Goff Tanguy, « Réformer la sécurité par la coproduction : action ou rhétorique ? », in Sebastian Roché (sous la dir.) *Réformer la police et la sécurité - Les nouvelles tendances en Europe et aux Etats-Unis*, Paris : Odile Jacob, 2004, p. 81-104.

Le Goff Tanguy, « Les contrats locaux de sécurité à l'épreuve du terrain. Réflexions sur l'action publique locale en matière de sécurité », *Politiques et management public*, 20 (1), 2002, p. 105-119.

De Maillard Jacques, « Les politiques de sécurité », in Olivier Borraz, Virginie Guiraudon (dir.) *Politiques publiques – 2. Changer la société*, Paris : Les Presses de SciencesPo, 2010, p.57-77.

De Maillard Jacques, « Réformes des polices dans les pays occidentaux. Une perspective comparée », *Revue Française de Science Politique*, vol. 59, n°6, 2009, p. 1197-1230.

De Maillard Jacques, « Les travailleurs sociaux en interaction. Politiques sociales urbaines, mobilisation des professionnels et fragmentations », *Sociologie du travail*, 44 (2), 2001, p. 215-232.

De Maillard Jacques, « Le partenariat en représentations : contribution à l'analyse des nouvelles politiques sociales territorialisées », *Politiques et management public*, 18 (3), 2000, p. 21-41.

Mouhanna Christian, « Coproduction, cohérence ou concurrence ? Réflexion sur la coopération élus-policiers en matière de sécurité », in Ferret Jérôme, Mouhanna Christian (sous la dir.) *Peurs sur les villes*, Paris : PUF, 2005, p.103-120.

Ocqueteau Frédéric, "France", in Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn (eds.) *Plural Policing, a Comparative Perspective*, London: Routledge, 2006, p. 55-76.

Roché Sébastien, « Vers la démonopolisation des fonctions régaliennes : contractualisation, territorialisation et européanisation de la sécurité intérieure », *Revue française de science politique*, 54 (1), 2004, p. 43-70.

Roché Sébastien, « Réformes dans la police et formes de gouvernement », in Sebastian Roché (sous la dir.) *Réformer la police et la sécurité - Les nouvelles tendances en Europe et aux Etats-Unis*, Paris : Odile Jacob, 2004, p.9-37.

Roché Sébastien, *Tolérance zéro ? Incivilité et insécurité*, Paris : Odile Jacob, 2002.

Rhodes R.A.W., "The Sour Laws of Network Governance", in Jenny Fleming, Jennifer Wood (eds.) *Fighting Crime Together – The Challenges of Policing and Security Networks*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006, p.15-34.

Thoenig Jean-Claude, « La gestion systémique de la sécurité publique », *Revue française de sociologie*, 35 (3). 1994, p. 357-392.

Weisburd David, Braga Anthony A., "Diffusion of Innovation in Policing: Lessons from the American Experience", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, vol. 59, n°6, 2009, p. 1097-1126.

Weisburd David, Braga Anthony A. (eds.) *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.133-154.

Wood Jennifer, Dupont Benoît (eds.) *Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Wyvekens Anne, « Les politiques de sécurité : une magistrature sociale, pour quelle proximité ? », *Droit et société*, n°44-45, 2000, p. 127-142.

Wyvekens Anne, « Le souci du territoire, les groupes locaux de traitement de la délinquance », *Les Annales de la recherche urbaine*, n°83-84, 1999, p. 81-88.