

# Meeting Different Needs The Implied Readers of the 'Pythagorean' Kingship Treatises

Michael Trapp

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## Meeting Different Needs The Implied Readers of the ‘Pythagorean’ Kingship Treatises

RÉSUMÉ-. Cet article propose une approche comparative des traités « pythagoriciens » sur la royauté, centrée sur une réflexion sur leur place au sein de l’offre plus vaste d’ouvrages sur la royauté disponibles à la fin de l’époque hellénistique et à l’époque impériale, ainsi que sur leur lectorat implicite. La comparaison avec les discours *Sur la royauté* de Dion Chrysostome permet de définir plus précisément ce que les traités offrent ou non au lecteur, mais il faut également développer des comparaisons avec d’autres textes « rivaux » et avoir un aperçu de la variété des communautés de lecteurs pour cette période.

MOTS-CLÉS-. lecteur implicite, Dion Chrysostome, cultures de la lecture, traités sur la royauté, traités pseudo-pythagoriciens

ABSTRACT-. This article proposes a comparative approach to the ‘Pythagorean’ kingship treatises, centered on a consideration of their place in the wider marketplace of kingship material and their implied readership in the later Hellenistic and Imperial periods. A comparison with the *Kingship Orations* of Dio Chrysostom provides an informative way of more closely defining what they do and do not offer the reader. However, this approach needs to be supplemented by comparisons with other ‘rival’ texts, and by a view of the range and variety of reading communities that we should envisage for this period.

KEYWORDS-. implied reader, Dio Chrysostom, reading cultures, kingship treatises, Pseudo-Pythagorean treatises

Sometime in the second century AD, in the Imperial province of Egypt, one Theon, apparently writing from Alexandria to his friend Heraclides in the provincial township of Oxyrhynchus, sent a parcel of books accompanied by the following missive:

Θέων Ἡρακλείδῃ ἑταίρῳ εὐ πράττειν. ὡς περ ἐγὼ πᾶσαν εἰσφέρομαι σπουδὴν τὰ χρήσιμα κατασκευάζειν βιβλία καὶ μάλιστα συντείνοντα πρὸς τὸν βίον, οὕτως καὶ σοὶ καθήκειν ἡγοῦμαι μὴ ἀμελῶς ἔχειν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν, οὐ τῆς τυχούσης εὐχρηστίας ἐξ αὐτῶν περιγυνομένης τοῖς ἐσπουδακόσιν ὠφελείσθαι. τὰ δὲ πεμφθέντα ἐστὶν διὰ Ἀχιλλᾶ τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα. ἔρρωσο, ἔρρώμην δὲ καὶ αὐτός· ἄσπασαι [ο]ὔς προσήκει.

ἔγρ(άφη) ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ

Βοήθου περὶ ἀσκήσεως γ' δ'

Διογένους περὶ γάμου

Διογένους περὶ ἀλυπίας

Χρυσίππου περὶ γονέων χρήσεως

Ἀντιπάτρου περὶ οἰκετῶν χρησέως α' β'

Ποσειδονίου περὶ τοῦ προτρέπεσθαι γ'

Rev.: παρὰ Θεώνος Ἡρακλείδῃ φιλοσόφῳ

Theon to his friend Heraclides, greetings. Just as I devote every effort to obtaining books that are profitable and especially relevant to life, so I think it is incumbent on you too not to be casual as regards reading them, as it is no ordinary benefit that accrues from them to those keen on self-improvement. The list below details what I am sending you via Achillas. Good health to you; I too am well. Pass on my greetings as appropriate.

Written in Alexandria.

Boethus *On Ascetic Training* Books 3 and 4

Diogenes *On Marriage*

Diogenes *On Freedom from Pain*

Chrysippus *On the Treatment of Parents*

Antipater *On the Treatment of Slaves*

Posidonius *On Moral Exhortation* Book 3

Rev.: From Theon to Heraclides, philosopher.<sup>1</sup>

This letter is one of a small but precious number of documents that open a window onto the circulation and use of philosophical materials among otherwise unknown private individuals of the Roman period.<sup>2</sup> These in turn are part of a larger—though still not enormous—number that offer a wider insight into the circulation of reading-matter and the dynamics of groups of readers more generally at this time.<sup>3</sup> Much interesting work has been done recently, on the strength of this and related material, on ancient reading practices and the possibility of establishing diverse reading cultures, specific to one or another category of readers (whether conventional classical *literati*, Christians, Empiricist doctors, or whatever),<sup>4</sup> but it is not to my purpose to pursue any of this closely here. What I wish to suggest instead is that Theon's letter can also serve to open up some imaginative space around the issue of the Pythagorean kingship texts that may in the end prove at least as rewarding as discussion of their dating.

Admittedly, in the particular case of Theon and Heraclides, the texts specified, though varied in topic and perhaps also in level of complexity, seem some distance from the kind of work represented by the Pythagorean kingship treatises. All are works of named and known major Stoics—'Diogenes' is Diogenes of Babylon, not the Cynic—and two of them (though interestingly only two, Diogenes's *On Freedom from Pain* and Posidonius's *On Moral Exhortation*) are attested in other surviving sources besides. But we perhaps also register that we are (as so often with letters) privy to one side only of this communication: what the rather pompous sounding Theon has seen fit to collect and to send to his friend. We do not know what Heraclides felt about the consignment when it arrived. We are thus free to imagine him wishing for something less mainstream or less demanding—something (pseudonymous) by the other Diogenes, for instance, or indeed something by a Pythagorean. And even if there is no special reason to project such thoughts specifically onto Heraclides, his example can encourage us, if we so desire, to imagine other individual readers distributed across the Greek-speaking half of the Empire whose tastes did run in such directions. At all events, I take this letter as an incentive to carry on thinking about consumer tastes in philosophical writing, and the variety of options philosophical readers with differing requirements wanted there to be open to them.

(1) P. Mil. Vogliano 11 (probably from Oxyrhynchus): cf. TRAPP 2003, p. 138-9 and 288-90 (no. 56); JOHNSON 2010, p. 183-185.

(2) Another is P.Oxy. 3069 (3rd/4th century), in which one Aquila encourages his philosopher friend Sarapion not to abandon his philosophical *askesis* in the midst of his (unspecified) troubles. Aquila mentions the approving comments of a third member of this network, Callinicus, and looks forward to a meeting with Sarapion in Antinoopolis. Cf. TRAPP 2003, p. 100-1 and 252-254 (no. 35).

