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Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations

Abstract : This paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying the two properties of justifiability and maximality and define stable alternatives as unique stationary points of the expectation function of some agent. We characterize stable alternatives in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states that can be supported as farsightedly stable.
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Contributor : Caroline Bauer <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, October 21, 2020 - 9:52:49 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, February 3, 2021 - 10:10:01 PM

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Francis Bloch, Anne van den Nouweland. Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2020, 121, pp.32-54. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.001⟩. ⟨halshs-02973406⟩



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