, 45' for a Speaker, Silence: Lectures and Writings by John Cage, pp.146-193, 1961.

J. Cage and D. Charles, For the Birds, p.150, 1981.

R. Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, pp.234-269, 2002.

, The use of [my music] is what's important. ? That's what Wittgenstein said about anything. He said the meaning of something was its use, vol.226, pp.153-54

M. Walter-benn, Blind Time (Drawing with Anscombe, REAL, vol.25, pp.49-60, 2019.

M. Interview and . Oliver, Cage Talk: Dialogues with and about John Cage, p.205, 2006.

, On "chance as a method" used intentionally by the artist, see Sarah Troche, Le Hasard comme méthode: Figures de l'aléa dans l, pp.33-35, 2015.

, Composition as Process: Indeterminacy, pp.35-40

, What makes the thing art is the artist's claim that it's art, itself an invisible gesture, Walter Benn Michaels writes, 2016.

, It is a common contradiction in postmodern thinking to defend a monism of mind and body, while simultaneously banishing the mind (alongside meaning) and so focusing on the body that the dualism necessarily returns" ("Is the Cheese Meaningless? The Distension of Dialectics in Jameson's The Antinomies of Realism, I've made this point in the context of other discussions on nonsite.org, in regards to Michael Fried's critique of literalism, 2014.

S. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, pp.226-253, 2002.

&. Michaels, . Anscombe, D. Winogrand, and M. ,

. Michaels, Blind Time (Drawing with Anscombe

. Michaels, When I Raise My Arm: Michael Fried's Theory of Action, pp.33-47, 2018.

T. Cronan, L. Corbusier, and M. Art, The Anscombian response to this worry is that it's a mistake to break the act down into component parts, a mistake to think of the intention as something that's outside of the physical act, either as its cause or as a mental state existing either prior to or alongside it, 2020.

. Cronan, Le Corbusier, Matisse, and the Meaning of Conceptual Art

M. Walter-benn, The Beauty of a Social Problem: Photography, Autonomy, p.16, 2015.

. Michaels, The Beauty of a Social Problem, vol.54

J. Nattiez, Introduction, p.20, 1991.

, The unintentionally ironic and slightly comic quality mentioned earlier can be seen in Cage's extramusical and extratextual explanations, in which he essentially says "I chose this material, I subjected it to these aleatory procedures, I did this and then this and this to it? and I allowed the material to act on its own

J. Cage, Empty Words, vol.11, p.65, 1974.

M. Perloff, Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage, p.338, 1981.

. Michaels-writes and A. Following, All actions are open to accident; indeed, it's only because you can fail to do what you meant to do that you can succeed in doing what you meant to do. ? The acts of an agent who is open to accident are just as intentional as the acts of one who isn't. ? The act of drawing with your eyes shut is not somehow less intentional than the act of drawing with your eyes open-they're just two different acts

, In this sense the hundreds of thousands of undeveloped negatives that Garry Winogrand left at his death should best be understood as unfinished works

S. Michaels, There's a reason why Anscombe put 'Signing, signaling' on a list of 'happening[s]' that 'can only be voluntary or intentional, I Do What Happens: Anscombe and Winogrand, 2016.

, Gallimard, 1976), vol.2, p.695

R. Caillois, . Esthétique-généralisée-;-dominic-mciver, and . Lopes, In this discussion I have generally avoided the extremely vague term "chance, Critical Inquiry, vol.38, issue.4, pp.855-69, 1962.

, Carol Armstrong writes that in photography "the intended and the unintended are wrapped around each other in a Gordian knot, Critical Inquiry, vol.38, issue.4, pp.705-731, 2012.

, Stanley Cavell in reference to modernism; Fried describes how a work's configuration, depicted shapes, and other intentional elements "acknowledge" its literal and material conditions, contingencies and unintentional elements, One way of understanding this imbrication of agency and contingency may be found in the concept of acknowledgment, pp.77-99, 1998.