(3) JOHNSON 2010, p. 179-199.

(4) Besides JOHNSON's monograph already referred to, see also *Id.* 2000 and 2009, plus GAMBLE 1995, p. 82-242, HURTADO 2012, and BERREY 2015.

A brief reminder of the contents of (what Stobaeus saw fit to preserve of) the three Pythagorean authors on kingship might not go amiss at this point.<sup>5</sup> The least voluminous of them, Sthenidas, is represented by just one short paragraph,<sup>6</sup> in which he does little more than list concisely a series of desirable divine attributes: the good monarch is a knowledgeable imitator of the wise first god, and his imitation should be manifested in such specific characteristics as greatness of mind, a gentle disposition, modesty in his needs, paternal concern towards his subjects, wisdom and obedience to law. Diotogenes is represented by two extracts, one shorter and one longer, but both more substantial than that from Sthenidas.<sup>7</sup> The first begins and ends with the concept of the monarch as supremely just, and indeed a 'living law' in himself. In between, it catalogues the primary areas of a monarch's activity as leadership in war (analogous to helmsman, charioteer and doctor), the dispensing of justice, and worship of the gods. The longer extract begins by highlighting the monarch's duty to master his emotions and his impulses to pleasure, so as to be devoid of personal greed and inclined to accumulate possessions only to be able to use them for the support of his friends; the psychology of this is articulated in terms of a modified version of the Platonic tripartition of the soul. The remainder of this second extract expounds the requirement for the good monarch to be just, dignified and benevolent, but also capable of inspiring fear when the occasion demands.

Ecphantus, finally, the most voluminously preserved, is represented by four excerpts, two of them apparently constituted from two discontinuous sections, arguably making six in all.<sup>8</sup> The first categorises human beings in general (in implicit partial contrast to the monarch) as intellects potentially capable of appreciating the divine, but impeded by the foreign environment of the physical world into which they have been transplanted. The second excerpt in its first section portrays the earthly monarch as an image of God and thus a being of a superior kind to ordinary humanity, and locates this portrayal within a model of a structured cosmos (supreme divinity, sphere of the fixed stars, planetary spheres, sublunary zone, earth) to which all of its inhabitants are harmoniously adjusted. The monarch is a being of a different order, thanks to his closeness to divine perfection, constantly drawing inspiration and reinforcement of his pure and radiant nature from his privileged contact with the beauty and order of the divinely ordained cosmos. The last part of the extract, perhaps discontinuous with the first, depicts the harmony among the inhabitants of the cosmos at large as a community (*koinônia*) which needs to be reproduced in earthly, human communities, where a benevolent monarch rules with the same friendliness shown by his divine counterpart in the management of the whole. The third excerpt again falls into two sections, of which the first underlines the self-sufficiency of the monarch, and the fact that he exercises the same virtue in ruling others and in ruling himself. The second section turns to the manner in which the monarch elicits the obedience of his subjects: rather than force and compulsion, he works—once more like the supreme divinity—by inspiring imitation of his virtues on the part of all beneath him. The author expresses the wish that even the modified 'force' of persuasion were not needed by rulers, while acknowledging by this very wish that it is. A fourth and final extract, harking back

(5) My aim here is simple summary; for more detailed discussion of aspects of Diotogenes and Ecphantus, see BOUCHET, GANGLOFF, WIDMER and VAN DER MEEREN in this volume, and DELATTE 1942 for close commentary on all three authors.

(6) Stobaeus 4.7.63, p. 270-71 HENSE = 187.8-188.12 THESLEFF; DELATTE 1942, p. 45-46 (text), 56 (tr.), 274-81 (comm.); MACRIS 2018.

(7) Stobaeus 4.7.61-62, p. 263-70 HENSE = 71.16-75.16 THESLEFF; DELATTE 1942, p. 37-45 (text), 52-56 (tr.), 245-73 (comm.); CENTRONE 1994.

(8) Stobaeus 4.6.22, 4.7.64-66, p. 244-45, 271-79 HENSE = 79.1-84.8 THESLEFF; DELATTE 1942, p. 25-37 (text), 47-52 (tr.), 164-244 (comm.); CENTRONE 1989.

to themes of the second and third, derives the monarch's justice, self-control and wisdom from his self-sufficiency and his commitment to community.

These Pythagorean 'kingship treatises' are frustratingly hard to penetrate, on more than one level of analysis. They are infuriatingly resistant to confident treatment not only chronologically, but also doctrinally.<sup>9</sup> Chronologically, it seems very difficult to get beyond a very unambitious set of possible *termini ante quos non*, which are necessarily unable to specify just how long *after* them we ought to be thinking of:

- not before Macedonian kings and Macedonian kingship become an issue for Athenian thinkers, especially in the Socratic circle—but any time after this;
- alternatively, not before the Diadochi, Alexander's Successors, establish monarchy as *the* senior political form in the Greek-speaking world—but any time after this;
- or again, not before a substantial body of philosophical writing *On Kingship*, from major figures, has accumulated to be played off from, i.e. at the earliest not before Xenocrates and Theophrastus—but any time after this.

I am deeply pessimistic about the chances of easing this state of affairs, given what you might even call a determined avoidance on the part of these texts of any kind of chronological specificity, whether overt or inadvertent.<sup>10</sup> If we are going to find any positive element here, then I would suggest that we might find it in the thought that this very avoidance of specificity may be deliberate: these are texts that want to present their contents as timeless and definitive truth, unrestricted by accidents of era or context.

Doctrinally too we seem to come up against a double frustration. On the one hand, although we call these 'Pythagorean' treatises, and they are indeed in the right dialect for Pythagoreans and attributed to individuals with the right kinds of name, it is extraordinarily difficult to isolate overtly, distinctively Pythagorean elements in the thinking they propound.<sup>11</sup> There is an intermittent concern for harmony, on both the cosmic and the political level, which is expressed in musical terms; but this is not done in a way that takes us beyond the kind of harmony-talk available to any thoughtful, literate writer familiar with his (or her) Plato. There are no numbers, no ratios, no invocation of symbolic sayings, no transmigrating souls, no dietary proposals; nothing to remind one with any force at all of either the acousmatic or the mathematic branch of the Pythagorean school. Nor, to shift the point of comparison from archaic to neo-Pythagoreanism, is there any suggestion, when the structure of reality is invoked in the course of legislating for human politics, of a metaphysics of limit and the unlimited or One and the Dyad. A whole series of opportunities for distinctively Pythagoreanizing colour are systematically declined.

