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I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions

Abstract : A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final bid can depend on new information provided about either the asset or the competitors. This paper examines the effects of new information regarding competitors, seeking to determine what information the auctioneer should provide assuming the set of allowable bids is discrete. The rational strategy profile that maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer is the one where each bidder makes the highest possible bid that is lower than his valuation of the item. This strategy profile is an equilibrium for a large enough number of bidders, regardless of the information released. We compare the number of bidders needed for this profile to be an equilibrium under different information settings. We find that it becomes an equilibrium with fewer bidders when no additional information is made available to the bidders compared to when information regarding the competition is available. As a result, from the auctioneer's revenue perspective, when the number of bidders is unknown, there are some advantages to not revealing information between the stages of the auction.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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Contributor : Elisabeth Lhuillier <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, December 16, 2020 - 8:44:28 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, December 29, 2020 - 3:31:32 AM


WP 2020 - Nr 44.pdf
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  • HAL Id : halshs-03078811, version 1


Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Yannick Viossat. I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions. 2020. ⟨halshs-03078811⟩



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