And it is not only that these treatises lack distinctively Pythagorean colouring; they are just not very colourful or distinctive in their central ideas at all.<sup>12</sup> With minor differences of elaboration from one to another, they advance a determinedly inoffensive set of ideas centred on an understanding of kingship as comfortably embedded in both the natural and the moral order of things; ideas moreover that seem slickly turned so as face in two complementary directions, both underlining to subjects the unchallengeability of royal status and authority, and underlining to monarchs the importance of protective benevolence towards their subjects as well as the maintenance of justice and law. The treatises are also very keen on the idea, well touted since Plato and (in this context

(9) For a fuller discussion of the scholarship on these issues to date, see GANGLOFF's paper in this volume.

(10) In this connection, I heartily endorse the reservations expressed by ROSKAM in his paper in this volume.

(11) This is again a commonplace in scholarship on these texts, already taken for granted in DELATTE 1942, p. 123-163; see again ROSKAM in this volume, especially his concluding remarks.

(12) ROSKAM in this volume makes the point specifically over points of contact with Plutarch, but, as I shall go onto illustrate, it can be generalised to cover other kingship writings (Dio, Seneca) as well.

especially) Xenophon, that *self*-mastery, continence, is an essential pre-requisite for the legitimate control of others.<sup>13</sup> This is anything but earth-shaking or adventurous stuff—as indeed the comparison with Dio Chrysostom, to which we shall soon turn, will show.

Admittedly, the uniformity between our authors is not complete. As has often been pointed out, Ecphantus does stand out somewhat from the other two in the way he develops *some* parts of the common stock of thoughts:

- the idea that the closeness of the monarch to divinity can be expressed as a superhuman purity of nature, and an ability to inhabit dizzy heights of eminence which ordinary human nature cannot endure;<sup>14</sup>
- the use of the imagery of light, sight and giddiness to articulate this perception; the sense of the monarch as a kind of alien in the human world;<sup>15</sup>
- and the attention to the structure of the cosmos as a background to the status of the monarch among men;<sup>16</sup>
- the curious stress on persuasion as a necessary but regrettable weapon in the monarch's armoury.<sup>17</sup>

All this indeed gives Ecphantus a welcome dash of colour. I sympathise with those who see here the best chance of fixing on a date (even if it is one for Ecphantus alone, as distinct from the other two),<sup>18</sup> and on a doctrinal orientation (something to do with some form or derivative of Platonism). But it is still not much to go on, not much of a basis for confident conclusions.

It is in the face of this frustration that I find myself looking for a change in direction. If satisfying answers to the traditional questions are not forthcoming, maybe the best course is to change the questions. More specifically, if questions about authorship, and about date of origin continue to prove intractable, might we do better by shifting the focus from authors to audiences, and from the dates of origin of texts to their subsequent careers? Wherever exactly they began in time, we at least know that these texts had a circulation history that lasted until the fifth century AD and Stobaeus. And whoever wrote and read them, we have at least some grip on the writings on the same topic along with which they circulated, and with which they were in some sense in competition. Can we therefore make *some* interesting headway by looking at our texts alongside this 'competitor' material? Can we use the comparison to frame some proposals about the kinds of readers our texts may have appealed to, and the kinds of wants on the part of those readers that they may have been calculated to satisfy?

It is as an exercise in this direction—anything but an exhaustive one—that I propose a comparison between our three 'Pythagorean' kingship treatises and the corresponding productions of Dio Chrysostom: Dio's *Orations* I-IV, the so-called 'Kingship Orations', along with LIII, *On Homer*, LVI, *Agamemnon, or On kingship*, and LXII, *On kingship and tyranny*. I do this in full—not to say apprehensive—awareness of the element of artificiality involved. If the idea is to get a fix on what our 'Pythagorean' texts offered a reader that was distinctive, then it of course has to be admitted that comparison with Dio will only ever do part of the job. The reader in (say) the mid-

(13) Diotogenes fr. 2, 72, l. 25-73, l. 9 ed. THESLEFF; Ecphantus fg. 4, 83, l.25-84, l. 8 ed. THESLEFF.; cf. ROSKAM in this volume.

(14) Ecphantus fr. 1, 80, l. 5-21 ed. THESLEFF.

(15) Ecphantus, fr. 1, 80, l. 10-14 ed. THESLEFF.

(16) Ecphantus, fr. 2, 79, l. 9-80, l.4 ed. THESLEFF.

(17) Ecphantus, fr. 3, 83, l. 1-17 ed. THESLEFF.

(18) E.g. BURKERT 1971, SQUILLONI 1991 (as cited by CENTRONE in ROWE and SCHOFIELD 2000, p. 570 n. 34); cf. GANGLOFF in this volume. DELATTE 1942 sees Ecphantus as standing apart from the other two in his 'mystical' ethos (see his conclusions on p. 282-90, summarising the more detailed remarks in his commentary), but not in date.

second century AD who was looking for enlightening reading on kingship had of course a much wider range of choice than just Dio, Diotogenes, Ecphantus and Sthenidas. I shall come back to this point later; for the time being I plead only that an exercise of this kind has to start somewhere.<sup>19</sup>

#### DIO'S KINGSHIP ORATIONS: CONTENTS

Dio's works on kingship make up a familiar set of writings, on which illuminating work has been done, not least by Gangloff.<sup>20</sup> I begin nevertheless with a brief survey.

For practical purposes, we need only think seriously about *Orations* I-IV, the full-dress *Kingship Orations*, since the fragmentary *Orr.* LIII, LVI and LXII simply go back over elements also present in the complete pieces. *Or.* LII revisits the territory of *Or.* II, the Homeric notion of kingship. *Or.* LVI picks up the figure of Agamemnon as paradigmatic monarch, again as in *Or.* II, varying only in its insistence that the good monarch should be prepared to accept a measure of external guidance and advice. *Or.* LXII echoes I, II and IV in contrasting the true monarch and the tyrant. It is therefore on *Orations* I-IV that we should concentrate.

These four pieces, whether or not planned together from the beginning, make a neatly shaped set. Two are in dialogue form, purporting to report on edifying conversations of the young Alexander the Great: with his father Philip on Homer's ideas of kingship in *Or.* II; and with his moral mentor Diogenes in *Or.* IV. The other two orations, I and III, are addresses in Dio's own person to the Emperor: *Or.* I claims its basis in his own personal experience, and in particular in a lesson taught him during his exile; *Or.* III presents itself as a summary of the philosophical view of kingship, as inherited and developed by later thinkers from the foundational figure of Socrates. But shared themes and expressive devices link across from the dialogues to the exhortations and *vice versa*: elaborate moral allegory, and a focus on Heracles as a paradigmatic figure, are in common between *Orr.* I and IV;<sup>21</sup> sustained exegesis of a classic authority—Homer and Socrates—links *Orr.* II and III; Homeric kingship is, moreover, a point of reference in *Orr.* I and IV as well,<sup>22</sup> thus providing what is perhaps the single most obvious linking thread.

As in form, so also in content. Although the emphases shift from oration to oration, a single, consistent set of ideas underlies the whole sequence. The good monarch is distinguished by his combination of

- self-control (mastery of his desires and appetites),<sup>23</sup>
- strong leadership (particularly military leadership),<sup>24</sup>
- support for law and justice,<sup>25</sup>
- philanthropic concern for the well-being of his subjects,<sup>26</sup> and
- a close relationship to the divine.<sup>27</sup>

(19) THESLEFF 1961, p. 72 characterises the treatises as 'on the whole intended as philosophical propaganda for laymen, or as textbooks in philosophy.' The project proposed here aims to refine on the (in itself very broad) notion of a lay public, and to seek diversity of aims and expectations within it.

(20) GANGLOFF 2009, with references to the earlier literature. Among earlier contributions, note particularly DESIDERI 1978, 283-318; MOLES 1983, 1984, 1990.

(21) *Or.* I, 59-84; IV, 32, 70-2 and 79-138.

(22) *Or.* I, 15-20; IV, 38-44.

(23) Self-control: *Or.* I, 13; (II, 34-48,) 75; III, 32-35, 58-59; IV, 24.

(24) Military leadership: *Or.* I, 22, 27-9; II, 31, 54, 69; III, 92.

(25) Justice and law: *Or.* I, 35, 40, 43, 45; II, 54; III, 39, 43-44; IV, 24.

(26) Philanthropy: *Or.* I, 17-20; II, 67-69, 77; III, 39, 55-57; IV, 24, 44-5.

(27) Close relation to divinity: *Or.* I, 15-16, 37-41, 45; II, 72; III, 51-54; IV, 21-23, 39-43.



(I suppose one might think to add that the good monarch is held also to set special value on friendship—*Or.* III, 86-118, cf. I, 20, 22—but this is perhaps not as regularly insisted on through all four orations as the other five features listed.)

Intermediate and intermediary between heaven and earth, the good king in Dio patterns himself on the supreme divinity, Zeus,<sup>28</sup> and is himself a paradigm to his earthly subjects; and he governs and orders his realm and his subjects as Zeus does to the whole physical cosmos.<sup>29</sup> This inspiring picture is expounded both positively, by reference to such *exempla* as Heracles and Agamemnon,<sup>30</sup> and negatively, in the sinister, degenerate figure of the tyrant.<sup>31</sup> In terms of the conventional roster of the virtues, the good king is a model of courage, justice, temperance and piety, even if of these it is courage, justice and temperance that receive the greatest attention, with piety less frequently highlighted.<sup>32</sup> The final canonical virtue, wisdom, is more cautiously treated: the good king has the provident foresight of the military commander and the shepherd of his human flock rather than any spectacular depth of intellectual insight;<sup>33</sup> and his cultivation (*paideia*) is the divine culture of a good moral character rather than the human culture of book-learning.<sup>34</sup>

This is a picture manifestly tailored, in the one direction, to Dio's own philosophical formation as a Stoic with attachments to the personal examples of Socrates and Diogenes, and in the other direction, to his Roman imperial addressee, normally taken to be the military, unintellectual Trajan for all four orations.<sup>35</sup> It is also a picture of kingship which it is remarkably difficult to separate at all far from what we find in our 'Pythagorean' texts—indeed as regards the basic elements, as opposed to the relative emphases with which they are presented, one might even risk the provocation of saying that they are impossible to separate. The idea of the good king as priest, underlined by Diotogenes, is not quite so sharply articulated by Dio; but Dio does nevertheless insist on the primacy of reverence for the divine in his good monarch, even if he does not talk in terms of the institutional status of priest.<sup>36</sup> The Pythagoreans' emphasis on harmonization, of the human community as of the cosmos, is similarly not highlighted by Dio, but it is anything but alien to the parallel he draws between the action of the monarch in the human world and that of Zeus in the cosmos, and his concern for concord (*homonoia*) in human communities in his political orations more generally.<sup>37</sup> Of the special features of Ecphantus's version of things that I distinguished earlier (the purity of the royal nature, the conceit of the blinding light of the domain of royalty, the necessity for persuasion, the monarch as heavenly exile), the first and last represent only slight intensifications of things Dio also says, and the second is matched by an element in Dio's allegorical portrait of personified Kingship in *Or.* I.<sup>38</sup> Dio's Kingship has a radiant countenance, which the wicked can no more bear to contemplate than those with weak eyes can gaze on the sun (*Or.* I,

(28) Zeus: *Or.* I, 12, 37-47; II, 75-78; III, 50; IV, 21-23, 27-32, 38-43.

(29) Cosmic notes: *Or.* I, 37-47; III, 50, 73-85 (the sun).

(30) Heracles: *Or.* I, 59-84; II, 78; IV, 31-32. Agamemnon: II, 65-66 (cf. *Or.* LVI).

(31) Tyrant: *Or.* I, 78-82; III, 40-41, 116-118; IV, 45 (cf. II, 73-76). A contrast also with the decadent, hedonistic 'monarch'—antitype to self-control rather than to justice): II, 37-42.

(32) But see, e.g., *Or.* I, 15-16; III, 51-4 (both places where piety is identified as the first of the good king's attributes).

(33) φρόνησις/φρονεῖν rather than σοφία.

(34) Regal culture: IV, 29-35 (διττή ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία, κτλ.); there is a nice argument to be had here over the ownership of the phrase/idea διττή παιδεία (cf. n. 47 below).

(35) See MOLES 1984, reasserting this traditional view in response to the suggestion by Paolo DESIDERI that the Emperor in question is not Trajan but Nerva (DESIDERI 1978, p. 279).

(36) E.g. *Or.* IV, 51-4.

(37) For the grand theory, see above all, *Or.* XXXVI, the *Borysthenitic Oration*; but note also the remarks on concord in the context of local politics in the cities of Bithynia in *Orr.* XXXVIII-XL.

(38) As noted by DELATTE 1942, p. 196-197.

71). Only Ecphantus's eccentric deprecation of persuasion is impossible to match, since persuasive speaking, though not directly considered by Dio, surely counts as a positive force for him.

DIO'S KINGSHIP ORATIONS: FORM AND COMMUNICATIVE POSSIBILITIES

It is therefore to the communicative possibilities of Dio's discourses, much more than to his content, that we need to look for a really effective contrast between him and our 'Pythagorean' authors. In so doing, for my present purposes at least, we should not be thinking primarily of the very first performances and audiences. I have no desire, fascinating though it may be, to ask about how we might imagine Dio's words working on the tastes and expectations of his ostensible first addressee, the Emperor.<sup>39</sup> (Among other things, we have no absolute guarantee that these speeches ever were actually so delivered.) My concern is rather with how we should imagine these texts communicating with a readership in their subsequent circulation, above all once they were gathered together as a group, whether it is Dio himself we should imagine as publishing them in a collected edition, or a subsequent editor. That is to say, I wish to think as much about communicative effect as about communicative intention, and about collective as much as about individual impact. What was it that we should imagine this set of texts doing to and for a readership interested in reflective thoughts about Kingship? The content of message, as we have seen, is much the same. What about the medium and the mode of engagement? Characterising this medium and mode of engagement positively, for what it is, will at the same time be a negative characterisation of the Pythagorean treatises: by thus having explored what they are not, we can restate what they *are*, and thereby hope to gain a handle on who might have wanted them and appreciated them.

So, what I propose Dio's orations on kingship offer to their readers—this should not sound too surprising, and I can only hope it does not sound too platitudinously obvious—is Culture, Drama and Personalisation. That is to say, rather than presenting their core message about good and bad (legitimate and illegitimate) monarchy in abstract reasoning, in a sequence of closely-argued definitions and propositions, they stage it in a series of didactic moments, in conversation, instruction and persuasion; they anchor it in specific contexts from both the recent and the classic past; and they illustrate it by means of colourful personal examples from mythology, history and (what comes to the same thing) the classics of Greek literature.

The point about historical and mythological exempla is too familiar and too straightforward to need elaborate discussion. The good king in Dio's presentation is not some abstract pattern—he is the good king in the mould of Hercules and Agamemnon, or again (and this perhaps starts to take things in a more interesting direction) of Alexander the Great as he might have been, if he had been able to learn all the lessons available to him, and in the mould of the current Emperor of Rome, if he too will listen to wise advice. Secondary paragons include other Homeric kings, Odysseus, Diomedes and Nestor, and the Spartan Ur-legislator Lycurgus.<sup>40</sup> Among the negative exempla Sardanapallus is supported by Homer's Alcinous and (to a qualified degree) Menelaus, or again by Phalaris and Apollodorus.<sup>41</sup>

Similarly, the connected point about evocation of the classics of Hellenic culture needs no long development. Homer who appears only once, allusively as 'the Ionian poet', in the Pythagorean

(39) A major concern for John MOLES in his work on these speeches: MOLES 1983, 1984, 1990.

(40) Specific good kings/rulers: *Or.* II, 43-5 (Odysseus, Diomedes, Lycurgus), 77 (Cyrus, Deioces, Idanthyrus, Leucon).

(41) Negative royal *exempla*: *Or.* II, 37 (Semiramis, Darius, Xerxes), 39-42 (Alcinous, Menelaus), 76 (Phalaris, Apollodorus); III, 41 (Cleisthenes), 72 (Sardanapallus).

treatises,<sup>42</sup> is a pervasive presence in the *Kingship Orations*, as he is indeed a fixed point in ancient reflective writing about kingship more generally;<sup>43</sup> and along with Homer comes the accumulated tradition of Homeric scholarship (as seen, e.g., in Alexander's observation that Homer's heroes do not eat fish, and his contrast between noisy Trojans and purposefully silent Greeks).<sup>44</sup> Classic poetic authority, of the right sort for rulers, is represented also in Dio by Pindar, Tyrtaeus, Phocylides and Theognis,<sup>45</sup> with Hesiod, Archilochus, Stesichorus, Sappho and Anacreon as contrasting instances of what the monarch need not attend to.<sup>46</sup> In philosophical authority, besides Homer, we also have Socrates (with both Plato and Xenophon lurking behind him, perhaps also Antisthenes<sup>47</sup>), and Diogenes. More broadly, just as the focus on Socrates in *Or. III* allows an evocation of Socratic dialogue generically and collectively, and the allegory in *Or. I* echoes Prodicus's (Xenophon's) myth of the Choice of Heracles,<sup>48</sup> so the staging of two of the orations as conversations of Alexander the Great enables allusions to the orations of Demosthenes as well as to the anecdotal life of Diogenes,<sup>49</sup> framed in *Or. IV* with further layers of Socratic and Platonic allusion (to the *First Alcibiades*).<sup>50</sup>

What I would like to underline more firmly, however, is the element of dramatization, which I see as distinctively important to Dio's version of kingship discourse. On the most obvious level, Dio dramatizes his salutary thinking about the aims and duties of the monarch by staging it in the form of those two conversations, between Alexander and Philip, and between Alexander and Diogenes. It is not perhaps dialogue at its subtlest or most unexpected, but the device does none the less enliven the presentation, breaking the exposition of the several key points up into easily assimilable stages, and giving them the reflective depth that goes with the presence of more than one viewpoint in play. Equally, the dramatic framing allows for the expression of some degree of emotional engagement, encouraging interest in the ideas on the part of an audience or reader by representing them as matters of vivid concern to the great and respected figures who debate them. All of this applies in the first instance to the overtly dialogic *Orr. II* and *IV*, but we should also observe the elements of dialogue embedded within the other two, monologic pieces: within *Or. I*, we have Dio's encounter with the Dorian prophetess and Heracles's with Hermes; and within *Or. III* we find conversations of Socrates with several (unnamed) interlocutors. Dialogue—an interchange of voices, a confrontation of conflicting (or at least diverging) attitudes and beliefs—is central to Dio's presentation.

But I suggest that we should not only be thinking about dramatic presentation within the four orations. We should also think of the external drama of their performance: this time most obviously in the case of the two monologic pieces, *Orr. I* and *III*, delivered by Dio *in propria persona*; but I think we should also bear it in mind in the case of the two dialogues. *Orr. I* and *III* overtly, but then also *II* and *IV* by implication, present themselves as discourses acted out by Dio himself in—apparently—the presence of the master of the Roman world. As we listen, or read, we are invited to conjure up the scene, so as to feel the drama, and appreciate the persuasive skills, that are in play when a master of both political wisdom and didactic *savoir-faire* sets to work on the most powerful of all sole rulers. Whether or not Dio did ever in the first instance deliver these discourses (or

(42) Diotogenes, fr. 2., 75, l. 12 ed. THESLEFF.

(43) As witness, besides Dio, above all Philodemus's treatise *On the Good King According to Homer* (PHerc. 1507, ed. OLIVIERI 1909): MURRAY 1965; 1970, p.; KLOOSTER AND VAN DEN BERG 2018.

(44) Fish: *Or. II*, 47, cf. Plato, *Rep.* 404bc, Athen. *Deipn.* 1.9d, ΣΑ *Iliad*, XVI, 407c, ΣΒ *Odyssey IV*, 368, with HEATH 2000. Noise vs silence: *Or. II*, 53, cf. ΣΤ *Iliad III*, 2, with GRIFFIN 1980, p. 4.

(45) *Or. II*, 5, 28-33.

(46) *Or. II*, 4, 8-14, 28.

(47) BRANCACCI 2000, esp. p. 252-256 (*contra* TRAPP 2000, esp. p. 225-227); cf. MOLES 2005.

(48) Xenophon, *Memorabilia II*, 1, 21-34.

(49) *Or. II*, 18-19.

(50) TRAPP 2000.

anything like them) in the actual presence of the Emperor, once they started to circulate as written texts, whether individually or in a collection, then the reader was positively invited, as part of the process of engagement with the text, to picture him doing so.<sup>51</sup>

This awareness of the ostensible external *mise en scène*, the implied communicative situation, then has a further importance. It sensitises us to the presence, within the drama of the discourses, of a whole series of embedded reflections of the external speaker and his addressee. Hermes guiding and instructing Heracles, the Dorian priestess instructing Dio, Socrates responding to his questioners, and above all Diogenes taking the young Alexander in hand with amused benevolence, are all figures for Dio himself as (in ambition at least) guide and instructor to the Emperor, just as the recipients of the instruction—above all Heracles and Alexander—are flattering as well as admonitory figures for the Emperor. There is a two-way signposting: Dio as imagined performer pointing towards these embedded guides and instructors, and the embedded figures feeding our sense of what it is that Dio wishes to be understood as performing.

The dramatizing, the particularising, the enlivening with exempla from the treasury of Hellenic *paideia*, can thus all be construed as part of a particular persuasive project, bearing on successive generations of readers as much as, or more than, on the supposed initial addressee. By representing himself at work deploying his mastery of *paideia* and of didactic strategy in an attempt to enlighten and guide the most important of all monarchs in good kingship, Dio seeks not to record a set of occasions, but to intrigue and involve a readership in the ideas at stake—to give them a way of relating to these propositions about political roles and structure via their knowledge of and affection for Homer, Alexander, Socrates, (Plato, Xenophon,) and Diogenes, and their appreciation of fine rhetorical craftsmanship.

This analysis in turn allows us to think also about the intended audience that this sort of persuasive strategy implies. The implied readers in this venture emerge—as one would think of as standard for Dio in general—as readers with a relatively high level of cultural competence, who wish to think of themselves, and be thought of, as taking a responsible and reflective interest in ethics and values, on both the personal and the political level. But they are at the same time readers who wish to be able to combine this reflectiveness with a comfortable and comforting return to some gold-standard favourites of the classical curriculum. Indeed, the rehearsal of the right kind of rhetorical skill and the right kind of range of reference is part of what they demand of a text as the price of their attention to it.

#### RETURN TO THE PYTHAGOREANS: EXPOSITORY STYLE

Now, it is from this characterisation of Dio's contribution to kingship literature, and of the target audience we can infer for it, that I propose we should return to our 'Pythagorean' authors.

What then do these treatises now look like, against the background of the suggested comparator? A first impression might well be that, in comparison with Dio's, theirs are decidedly dull pieces of work: flat exposition, without the enlivening of either dramatized presentation or glamorous historical contexts, bare of illustrative exempla, and enjoying only as much colour as is conferred by the wash of (unambitious) Doric dialect that suffuses them.<sup>52</sup> I think that this is not at all an unfair reaction, but what I now wish to propose, in line with something I hinted at earlier, is that

(51) There is a larger point to be made here about how Dio's published collection works as a kind of biography: the travels and teaching of Dio Chrysostom, τὰ εἰς τὸν Πιρρυσάα Δίωνα. Cf. TRAPP 2012, p. 120-125.

(52) On the dialectal colour, cf. n. 58 below.

it is in another way a misguided reaction, if it involves assuming that this dullness is so to speak accidental—that these writers write dully because they are incapable of doing any better. Might we not be onto something significant if we supposed that this is instead as deliberate a strategy in its own way as Dio's was?

Does it not in fact make good and interesting sense to look for intent in this 'flatness', and to find it precisely in the contrast with Dio's more dramatic, ornate and cultivated presentation? May our authors not be positively trying to come across as the people to go to if you want not elegant length, but purposeful concision—the essence of the story, unencumbered by all that entertaining but also potentially obstructive elaboration? I think so; and I think that reinforcement for this suggestion can be found from several sources. We have already noted what looks like a deliberate avoidance of chronological specificity, and speculated that this could help to create a sense of for-all-time definitiveness. But I should now like to suggest that the same impulse can also be seen in the structure and the stylistic texture of our treatises.

One does of course have to be careful in offering stylistic and structural analysis, given that we are dealing with extracts from what we know to have been longer works, without knowing how much longer they originally were. On top of that, another layer of uncertainty is created by the suspicion that some at least of the extracts presented in our manuscripts of Stobaeus as continuous wholes are in fact discontinuous, a series of several excerpts rather than just one large one. Nevertheless, some impressions of style and presentation, and inferences from them, are surely legitimate. And prominent among them, I would say, is precisely a sense of didactic economy and decisiveness, embodied in sentence-structures, connecting particles and patterns of repetition designed to highlight logical sequence and demonstrative cogency.<sup>53</sup> For a characteristic example (or at least, an example that I would want to claim as characteristic) we could do much worse than to examine the opening sentences of the first fragment of Diotogenes.

I set these sentences out with an attempt to highlight typographically the devices of order and word-choice used to convey the impression of decisiveness, clarity and tight cohesion. We can perhaps distinguish three phases of exposition. In the first, the good monarch's intimate connection with justice and law is set out in a proposition, two layers of supporting argument (γάρ) and a *quod erat demonstrandum*, with the asserted logical connections underlined in a pattern of repetitions:

Βασιλεύς κ' εἶη ὁ δικαιοτάτος, δικαιοτάτος δὲ ὁ νομιώτατος.

ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνας οὐδεὶς ἂν εἶη βασιλεύς, ἄνευ δὲ νόμου <οὐ> δικαιοσύνα.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ἐντί, ὁ δὲ γὰρ νόμος αἴτιος τῷ δίκαιῳ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς ἦτοι νόμος ἔμψυχός ἐντι ἢ νόμιμος ἄρχων.

διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν δικαιοτάτος καὶ νομιώτατος. [QED]<sup>54</sup>

(53) This is indeed precisely what Iamblichus in *De vita Pythagorica* 29, 157, praises in the Pythagorean ὑπομήματα collectively: clarity, concision, concentrated, unambiguous confidence, economical but tight logical demonstration (τὰ γραφέντα ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων ὑπομήματα, περὶ πάντων ἔχοντα τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ στρογγύλα μὲν παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ἀρχαιοτρόπου δὲ καὶ παλαιοῦ πίνου διαφερόντως ὥσπερ τινὸς ἀχειραπτήτου χνοῦ προσπνέοντα, μετ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ δαιμονίας ἄκρωσ συλλελογισμένα, ταῖς δὲ ἐννοίαις πλήρη τε καὶ πυκνότατα, ποικίλα τε ἄλλως καὶ πολύτροπα τοῖς εἶδεσι καὶ ταῖς ὕλαις, ἀπέριστα δὲ ἐξαιρέτως ἅμα καὶ ἀνελλιπῆ τῇ φράσει καὶ πραγμάτων ἐναργῶν καὶ ἀναμφιλέκτων ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα μεστὰ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως ἐπιστημονικῆς καὶ πλήρους, τὸ λεγόμενον, συλλογισμοῦ, εἴ τις αἰς προσῆκεν ὁδοῖς κεχρημένος ἐπ' αὐτὰ τοῖ, μὴ παρέργως μὴδὲ παρηκουσμένως ἀφοσιούμενο). I am grateful to Constantinos Macris for underlining this point to me.

(54) 'The monarch would be the man possessed of the highest degree of justice, and the man possessed of the highest degree of justice would be the man who most perfectly upholds the law; for no-one could be king without justice, and there could be no justice without law. For justice resides in law, law is responsible for justice, and the monarch is either 'living law' or 'lawful ruler'. These then are the reasons for which he is most perfectly just and most perfectly upholds the law.'

In the second phase, following a carefully signposted transition from βασιλεύς to ἔργα βασιλέως, we meet an equally careful tripartition, in which each element is expanded in a symmetrical trio of participial clauses, each of which begins with a repetition of one of the terms of the tripartition. This is then rounded off with a repetition of the keynote statement, with minor variation and expansion, once more in the form of a QED:

ἔργα δὲ βασιλέως τρία, τό τε στραταγὲν καὶ δικασπολὲν καὶ θεραπεύειν θεῶς·  
στραταγὲν μὲν ὧν καλῶς δυνασεῖται πολεμὲν καλῶς ἐπισταθείς,  
δικασπολὲν δὲ καὶ διακοῦεν πάντων τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν φύσιν δικαίω καὶ  
νόμῳ καλῶς ἐκμαθῶν, θεραπεύειν δὲ τῶς θεῶς εὐσεβῶς καὶ ὁσίως φύσιν  
θεῷ καὶ ἀρετὰν ἐκλογισάμενος.

ὥστε ἀνάγκα τὸν τέλειον βασιλέα στραταγόν τε ἀγαθὸν ἡμεῖν καὶ δικαστὴν καὶ ιερέα.<sup>55</sup>

In the third element, finally, we find this statement of kingly functions provided with its supporting justification, this time to not two but three levels of γάρ: ‘this is necessarily the case *because* such functions are consistent with kingly superiority and virtue, and that is in turn the case *because* such functions in a king conform to a more general pattern in the attributes of leaders and directors (compare helmsmen, charioteers, doctors); and underlying this truth is the unifying principle that (allegedly) the leaders of complex entities are also (necessarily?) their overseers and creators.’

ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἀκόλουθα καὶ πρέποντά ἐντι βασιλέως ὑπεροχῆ τε καὶ ἀρετῆ.  
κυβερνάτα μὲν γὰρ ἔργων ἐντι τὰν ναῦν σῶζεν, ἀνιόχῳ δὲ τὸ ἄρμα, ἰατρῷ δὲ  
τῶς νοσίουσας, βασιλέως δὲ καὶ τῷ στραταγῷ τῶς ἐν πολέμῳ κινδυνεύουσας.  
ὧ γὰρ ἕκαστος ἀγεμῶν ἐντι συστάματος, τούτῳ καὶ ἐπιστάτας καὶ  
δαμιουργός.<sup>56</sup>

This done, Diotogenes can draw breath and move on (καὶ μάν—a fresh consideration), using the combination of the king’s justice and his role as supervisor of a complex whole, to draw the parallel between his earthly rule and god’s supervision of the cosmos: καὶ μάν το τε δικασπολὲν καὶ διανέμεν τὸ δίκαιον,...

This is a small sample, and it would not be realistic to claim that the degree of organization, and the very obvious striving for an impression of economical cogency and decisiveness, is exactly typical of the whole extent of our three treatises. But I suggest that it is none the less symptomatic of their overall tone and spirit. All three of our authors, the somewhat more colourful and expansive Ecphantus as much as the austerer and conciser Diotogenes and Sthenidas, seek to present their treatment of the topic of kingship as neat and definitive—tightly argued, and covering the essentials with a reassuring authority.

For a further illustration we could look, for instance, at the second of Stobaeus’s extracts from Ecphantus. Ecphantus begins with the confident assertion of a truth about the unity of the cosmos: ‘That the nature of every living creature is harmoniously adjusted to the cosmos and its contents I judge to be manifest from many pieces of evidence’, Ὅτι μὲν ἅπαντος ζῶφ φύσις ποτὶ τε τὸν κόσμον ἄρμονται καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πολλοῖς μοι δοκεῖ τεκμαρίοις φανερόν ἡμεῖν. This is then expanded

(55) ‘The functions of the monarch are three: **military command**, the *dispensation of justice*, and the worship of the gods. He will be able to achieve excellence in **military command** if he knows how to wage war well; he will be able to *dispense justice* and try the suits of all his subjects if he has well and fully learned the nature of justice and law; he will be able to worship the gods in reverence and piety if he has reckoned up god’s nature and virtue. Thus the perfect monarch will necessarily be a **good general** and *judge* and **priest**.’

(56) ‘For these attributes are fitting accompaniment to the *monarch’s* pre-eminence and virtue. For it is the function of the *helmsman* to preserve his ship, of the *charioteer* to preserve his chariot, of the *doctor* to preserve his patient, and of the *monarch and military commander* to preserve those imperilled in war. For each is both the supervisor and the creator of the complex whole of which he is the leader.’

with a set of explanatory and supporting considerations (συμπνείουσα γάρ ..., παρὸ καί), structured on the antithesis between whole (τῷ παντὸς περιγεομένῳ) and parts (ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσιν), which in turn leads to an enumeration of the hierarchy of authority in the zones of the cosmos (ἐν μὲν τῷ θείῳ ... φύσει ..., ἐν δὲ τῇ χώρᾳ τὰς σελάνας ..., ἐν δὲ τῇ γᾶ ...). Further on, in what may be a separate section within Stobaeus's excerpt, we find a second confident assertion of the truth of the author's declarations: σκοπέοντι δ' ἀρχᾶθεν ἀλάθεια λόγος, 'If one considers the issue from first principles, this account is the truth: ...' This is followed by some twenty lines in which Ecphantus lays down the law about κοινωμία, replete with expressions of (logical) necessity (συνεστάναι γὰρ χωρὶς φιλίας καὶ κοινωνίας ἀμάχανον), clusters of γάρ (ἐλάττων γάρ ... οὐ γὰρ δέονται ... τέλειοι γάρ ...), and didactic signposting (σκοποῖη δ' ἄν τις ταῦτα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συμπολιτευομένων).

#### RETURN TO THE PYTHAGOREANS: READERSHIP

The characteristics we have been reviewing seem to me to add up not just to a more concise and direct exposition of right thinking about kingship, but also to a more naked and direct assertion of didactic authority than Dio's. Dio does indeed claim authority, but he does so in a more urbane and indirect manner, by representing himself in action advising another, not directly instructing the reader, and by sowing his speeches with representations of other, comparable authority figures, each doing their own instructive work. We have converted that understanding of Dio into a portrait of the target audience for the written circulation of his works. What happens when we try to do the same for our Pythagoreans?

The obvious suggestion is that we could think of theirs as texts aimed at, and likely to be sought out by, readers impatient (at a particular moment, or constitutionally) of elaboration and indirectness: readers who desire (perhaps always, perhaps only in certain passing moods) not elegant and cultivated packaging that will remind them pleasantly of whole swathes of their *paideia*, but the essential message, the heart of the matter set out with only the necessary core of supporting argumentation. These texts, that is to say, presuppose the existence of fancier products, and deliberately define themselves and go looking for a readership in contradistinction to them.

Such a reading would seem to converge nicely with what we think we know about the pseudo-Pythagorean texts in general, beyond just the kingship writings. A large part of the point of choosing cover-names that evoke the early philosophers is precisely the promise thus offered of getting back to the originators, the pure early sources of essential ideas that were subsequently chewed over and over-elaborated by the supposed greats of later philosophical tradition. Why submit yourself to the *Timaeus*, when you can read the cosmological text that Plato himself was working from? For the author, there is the substantial benefit of the power of a great name to attract readers. For the reader, there is the double benefit of saving time and intellectual effort (pseudonymous texts are just *simpler*), while at the same time being able to claim the credit for seeking out the oldest and best authority.<sup>57</sup>

Our hypothetical readers of Diotogenes, Ecphantus and Sthenidas, then, want it plain and they want it straight, without having to involve themselves either in Dio's mannered indirectness, or for that matter in the greater length and intellectual complexity of, say, a Theophrastus or a Cleanthes. But we should not exaggerate the degree to which they are seeking simplicity at all costs. We have at least to remember that there is at least one 'learned' feature to our texts, that these readers seem to have been happy to take on: the dialect. It is not, to be sure, a difficult Doric, more like a

(57) Cf. THESLEFF 1961, p. 71-77, and 1972, esp. p. 84-87; DILLON 1996, p. 117-119; KAHN 2001, p. 72-79.

conventionalised Doric that conveys the right flavour in its freedom with alphas and omegas, but without setting a very steep linguistic challenge.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless, it is an educated feature, requiring a degree of cultivation to cope with it smoothly. We might perhaps say it is a price our hypothetical readers are ready to pay, as a condition of access to old wisdom, and a price that tells us at least a little more about their social status.

#### CLOSING REMARKS

As I observed earlier, the relatively simple comparison of the Pythagorean kingship texts with Dio Chrysostom's can only have a limited, suggestive value. I have gestured only very briefly towards a larger picture in proposing that we should see these texts as in some sense in competition for readers not only with Dio, but also with the accumulated earlier literature of a more scholastic philosophical stamp: Theophrastus, Cleanthes, Epicurus, Persaeus, Philodemus, etc. Another player, of whom I have said nothing is Plutarch, who offers in himself a whole range of styles of engagement with the topic of monarchy, from the case-studies of monarchs in the *Parallel Lives* to the persuasive (or dissuasive) vehemence of the *Ad principem ineruditum*, via the *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*.<sup>59</sup> And there is Philo Judaeus, who is already well entwined with our texts in the scholarly literature.<sup>60</sup> Can we also adapt our story so as to suggest how readers may have weighed the attractiveness of the Pythagoreans against this larger body of material as well? To be convincing, an analysis of the kind I have proposed would have to take on all this and more. But I would also take some persuading that this is not at least an interesting angle of approach.

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(58) On the artificial and simplified nature of Pythagorean Doric, see DELATTE 1942, p. 85-87, THESLEFF 1961, p. 85-96, ABBENES 1996, p. 11-15, WILLI 2012, p. 283. Even this, however, was thought by Porphyry (*Vita Pythagorae* 53) to damage the texts' accessibility to potential readers.

(59) ROSKAM in this volume illuminatingly compares this range of Plutarchan material with the Pythagorean treatises in terms of contents; my suggestion is that comparison in terms of presentation, and speculation on the audience demands and expectations it implies, would be profitable as well.

(60) GOODENOUGH 1928, 1932; more recently, MORE 2012.



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